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Korea - Foreign policy - Relations with Australia

RECORD

EAST ASIA SUB-SECTION FILE No. ^{3/27/10/1} ~~27/1~~ - Part 1

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. ^{Class 28-2-54}

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
RETURN TO PACIFIC SECTION

SECRET. R.P.

SUBJECT.

KOREA

Foreign Policy

Relations with Australia

Sawer 1910

BASEMENT

PREVIOUS FILE:

NEXT FILE:

Part 2

RELATED PAPERS.

FILE No.

SUBJECT.

BASEMENT

SECRET

FILE NO. _____

SUBJECT:

RECORD OF TRANSFER OF FILE

NAME	DATE RECEIVED	NAME	DATE RECEIVED	NAME	DATE RECEIVED

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.

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From.....

Date.....

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Date.....

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~~Mr. Plimsoll~~
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Mr McNICAL

OUTWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 254.

1204

26:2:1954.

TO :- MARSHALL.

Mr Hodson

FROM :- PLIMSOLL.

YOUR MESSAGE 371.

I THINK THE BEST THING WOULD BE FOR THE MINISTER TO WRITE A PERSONAL LETTER TO MR. CAHILL, THE PREMIER OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND ENCLOSE THE \$10 EXPLAINING ITS SOURCE. MR. CASEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT WANT HIMSELF TO BE PUT INTO THE POSITION-- POSITION OF HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SEVERAL FUNDS AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE THAT ARE BEING ORGANISED IN NEW SOUTH WALES JUST NOW.

MESSAGE NUMBER ENDS.

1205 MB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO MINS 371 11.2 26/2/54

TO: MR. PLIMSOLL, EXTERNAL, CANBERRA

FROM: MARSHALL, MINS OFFICE, MELBOURNE

KING, THE CONSUL GENERAL OF KOREA HAS SENT THE MINISTER
£10 AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CYCLONE SUFFERERS IN NORTHERN
N S W AND QUEENSLAND. MINISTER IS THANKING HIM. COULD YOU ADVISE
THE BEST MEANS OF DISPOSING OF THE £10 PLEASE.
MESSAGE ENDS

MARSHALL

PLIMSOLL

Your Message 371.

I think the best thing would be for the Minister to write a personal letter to Mr. Cahill, the Premier of N.S.W. and enclose the £10 explaining its source. Mr. Casey probably would not want himself to be put into the position of having to choose between several funds and other forms of assistance that are being organised in N.S.W. just now.

~~Mr. Hudson~~
Korea General
file 504/1

HH
26/2

G.R.

J. Plimsoll
J. Plimsoll.

26.2.54.

CABLEGRAM.

MQ:MK

0.759

Sent: 26th January, 1954.
1750

TO:

Australian Delegation to U.N.C.U.R.K.,
P U S A N.

1. UNCLASSIFIED.

Glad if you would convey following message from
Mr. Casey to Pyun, thanking him for Australia Day Message.

"Thank you for your kind message which is greatly
appreciated."

(Cost 6/2)
MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

27th January, 1954.

SEC A/Ss PAC EA PI C & P ADMIN

504/1

CONFIDENTIAL

12th November, 1953.


504/1
Memo No..... 662.

MEMORANDUM for:

The External Affairs Officer,
LONDON.

Letter from R.O.K. Foreign Minister to Australian
Minister for External Affairs

Further to our memorandum No. 586 of 24th
September, attached for your background information is
a copy of a further letter from Mr. Pyun to Mr. Casey.


(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

504/1

Memo No. 142


12th November, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Representative on UNCURK,
Pusan. KOREA.

Letter from R.O.K. Foreign Minister to Australian
Minister for External Affairs

Further to our memorandum No. 124 of 23rd
September, attached for your background information is
a copy of a further letter from Mr. Pyun to Mr. Casey.


(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.

Copy sent to Washington. 779

504/1

Memo No. 789

11th November, 1953.


MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Correspondence between R.O.K. Foreign Minister and the
Australian Minister for External Affairs

Attached for your background information is a
copy of a further letter from Mr. Pyun to Mr. Casey.

2. As we are not aware if you have copies of the
earlier correspondence we also attach copies of Mr. Pyun's
letter of 20th July and Mr. Casey's of 8th September.


(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.

479/10/8

11th November, 1953.

Memo No. 977.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.

Compensation for former P.O.W.'s under Article 16 of
the Peace Treaty

You will have received a copy of Washington's telegram No. 1189 of 10th November. This stated that the State Department on 5th November instructed the United States Ambassador in Tokyo to lend diplomatic support to the Red Cross Representatives' request to the Japanese Government for a lump sum payment.

2. We should be glad of any information you can obtain about the results of this approach to the Japanese.


(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

~~W. Plimrod~~
W. Shaw
W. Plimrod
W. Plimrod
see file

Seen
Plimrod
5/11/53

Mr McNeill
Would you please see
copies go to Bureau etc?
Plimrod
5/11/53

BRANCH

22nd Dec. 1953.

W

File
504/1

With
Mr. R. G. Casey's
Compliments.

He He!
[Signature]

A. S. Watt, Esq., C.B.E.,
Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES,
TREASURY GARDENS,
MELBOURNE. C.2.

Note: So far as we know N.Y. & Washington
have not a copy of Pyun's letter.

(COPY)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mission to the United Nations

New York, October 6, 1953.

My dear Mr. Minister :

Though I acknowledged in person the receipt of your good letter of September 8 after one of the U.N. meetings some time ago, and though you generously and readily agreed to my suggestion that we need not exchange any more notes on the same subject, the recurring thought that a written explanation from me might be, after all, more satisfactory, has at last decided me to write this letter.

I sincerely regret that my letter of July 28 appeared as a contrast to the warm friendliness that has marked the relation between our two governments and peoples. Nothing could be further from the intention of me or of my Government to deliberately create an unfortunate impression of that kind. By the time your first letter came to hand, we had received several letters from European governments, including that of the President of the United Nations General Assembly, which were all of a protesting nature but of varying intensity. Pressed for time, an identical note was drawn up and sent to the various governments awaiting a reply from our government. A more circumspect attention paid to your letter and a more individualized reply would have obviated the unpleasantness you underwent in reading my generalized answer, for which I now offer my most sincere apologies.

Allow me, however, to give you a short explanation in connection with your reference to General Mark Clark's words in his letter to my President on June 28th. In advance of the release of the prisoners-of-war, the President had told General Clark that he would let him know whenever he would withdraw the Republic of Korea forces from the United Nations Command. Apparently, General Clark confused the release of the prisoners-of-war with the unilateral action embodying the withdrawal of the Korean forces from the United Nations Command. As a matter of fact, these two things were different.

In the first place, what the President committed to in his letter to General MacArthur in 1950 was to assign the Republic of Korea land, sea and air forces to the United Nations Command for military activities in the battlefield. Matters properly belonging to the administration of the Korean Government in the rear areas were never transferred. Those anti-Communist Korean prisoners-of-war had long been a subject for release between the United Nations Command and my Government, whom my Government was in the habit of regarding as our own loyal citizens, their loyalty established by their very wish and determination to remain in the Republic of Korea instead of returning to the Communists. As a matter of fact, they were in the custody of the Korean guards under the Provost Marshal who was not in any manner under the United Nations Command.

File
—

In fact, a letter from President Rhee explaining these differentiating points involved in the release of the prisoners-of-war was sent to General Clark, but unfortunately, before it reached the General, his letter you referred to in your letter was released. Had that President's letter got to his hand early enough, his protesting letter would not have been published, or would have put on a different tone.

In conclusion, let me assure you, Mr. Minister, that nothing, not excepting my own epistolary mistake, can stand between our two Governments which are bound up in a fast comradeship testified by great Australian love and sacrifice for the Korean cause and dedicated to our common interests and ideals, and whose relationships have been characterized by unusual warmth and sympathy and cooperation. Let me also remind you that whenever my President mentions Australia and Australians, he speaks with feelings as about one most dependable ally or great congenial personal friends.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

Y. T. Pyun
Foreign Minister

His Excellency R. G. Casey
Minister for External Affairs
Commonwealth of Australia
c/o Australian Delegation to the United Nations
New York, New York.

COPY

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mission to the United Nations New York, October 6, 1953

My dear Mr. Minister:

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co-operation. Let me also remind you that whenever my President mentions Australia and Australians, he speaks with feelings as about one most dependable ally or great congenial personal friends.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Y. T. Pyun
Foreign Minister

His Excellency R.G. Casey
Minister for External Affairs
Commonwealth of Australia
c/o Australian Delegation to the United Nations
New York, New York

504/1
(COPY) File

Copies for Pusan
N.Y.
& Washington
and CCC
6/11

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mission to the United Nations

New York, October 6, 1953.

My dear Mr. Minister :

Though I acknowledged in person the receipt of your good letter of September 8 after one of the U.N. meetings some time ago, and though you generously and readily agreed to my suggestion that we need not exchange any more notes on the same subject, the recurring thought that a written explanation from me might be, after all, more satisfactory, has at last decided me to write this letter.

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Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

Y. T. Pyun
Foreign Minister

His Excellency R. G. Casey
Minister for External Affairs
Commonwealth of Australia
c/o Australian Delegation to the United Nations
New York, New York.

Australian Embassy,

TOKYO

REPEATED TO: Australian Representative on UNCURK, PUSAN, KOREA

RESTRICTED.

For Walker from Watt.

Your telegram No. 484.

Your visit to Korea with General Wells is approved. Assume that any contacts you make with Korean Government officials will be in association with Critchley.

504/1

8/10
Mr. Plussell
Mored 4 p.m.
& despatched
✓

JP.YJL

7th October, 1953.

E.A.
P.M's

Ben Watt
a/w.

CABLEGRAM.**RESTRICTED.**

DBB:HP

I.13295

FROM:

Dated: 6th October, 1953.

0700

Rec'd: 6th October, 1953.
1450Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.484. RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

For the Secretary from Walker.

General Wells invited me to accompany him on a visit to Korea from 26th October to 30th October. The Commonwealth Division has had recent visitors and no other visitors are scheduled in the near future. The Commander-in-Chief asked me to inform you that he considers my visit to the Division would be useful at this time.

2. I should like to take this opportunity of getting first hand impression of conditions in Korea and meeting Korean and United States officials which in addition to other advantages would undoubtedly facilitate any future consultations in Tokyo with the United Nations Command and other diplomatic missions. Korean Minister in Tokyo also is anxious for me to meet members of the Korean Government and presumably to inform me on Korean attitude towards the Japanese-Korean relations.

3. As arrangements would have to be made well in advance I should appreciate early reply.

A/Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

6th October, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN EA PI
G*Quaterly Tokyo**Repeated to UNCURK
Restricted**For Walker from Watt
Your cablegram No 484**Your visit to Korea with General Wells is
approved, ~~but~~ ^{you should} any contacts with Korean government
officials should be made in association with
Critchley.*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO MIN 1047

4.11.53

TO NCNICOL

FROM MARSHALL

MINISTER HAS APPROVED LETTER AND CABLE RE GIFT TREES FROM
RHEE. YOUR FILE 504/1/9. LETTER BEING DONE HERE. YOU CAN SEND OFF

CABLE.

MESSAGE ENS

FOR THE MINISTER.

President Rhee has offered through you to the Australian Government a gift of 50 maple trees.

Attached herewith are (a) a draft letter from you to President Rhee accepting the trees, and (b) a draft cable to the Australian Representative on UNCURK indicating your acceptance of the gift and passing on information about the formalities involved in getting the trees into Australia.

Mhewi

This has been done

*Ladhl
5/4/53*

East Asia Section.
DWMcN. YJL
2nd November, 1953.

File 50411

D R A F T.

Dear President Rhee,

It is with great pleasure that I accept on behalf of the Australian Government and people your generous gift of maple trees. These trees planted in Australian soil will be a constant reminder of the close ties which exist between your people and mine. They will also be ~~a~~ living memorial to the Australian forces who fought alongside your gallant people in the recent conflict.

Please accept the sincere gratitude of the Australian Government for your gracious act and the cordial sentiments which prompted it.

With warmest personal greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

(R.G. CASEY)



DEPARTMENT OF
SECRET: AFFAIRS
 -1 OCT 1953
 504/1
 CANBERRA.

Delegation
 AUSTRALIAN ~~EMBASSY~~
 UNCURK
~~TOKYO~~
 Pusan, Korea

25 September 1953

Memorandum No. 310

The Secretary
 Department of External Affairs
 CANBERRA A.C.T.

LETTER TO ROK FOREIGN MINISTER

At a private meeting yesterday with President Rhee and Acting Foreign Minister Chou, the former referred to the Minister's letter (your memorandum No. 121 of 17 September) and expressed regret that the letter from the Foreign Minister to which it replied had been in such brusque terms. He explained that the ROK Foreign Minister's letter was based on letters which had been sent in reply to strongly worded protests from the British Prime Minister and others. He said that Mr. Casey's more friendly letter had not justified such a reply and he was very sorry that it had been sent. On receipt of Mr. Casey's letter, he had written to Mr. Pyun in Washington asking him to explain the position.

President Rhee considered that the trouble had been caused by General Clark and the publication of the General's letter of protest. On a number of occasions, he had pressed the United Nations Command to release the anti-communist North Koreans as was only proper and had suggested that if it would save embarrassment to General Clark he could release them himself. The Commander-in-Chief had immediately expressed concern and had asked him not to do this. Referring to his promise to General Clark, he said that this had been given in very general terms in the course of friendly conversations when he had expressed his strong opposition to an armistice. He had eventually told General Clark that he would not withdraw his troops from the control of the United Nations Command without informing the General, but he had had in mind only the front-line troops and did not consider that this promise applied to the guards under General Won Yong Dok in the rear area.

Handwritten initials/signature

Handwritten signature: T. K. Critchley

T. K. Critchley
 Australian Representative

Mr Plimsole has sent a copy to the Minister.

DWH

Handwritten notes:
 Handover base
 Mr Lewis call
 File file

P

CONFIDENTIAL

504/1

Memo No.....

586

24th September, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR:


External Affairs Officer,

LONDON.

KOREA

We are attaching for your information copies of (a) a letter from Mr. Pyun, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, to the Minister for External Affairs dated 20th July, 1953, and (b) the Minister's letter in reply. (The text of the communication referred to in the first paragraph of Mr. Pyun's letter was contained in our telegram No. 2155 to you of 23rd June).

2. It is suggested that you might show these two letters to your British colleagues.



(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.

FILE COPY

DWMcN:LJB

504/1

CONFIDENTIAL

23rd September, 1953

Memo. No. 124


MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Australian Representative on UNCURK,
Pusan, KOREA.

Letter to R.O.K. Foreign Minister

Reference is made to our memorandum No. 121 of 11th September enclosing the text of a draft letter from the Minister of External Affairs to the Korean Foreign Minister, Mr. Pyun.

2. We have now been advised that the Minister has approved our draft letter (with the deletion of the word "strong" before "exception" in the early part of the letter) and passed it to Mr. Pyun in New York.


(D. W. McNicol)
for Secretary



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

8th September, 1953.

With
Mr. R. G. Casey's
Compliments.

J. Plimsoll Esq.,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

*Seen
J. Plimsoll
18/9/53*

*many thanks. Good Dept
-with plenty of teeth!*

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES,
TREASURY GARDENS,
MELBOURNE. C.2.

[Handwritten signature]

W. H. Harrison

Written in Washington. D.C.

18/9

See

HW

8th September, 1953.

My dear Minister,

I have to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of 20th July, which was received by me by ordinary post on 20th August. In it you ask me for an explanation of the statement that President Rhee had violated some undertaking in releasing certain Korean prisoners of war in June 1953.

I must, at the outset, take exception to your statement that my message to President Rhee, which, in the circumstances was couched in the most moderate terms, was a "serious breach of international respect". The tone of your letter is in marked contrast with the friendly attitude to Australia which President Rhee has always shown, and I cannot believe it represents the approach of a Government for whose succour the Australian people have from the very beginning of the conflict made great sacrifices and for whose people Australians have the most friendly feelings.

The action of your Government in releasing Korean prisoners of war was regarded in Australia as contrary to the agreement which President Rhee entered into with General MacArthur on 15th July, 1950. In his letter to General MacArthur, President Rhee stated that he was "happy to assign.....command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities". In the face of this statement I would believe that the Republic of Korea Provost Marshal, as a military officer, was under the command authority of the United Nations Command. Moreover I would draw your attention to General Mark Clark's own words in his letter to your President of 20th June that there was a "unilateral abrogation of" the President's "personal commitment".

There is a further and equally important point. In time of war when Governments are allied in a common cause, the authority normally vested in a sovereign nation, to which you refer, has frequently to be exercised in a way that pays very great regard to the views of its partners in the struggle. In this instance your allies were of the opinion that the agreement reached at Pan Mun Jom about prisoners of war should have been adhered to, and that your Government's action in releasing the prisoners could have had the most far reaching ill effect on the common cause for which we had all made such great sacrifices.

You also state that no Government condemned the Communists for conscripting into their forces soldiers of the Republic of Korea whom they had captured. Australian representatives have frequently condemned this in public speeches. As far as the United Nations as a whole is concerned, I need only refer to the statement to the Communists on 2nd January, 1952, made by Rear-Admiral Libby, U.S.N., on behalf of the Governments with forces in Korea, that the wholesale incorporation of prisoners of war released at the front into the

North Korean army was "contrary to the rules of warfare and a violation of the rights of the men concerned."

I regret that your letter has required me to reopen these questions. It is my sincere hope that in future your Government, by taking into account the views of her proven friends and allies, will allow continued fruitful co-operation between us. The making of peace often presents difficulties almost as great as in the waging of war. If we are united I am sure we can reach a just peace- if we are divided, the only result will be aid and comfort to the enemies of freedom.

With my respect and regards.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

(R. G. Casey)

His Excellency,
The Hon. Y.T. Pyun,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Government of the Republic of Korea,
Embassy of Korea,
WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

FOR ECKERSLEY

Glad of advice whether Minister signed and
forwarded letter to Pym in terms drafted.

Pym

504/1

17th September, 1953.

E. A.

P. M. 's.



50411
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In reply quote No.

10th September, 1953.

Minute to: D. W. McNicol Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra. A.C.T.

With reference to the draft letter to Mr. Pyun, the ROK Foreign Minister, the Minister considered this draft two or three days ago, revised it very slightly (deleted the word "strong" in reference to "exception"). The letter was signed and despatched to Mr. Pyun this week.

A copy of this letter, as sent, has been forwarded to Mr. Plimsoll and is probably in this present bag. Sir Percy Spender was also given a copy of the correspondence.

H. Marshall
H. Marshall
Private Secretary

Please draft memo to
Britches following our
memo of 18/9/53.

done G.C.
18/9.

CABLEGRAM.

MK:CG

0.10823.

Dated: 17th September, 1953.
1610.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.



297. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Eckersley.

Reference R.O.K. Foreign Minister's letter
of 20th July.

Glad of advice whether Minister sent
draft letter to Pyun.

E.A. (504/1)
P.M'S.

18th September, 1953.

File.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN PAC EA@ PI

504/1

Memo No. 121.....

17th September, 1953.


MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Representative on UNCURK,
Pusan, KOREA.

Letter to R.O.K. Foreign Minister

Referring to our memorandum No. 114 dated 4th September, 1953, I attach for your information a copy of the draft reply to the R.O.K. Foreign Minister which was forwarded to Washington for the Minister's signature.

For the present this should be treated as being for your own information only as it is not yet known whether the Minister has approved and sent off the letter as drafted.


(D.W. McNicol)
for Secretary.

504/1
Mr Handmer left
Mr Lewis cc

rv/8

~~Mr. Phinroll~~

Pls file &
watch for reply
from N. York saying
minute signed letter.

I think this needs a very
careful reply

J.W.H.P.
10/9/53

N ↓

East-Asia Section

Pls. refer to our message
to Di. Rhee
and see what we said - I think
we mentioned "violation of the
armistice agreement." What were
the facts? Was there an agreement
or was it simply that a draft on
prisoners had been agreed in principle?
Was South Korea a party to any such
draft? If not - pls suggest

Lines upon which we
should reply to ROK.

WG 24/8.

→ MR WATT, would you please have
this looked at carefully. *WAL 20*
22/8 53
See
AW

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July 20, 1953

Dear Sir:

Your communication to the President dated 24 June 1953 has been referred to me.

Thus far we have not discovered what this Government has done to "shock" the Governments of our friendly nations nor do we know what our President did to cause him to be publicly denounced as if he had committed some "treacherous violation." This accusation is a serious breach of international respect and a serious threat to the friendly feelings entertained by our people toward the Governments allied with us in our common war against aggression.

This communication is to be considered as an official request for the explanation of your Government of the grounds for this charge.

The release by this Government of the Korean nationals who were held under the command of our own troops in our own prison stockades was done with the full authority vested in a sovereign nation. It was not done in violation of any pledge or promise, for none had been asked or given. It was not done in violation of the agreement by which command of the Korean armed forces was vested temporarily, and for the purposes of waging the common war, in the Unified Command, for the troops guarding the prisoners were specifically under the command of the Republic of Korea Provost Marshall, who, in turn, is responsible to the Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense. So far as we are able to determine, our release of the anti-communist Korean national prisoners was no violation of any agreement or understanding or commitment of this Government.

The only basis for the heavy charges that have been made against this Government is that the release was a breach of promise, which is not the case. It was, of course, unfavorably received by the communist aggressors. But, surely it cannot be conceived that we have made any pledges to them! This Government recalls that the communist agents at Panmunjom officially

informed the representatives of the Unified Command that they had "released" 53,000 captured soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army, and that they then proceeded to conscript them into their own labor battalions and armed forces. This Government does not recall that any of the Allied Governments then charged the communist enemy with being a "treacherous violator" or even expressed "shock" at what was truly a shocking action.

It is not the purpose of my Government to represent that there is any true parallel between the release and immediate conscription of the loyal Korean troops by the communists, on the prior occasion, and the release by this Government of its own anti-communist prisoners. The two instances are basically dissimilar. The communist action constituted a basely treacherous violation of the Geneva Convention, of the rights of nations, and of the individual rights of the captured soldiers. The action by our Government, on the contrary, was in conformity with all the rules of international conduct and, indeed, accorded with the expressed sentiment of our Allies and even of our enemies that the anti-communist prisoners should not be subjected to any force to effect their submission to communist authority.


The United Nations started by fighting against communism and punishing the communist aggressors, for which humanity would remain everlastingly indebted to the United Nations but for the ignoble pains it seems to take now to appease the aggressors even by going so far as to allow them to come amongst us and indoctrinate our own kith and kin who have chosen free ways of life into communists. We committed all our forces to the United Nations Command in order to liberate our brethren in the north from the tyranny of communism, not to communize our own loyal citizens clinging to us, begging us not to send them away to the communists. We sincerely believe that the release of the anti-communist prisoners was an act quite compatible with our original common objective, to which this Government has been and means to continue to be steadfastly faithful.

This Government has done nothing all other free governments would not have done under similar circumstances. From our common belief in values of civilization, in free institutions and in human decency and dignity, this Government expected its sister governments, at least, to feel mute commiseration for its merciless situation though they could not (for reasons of calculated expediency but misguided and misleading) openly advocate the only humanitarian course it had been compelled to take. This Government, therefore, cannot help showing a surprise on its part at finding some of its friendly Governments so loudly shocked at an act this Government could not have possibly avoided, unless it had decided to turn its back on all the principles, for which it had paid so dearly in terms of human life and property as no other nation has ever paid.

In the interests of the continuing friendly relations between this Government and yours, which we value highly and for the maintenance of which we have made such heavy sacrifices during our common war to resist communist aggression, this Government requests an explanation of the charge of "violation" which has been made against it.

With sentiments of esteem and of mutual consideration, I am

Sincerely yours,



Y. T. PYUN
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Richard G. Casey
Australian Minister for External Affairs
Government House
Canberra, Australia

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Via Korean Embassy
Washington, D.C.*

(12)

The Honorable R. G. Casey
Australian Minister for External Affairs
Government House
Canberra, Australia

IT'S TYPING from E. Asia

DRAFT letter to ROK. Foreign Minister,
in reply to his letter of 20th July
which was received by me by ordinary post on 20 August.

F
504/1
3/2

I refer to your letter of 20th July, ~~in which, on behalf~~
~~of your President,~~ ^{Government, but,} ~~you request~~ ^{asked} an explanation of ~~what you~~ ^{the}
~~allege to be the Australian Government's charge~~ ^{statement} that President
Rhee ~~committed a treacherous violation~~ ^{had violated some undertaking} in releasing certain
Korean prisoners of war in June 1953. ~~You cannot but be aware~~ ^{with, of course,}
that ~~I did not use the words quoted above in my message to your~~
~~President on 24th June.~~

I must, at the outset, take strong exception to your state-
ment ~~that~~ my message to President Rhee, which, in the circum-
stances, was couched in the most moderate terms, was a "serious
breach of international respect". The tone of your letter is
in marked contrast with the friendly ~~approval~~ ^{attitude} to Australia
which President Rhee has always shown, and I cannot believe it
represents the ~~views~~ ^{approach} of a Government for whose succour the
Australian people have from the very beginning of the conflict
made great sacrifices and for whose people Australians have the
most friendly feelings.

The action of your Government in releasing Korean prisoners
of war was regarded in Australia as contrary to ^{the} ~~an~~ agreement which
President Rhee entered into with General MacArthur on 15th
July, 1950. In his letter to General MacArthur, President Rhee
stated that he was "happy to assign ... command authority over
all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the
period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities".
In the face of this statement it is my view that the Republic
of Korea Provost Marshal, as a military officer, was under the
command authority of the United Nations Command. Moreover I
would draw your attention to General ^{Mark} Clark's own words in his
letter to your President of 20th June that there was a "unilateral
abrogation of" the President's "personal commitment". ~~Leaving~~
~~aside the commitment made "so freely and voluntarily" by your~~
President [There is a further and equally important point. In
time of war when Governments are allied in a common cause, the

Mr. Handmer
Lewis

Fair copy
of draft
reply sent
to Minister
should be
filed.

Copy of
draft shld
also go to
Cutchley
with a
statement
that we
are not
yet aware
whether the
Minister has
approved the
draft.

Done
10/9/53
G.C.C.

authority normally vested in a sovereign nation, to which you refer, has oftentimes to be exercised in a way that pays very great regard to the views of ~~all~~^{its} the partners in the struggle. In this instance your allies were of the opinion that the agreement reached at Pan Mun Jom ~~concerning~~^{about} prisoners of war should have been adhered to, and that your Government's action in releasing the prisoners could have had the most far reaching^{ill} effect on the common cause for which we had all made such great sacrifices.

You also state that no Government condemned the Communists for conscripting into their forces soldiers of the Republic of Korea whom they had captured. Australian representatives have frequently condemned this in public speeches. As far as the United Nations as a whole is concerned, I need only refer to the statement to the Communists on 2nd January, 1952 made by Rear-Admiral Libby, U.S.N., on behalf of the Governments with forces in Korea, that the wholesale incorporation of ~~P.O.W.~~^{prisoners of war} released at the front into the North Korean army was "contrary to the rules of warfare and a violation of the rights of the men concerned".

I am sorry that your letter has required me to reopen these questions. It is my sincere hope that in future your Government, by taking into account the views of her proven friends and allies, will allow continued fruitful co-operation between us. The making of peace often presents difficulties almost as great as in the waging of war. If ~~WAR~~ we are united I am sure we can reach a just peace - if we are divided, the only result will be aid and comfort to the enemies of freedom.

Draft Letter to R.O.K. Foreign Minister, in reply to his
Letter of 20th July.

I refer to your letter of 20th July, which was received by me by ordinary post on 20th August. In it you asked an explanation of the statement that President Rhee had violated some undertaking in releasing certain Korean prisoners of war in June 1953.

I must, at the outset, take strong exception to your statement that my message to President Rhee, which, in the circumstances, was couched in the most moderate terms, was a "serious breach of international respect". The tone of your letter is in marked contrast with the friendly attitude to Australia which President Rhee has always shown, and I cannot believe it represents the approach of a Government for whose succour the Australian people have from the very beginning of the conflict made great sacrifices and for whose people Australians have the most friendly feelings.

The action of your Government in releasing Korean prisoners of war was regarded in Australia as contrary to the agreement which President Rhee entered into with General MacArthur on 15th July, 1950. In his letter to General MacArthur, President Rhee stated that he was "happy to assign ... command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities". In the face of this statement it is my view that the Republic of Korea Provost Marshal, as a military officer, was under the command authority of the United Nations Command. Moreover I would draw your attention to General Mark Clark's own words in his letter to your President of 20th June that there was a "unilateral abrogation of" the President's "personal commitment".

There is a further and equally important point. In time of war when Governments are allied in a common cause, the authority normally vested in a sovereign nation, to which you refer, has oftentimes to be exercised in a way that pays very great

regard to the views of its partners in the struggle. In this instance your allies were of the opinion that the agreement reached at Pan Mun Jom about prisoners of war should have been adhered to, and that your Government's action in releasing the prisoners could have had the most far reaching ill effect on the common cause for which we had all made such great sacrifices.

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FOR THE MINISTER

Attached are:

- (a) A copy of Mr. Pyun's letter to you of 20th July;
and
- (b) A draft letter in reply to Mr. Pyun.

If you approve of the text of the draft it is suggested that your letter be transmitted directly to Mr. Pyun if he is in New York. If he is not in New York the letter might be sent to him through the Korean Embassy in Washington.

(J. Plimsoll)
Assistant Secretary.

Geographical Regions Division.

DWMcN:YJL

4th September, 1953.

MR. ECKERSLEY

Would you please bring the enclosed attachment to the attention of the Minister. The subject is a reply to a letter addressed to the Minister by Mr. Pyun, the R.O.K. Foreign Minister.

East Asia Section.

DWMcN:YJL.

4th September, 1953.

~~Mr. Blakely.~~

→ Mrs. McNichols
219

50411

Delegation
XXXXXXXXXX
UNCURK
XXXXXXXXXX
Pusan, Korea
25 August 53

Memorandum No. 271

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
CANBERRA A.C.T.

VISIT OF SENATOR ARMSTRONG

At Senator Armstrong's request for notes on his interviews
with President Rhee and Foreign Minister Fyun, I have sent him
extracts from my memorandum No. 243 dated 24 July 1953.

T. K. Critchley
Australian Representative

→ P.H. (for info. - retain or
E.A. per to E. Asia).
~~10/9~~

Mr Handman 14/9
Please file.

H.S. 9
9

D.W.H. 14/9/53



5-04/1

Delegation
AUSTRALIAN ~~EMBASSY~~.
UNCURK
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~.
Pusan, Korea

25 August 53

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T. K. Critchley
Australian Representative

→ E.A. ~~10/9~~ File

HS 9
3
(sent to P.I.)

File 852/20/4/25

7th January, 1953

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.


Reference is made to your memorandum 7/4 of the 2nd December, 1952 concerning a question asked of the Prime Minister by Mr. Riordan, M.P. relating to a visit to Korea and Japan by a Parliamentary Delegation.

2. This matter has been referred to the Minister for External Affairs, who has it under his consideration.



(K.C.O. Shann)
for Acting Secretary

Copy for: G.R. DIVISION



East Asia

PP.MS

504/1

5th March, 1952.

MEMORANDUM for :-

The Director,
News & Information Bureau,
Department of the Interior,
CANBERRA.

Attention Mr. M. Pratt

I refer to your memorandum of 29th February, 1952, concerning Mr. Koppanburg's request for information as to whether Australia has provided any help for Korea other than military help.

As noted in the UNCURK report for 1951, Australia has provided quantities of the following items : penicillin crystalline; distilled water; laundry soap; procaine penicillin and 2,000 long tons of barley. The total value of these items is approximately £A170,000.

In addition, the Minister for External Affairs has approved the award of two fellowships for Koreans.

9
(A. B. Jamieson)
for Secretary.

TELEPHONE :
647.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEGRAMS :
" INBUR "

NEWS AND INFORMATION BUREAU. 504/1

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

POST OFFICE BOX 12,

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

REFERENCE :

MP/VJ

February 29, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Attention : Mr. A.B. Jamieson

Mr. Kloppanburg of the Netherlands Information Service has asked us if Australia has provided any help for Korea other than military help. I would be grateful if you could supply details of this and what it has cost and is costing Australia.

Mel Pratt

Mel Pratt
Editor

(for Secretary)

Mr. Pelrus

Pls attend.

PP

27. 3/3/52

Memorandum No. 52

Australian Delegation
UNCURK
Pusan, Korea
25th January 1952

50A/1

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

Mr. Cho Min Ha

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum No. 8 dated 18th January 1952.
2. The Australian delegation will be very pleased to see Mr. Cho Min Ha and will willingly render any assistance which appears appropriate.

H.W. Bullock
H.W. Bullock
Acting Australian Representative

Memorandum No. 25

Australian Delegation
UNCURK
Pusan, Korea
16th January 1952

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

504/1

Copy Def L

Statement of Welcome by Minister of Defense to Australian editors

1. Reference is made to paragraph 6 of our memorandum No. 9 dated 9th January 1952.
2. Attached herewith is a copy of the statement issued by the Minister of Defense.

H.W. Eullock
H.W. Eullock
acting Australian Representative

January 7, 1952
Pusan, Korea

At this time of confusion and insecurity, it is a matter of deep significance to welcome the editors of the principal metropolitan newspapers in Australia. Also, it is encouraging to the Korean people and the Korean government to have representatives of the Commonwealth press coming to this war-stricken country to actually observe the real conditions of the country, and at the same time seeing for themselves how the principle of collective security is being carried out for the first time in history. This brings to mind the fact that it was the Australian Air Force which first took the leadership in punishing and suppressing the aggressors, and I believe the courage and determination displayed by the Australian Air Force to preserve the principles of freedom and justice cannot be too strongly emphasized. But what makes my tribute to the Australian contribution to the concerted world effort to repulse the aggression more substantial is that side by side with the Australian Air Force, her army and Navy have been, and are at present, playing an important part in spite of difficulties and hardships, and it is my pleasurable duty to express my profound gratitude to the people of Australia and her Armed Forces on behalf of the Korean Government and people.

Though we are in a time of trial and fallen on evil days, our future is quite promising, especially because of the fact that there exists ~~an~~ every possible co-operation between the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the Republic of Korea, and I think that if there can be any indication on which the whole of mankind may depend for a better prospect of life, it is the very spirit of co-ordination and collaboration which brings closely together the armed forces of people who are fighting for the preservation of freedom and justice.

Everybody will recognize that the relation between our two countries is already very cordial, but I wish to take this opportunity to stress the magnificent contribution that the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea have so far made to strengthen the bonds between our two peoples by their unstinted efforts to accomplish their hard task which is to realize the unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

While I am very confident that a better understanding and stronger sympathy will be forthcoming toward Korea as a result of the combined efforts of the press representatives and United Nations Delegation of the Commonwealth, there is no doubt that the final victory will be ours by the grace of God which is powerfully reflected at present in the continued effort to suppress aggression and preserve the principles of democracy.

Ki Poong Lee
Minister of Defense
Republic of Korea

Memorandum No.25

Australian Delegation
UNCURK
Pusan, Korea
16th January 1952

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

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Ki Poong Lee
Minister of Defense
Republic of Korea

January 7, 1952
Pusan, Korea

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Ki Poong Lee
Minister of Defense
Republic of Korea

Australian Delegation,
UNCURK,
Pusan, Korea.

15th January 1952.

Memorandum No 22.

The secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, ACT.

504/1

Australian Trees for Korea.

1. Reference is made to your Memorandum No 83 of 28th November.
2. We have conveyed the substance of your remarks to the Chief of the Forestry Bureau of the ROK Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and his reply is attached. We have also informed Major General Lloyd, UNKRA Chief of Mission in Korea. Mr du Pesquier has now returned to France, but there will no doubt be someone in UNKRA who will be able to handle this matter.

ONS

O.N. Smyth.
Australian Alternate.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
Republic of Korea
Pusan, Korea

Jan. 8, 1952

Mr. O. N. Smyth.
Australian Alternate Delegate
Australian Delegation,
UNCURK, Pusan, Korea


Dear Mr. O. N. Smyth,

Australian Trees for Korea.

1. Reference is made to your letter of December 31, 1951, on the above subject.
2. It is highly appreciated for the development of Korean forestry, to have the opportunity for the silvicultural experiment of Australian trees in our country, owing to your kind consideration.
3. As soon as the trees and seeds reach here, the experiment will be started under the full preparation.

Sincerely yours.

SL


NAM BONG SOON
Chief,
Bureau of Forestry

Australian Delegation,
UNCURK,
Pusan, Korea.

15th January 1952.

Memorandum No 22.

The secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, ACT.

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ONS

O.N. Smyth,
Australian Alternate.

Australian Delegation,
UNCURK,
Pusan, Korea.
14th January 1951.

Memorandum No 20.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, ACT.

504/1
Copy to Mr

Visit of Australian Newspaper Editors: Statement by Dr Clarence Rye.

1. Reference is made to our Memorandum No 9 of 9th January.
2. The following is the text of the OPI release on their visit :-

"Nine Australian Editors arrived in Pusan at 10 Monday Morning, and were welcomed by Clarence Rye, Director of the Office of Public Information and Australian Delegates to UNCURK. The newsmen, who came to Korea to observe the tough winter conditions under which the Australians are fighting, left Pusan for Seoul at three. Dr Rye's statement welcoming the news editors follows :

"It is with great pleasure that we welcome to Korea our Australian colleagues of the Fourth Estate. We hope that Messrs: Foster, Ashton, Ellis, Waters, Sinclair, McFarling, Deburgh, Bray and Vickers will find their stay here interesting and informative.

"Relations between Korea and Australia have always been especially cordial. Also, the Korean Government is particularly appreciative of the gallant efforts of the courageous Australian troops fighting here. It is only natural, then, that we greet the Australian newspaper editors most enthusiastically.

"The facilities of the Korean press and of the Korean Government are completely at their disposal. We hope that the Australian newsmen will obtain a first-hand picture of conditions here and report their findings to their people. We are proud of the achievements of the United Nations forces and of the Korean people during this great crusade of the Free world against Communist imperialism. We think that the editors from the "Land Down Under" will find many newsworthy stories here.

"Also, we would like to call attention to our own free Korean press; we are justifiably proud of our newsmen and our papers. As the latest report of UNCURK pointed out: "...the Republic of Korea is a member of several specialized agencies, submitting reports when they are sought and permitting visits by international officials. This willingness to open the Republic of Korea to the outside world, to seek international assistance and to co-operate in the work of international bodies is a sign of a genuine desire to carry out the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations ~~to~~ to the best of the country's ability." And commenting on the status of the press here in Korea, the report noted: "Considerable public criticism of the Government is allowed, thus paving the way for correction and reform." The free press and free people of Korea welcome the newsmen of the free nation of Australia."

ONS

O.N. Smyth,
Australian Alternate.

Memorandum No.9

Australian Delegation
UNCURK
Pusan, Korea
9th January 1951


The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs
Canberra A.C.T.

504/1
Ohyo DL

ABJ
LEP
PPD
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Visit of Australian Newspaper Editors

1. The party of nine Australian newspaper editors arrived in Korea on January 7th and spent a few hours in Pusan. The Australian delegation looked after their arrangements in Pusan.
2. Prior to arriving in Pusan they had expressed a desire to meet the President. He was however away at Chinhae for a brief vacation.
3. We had arranged with UNCACK headquarters for the editors to be given a briefing on the magnitude and type of relief operations in Korea. Colonel Carraway, deputy-commander of UNCACK in a briefing which was attended also by certain members of UNKRA gave them a very excellent and full briefing. UNCACK had also prepared in advance a brief summary of information which was distributed to them. A copy of this information is attached. The briefing lasted about an hour and the editors were given the opportunity to ask questions. The editors later expressed very deep appreciation for this briefing.
4. They then visited the United Nations cemetery where they laid a wreath.
5. The Australian delegation gave them a buffet lunch to which we invited members of the Korean cabinet and other leading Korean personalities, the other members of UNCURK, some members of UNKRA the diplomatic corps, and some Korean journalists.
6. Their visit aroused a considerable amount of interest among the Koreans. The Minister of Defense issued a statement of welcome in which he took the opportunity to pay a high tribute to the part played by Australian forces in the Korean struggle. This appeared in all the Korean papers. The Office of Public Information also issued a statement welcoming them.
7. I accompanied them in the plane as far as Seoul. Thereafter their interests were purely military and I dropped out of the picture. The editors created a very good impression on the Koreans. They were very reasonable in their attitude and appreciative of anything which was done for them.


H.W. Bullock
Acting Australian Representative.

TEMPLE BAR 6811

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

22 NOV 1951

504/1
CANBERRA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.



AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W. C. 2.

430/17/64.
DJB.PJ

No. 863.

12th November, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Further to your memorandum No.187 (504/1)
of 18th April, 1951, on the exchange of mails with the
... Republic of Korea, I attach hereto ^{the original} ~~copy~~ of a self-explanatory
letter of the 8th November from the Commonwealth Relations
Office.

(D.J. Billington)
for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

(Encl.)

P

430/17/64.
DJB,PJ

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for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

(Encl.)



COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

DOWNING STREET

LONDON S.W. 1

Whitehall 2323

Ext.:

Your reference :

Please quote in reply: Q.2251/15.

8th November, 1951.

Dear Cooper,

Will you please refer to your letter No.430/17/64 of 2nd May to Ross about the exchange of mails with the Republic of Korea.

We have now heard from our Mission in Tokyo and as we had already obtained the views of our Legation in Pusan and of the G.P.O., to whom proposals similar to those made to Australia have been made by the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, on the points raised by your Postmaster-General's Department, we can now offer the following observations on the numbered paragraphs of your letter of 2nd May.

- (1) We consider that the Korean Ministry of Communications is a qualified administration and the United States Embassy at Pusan are of the same opinion.
- (2) The following is an extract from a letter to the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, Tokyo, from General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, about the resumption of postal services with Korea.

"Arrangements have been made by the authorities concerned to resume normal postal service with Korea effective 10th September. This service will embrace surface mail and parcels, but will not, at the present time, include the exchange of registered articles.

It is assumed that the Ministry of Communications of the Republic of Korea will accord formal notification of this resumption to the Governments concerned through the agency of the Universal Postal Union".

/Before

H.B. COOPER, ESQ.,
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT.,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

Before the outbreak of hostilities no direct accounting between the United Kingdom G.P.O. and the South Korean Post Office was required but such accounting was necessary in the operation of the parcel service. The United States Embassy at Pusan state that settlement of what little international mail is transmitted through the Ministry of Communications at the present time is being effected in accordance with the agreed procedure.

(3) The letter from General Headquarters quoted above implies that the Japanese postal administration will act as an intermediary for the exchange of mails with South Korea and this is borne out by two circulars, No.210 of the 14th September and No.219 of the 21st September, issued by the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union on behalf of the Japanese Administration. Taken together these circulars, of which copies are no doubt in the hands of the Australian postal administration, show that Japan can now accept registered articles for South Korea as well as the normal classes of correspondence and parcels.

(4) Direct accounting with Korea would be required if closed mails originating in Korea were to be carried by British air services but it is more than likely that the Korean Ministry of Communications would despatch its correspondence to Tokyo, or perhaps Hong Kong, for inclusion in mails made up by those offices. In that case the question of payment would have to be settled between the Japanese Post Office or the Hong Kong Post Office and Korea.

Once again I must apologise for not having been able to reply to your letter before and I only hope that the above observations have not come too late to be of use to your Postmaster-General's Department.

If there are any points on which you would like further information you will no doubt let me know.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. Law

C O P Y.
COPY FOR PACIFIC SECTION. ←

COPY ALSO SENT TO DEPT. OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPT. OF COMMERCE Australian Mission,
AND AGRICULTURE. Tokyo

24th September, 1951.

Memo No. 787
File No. 15/1/5A

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Entry into Australia - Korean
Businessmen

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mr. Han Sang Lee,
President of Tong Hyung Company Ltd., Importer and
Exporter, Seoul, Korea, enquiring whether it is
possible for him to open a business firm in Sydney.

It would be appreciated if you would
refer this letter to the Department of Immigration
for advice as to whether Korean business men may enter
Australia and in particular whether a visa may be
granted Mr. Han Sang Lee to visit Australia for the
purpose stated in paragraph 5 of his letter.

(Sgd.) E.M. WEATHERSTONE.

For Head of Mission.

File 504/1

*RAF
LEP
PP
SS*

C O P Y

TONG HYUNG CO., LTD.

Importer & Exporter
SEOUL, KOREA

HEAD OFFICE
P. O. Box 107
Seoul, KOREA.

BRANCH OFFICE
P. O. Box 2193
Honolulu, HAWAII

Fuji Building
No. 1, Shiba
Kotohiracho
Minato-ku
TOKYO, JAPAN

September 15, 1951.

Australian Diplomatic Mission
Trade Section
Empire House,
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Sirs;

I, personally, extend my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to the Australian participation with UN activities in the present Korean War.

For the elevation of international exchanges of commerce and cultures, and our democratic peace victory, I request you to offer us your kind informations regarding the regulations, or possibility of setting up a business firm in the city of Sydney in your country to trade between Australia and Korea.

Our company has been organized in the year of 1945 just after the liberation of Korea for the purpose of international trade, and we have been made some successful business with America, British Commonwealth and Japan so far.

I was one of the member of Korean Trade Mission to the Far East Asia Area from our country in last year, spring, and also I have presented myself in person to the First International Trade Fair at Chicago in last year August, although it was not successful for me on account of Korean war.

Under your permission and cooperation, I will plan to visit your country for the investigation of possibility or possible to set up an office of our branch in your country for the practical transactions and to exchange Korean and Australian products in the near future.

With the letter of introduction and recommendation by the Australian Religion Mission here in Pusan, I enclose this letter with the confidence of receiving your reply to us regarding above mentioned subject in details, I remain,

Very truly yours,

HAN SANG LEE, PRESIDENT
TONG HYUNG CO., LTD.

C O P Y

AUSTRALIAN PRESBYTERIAN MISSION IN KOREA

c/o British Commonwealth
Maintenance Area,
Pusan, KOREA.

August 27th, 1951.

Australian Diplomatic Mission,
Trade Section,
Empire House,
Tokyo, JAPAN.

Dear Sir,

Mr. Han Sang Lee is a Korean Christian business man, desirous of establishing trading relations with Australia, and if possible residing there for trade purposes, with his family.


His father was one of the early converts in this province, and a founder of the Presbyterian Church of Masan. Mr. Lee also is an active member and office bearer of the Presbyterian Church.

I understand Mr. Lee is writing to you in detail concerning his proposals. Mr. Lee has had experience in trading with America, and also has been educated in America. Any assistance you can give him will be greatly appreciated.

(Rev.) H.W. Lane,

Secretary, Australian
Presbyterian Mission in Korea.

Unreceived

Don't think it's
worth sending or 

had you check file and see

if this is worth sending

an. We have sent some

information to AMG's already


THE INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELEVANT TO THE FILE.

Book or Table to be used for Cyphering or Coding.	Recyphering or Recoding.	Initials of Cypherer or Coder.	Time of Receipt in Cypher or Coding Office.	Date.



AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W. C. 2.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

430/17/64
JBC/HT

29th August, 1951.

No. 707

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 11 SEP 1951
File No. 504/1

MEMORANDUM FOR:- The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

... With reference to your memorandum No. 187 of 18th April, 1951, to the Official Secretary (your file No. 504/1) concerning the exchange of mails with the Republic of Korea, I now attach copy of an interim reply received from the Commonwealth Relations Office, which is forwarded for your information.

(F. B. Cooper)
for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

F B C
P

430/17/64
JBC/HT

29th August, 1951.

No. 707

MEMORANDUM FOR:- The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

... With reference to your memorandum No. 187 of 18th
April, 1951, to the Official Secretary (your file No. 504/1)
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I now attach copy of an interim reply received from the
Commonwealth Relations Office, which is forwarded for your
information.

FB
(F. B. Cooper)
for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

DUPLICATE

Q.2251/15

24th August, 1951

Dear Cooper,

I am sorry that we are not yet in a position to let you have a reply to your letter 430/17/64 of 2nd May to Ross, about the exchange of mails with the Republic of Korea, but we are still awaiting the views of the United Kingdom Mission in Tokyo, who will no doubt sound the United Nations High Command before sending their comments.

As soon as we receive a reply from Tokyo, to whom a reminder has been sent, we will let you know.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. C. J. Tan

F. B. COOPER, ESQ.,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
W.C.2.

~~RLH~~
~~ABJ~~
LEP
WV

Mr. Darg (Tech. Advice)
is leading
this problem
RP.

Mr. Bennett - Mr. Roberts
in U.N. Section

Mr. Jamieson :

RP

What is the history
and present proposal
on scholarships - See Para 5(c)

Could UNKRA funds be
used to finance visits of
Koreans to Australia for
technical training?

Russell

Australian Delegation,
UNCURK,
Pusan, Korea,
10th August, 1951

Memorandum No 479

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

504/1

Visit of Mr Casey to Korea

1. Mr Casey, accompanied by Messrs Watt and Loveday and by Brigadier King, arrived in Seoul by air from Tokyo at mid-day on 8th August. They were joined in Seoul by Mr Flimsoll. They visited the RAAF fighter squadron, and then proceeded in five small planes (L-18's) to the headquarters of the Commonwealth Division, where they had lunch with Major-General Cassells and his staff. They then proceeded further north by road, seeing a United States artillery unit en route to the Australian battalion; and after leaving the main Australian forces, continued to the Australian element of a patrol just back from enemy territory -- they were addressed by Mr Casey. Then a special flight was made to the headquarters of the ROK First Division, where Mr Casey met the commanding general (Brig-Gen Paik). In the evening the party had dinner in Seoul with the chief of staff of the Eighth Army (Major-General Allen).

2. Brigadier King remained in Seoul, and the others flew south to Pusan on the morning of 9th August. At 12.30 Mr Casey, accompanied by Messrs Watt and Flimsoll, called on President Syngman Rhee. At 1 p.m. the President gave a luncheon in Mr Casey's honour. At 3.30 Mr Casey attended a meeting of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. At 4.45 Sir Arthur Rucker (Deputy Agent-General) and Major-General Lloyd (head of the Pusan office of UNKRA) called on Mr Casey. At 5.30 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea (Chang Myun) called on Mr Casey. At 6 p.m. there was a cocktail party given by Mr Flimsoll, attended by members of the Korean Cabinet, the chief members of the Korean National Assembly, the diplomatic corps and members of UNCURK, the senior American and British Commonwealth military officers in Pusan, and Australians resident in Pusan (such as the head of the Australian Presbyterian Mission). At 8 p.m. there was a small dinner given by the American Ambassador (Mr Muccio).

3. On Friday 10th August Mr Casey laid a wreath at the Australian graves in the United Nations cemetery in Pusan. He departed by air for Tokyo at 11.30 in the morning.

4. The foregoing is a brief chronological account of the visit, which was very successful. Mr Casey made an excellent impression, and Koreans were impressed and touched by his going out of his way to visit a Korean military unit and by the appreciation he expressed for the Korean effort. Too many foreign visitors to Korea have given the impression that they are interested only in their own troops; but Mr Casey on many occasions showed his interest also in the Koreans themselves. He is, incidentally, the first foreign minister to visit Korea since the outbreak of fighting.

5. In the discussions on foreign affairs generally, the question of going north to the Yalu River was not raised, though Mr Casey had full talks with the President, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister. Three matters were raised with Mr Casey by these Korean officials:

(a) Japanese peace treaty. Article 4 (former Japanese vested properties) gave most concern. Fishing rights were also discussed. These matters have been reported to you in my Departmental Despatch No 6 of 21st July. Mr Casey indicated some sympathy with the Korean case, particularly in regard to vested properties, but he did not make any commitment.

(b) Pacific Pact. The President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister all mentioned this. They said they welcomed the agreement between the USA, Australia, and New Zealand, and hoped that it would be extended later to include other countries such as the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. Dr Rhee referred to the practical difficulties of including states (such as Indonesia) whose stand on the question of communism was not clear-cut; he could see that there were many problems involved in drawing up a comprehensive pact. Mr Casey said that the whole question of security in the Pacific was

under constant consideration; defensive arrangements often took a long while to work out. But Australia had not waited for a Pacific Pact which included the Republic of Korea before sending forces to Korea. Australia also had air force in Malaya. The United States and New Zealand also had forces in Korea and north-east Asia. Thus none of the three members of the so-called Pacific Pact had indicated any lack of interest in the fortunes of its Asian neighbours.

(c) Australian scholarships for Koreans. The Prime Minister told Mr Casey that, when he visited Australia last year, he had been given to understand by Dr Wynes of the Department of External Affairs that Australia might provide about five or six university scholarships for Koreans. The Korean Government would select persons who spoke adequate English, and who would take useful courses such as engineering and science. Mr Casey said he felt hopeful that something could be done, and he would have the whole matter looked into the moment he returned to Australia. (This matter was raised with you in my Memorandum No 255 of 30th April, to which you replied in your Memorandum No 39 of 26th June. Your reply was not very helpful because it did not give your understanding of the talks which Dr Wynes had with the Korean Prime-Minister. These talks presumably covered the question of the extent to which the Australian Government would finance scholarships.)

6. The discussions with Sir Arthur Rucker and Major-General Lloyd covered in general terms the operations of UNKRA. The Minister was given a broad picture of progress up to date and the plans for the immediate future. Sir Arthur Rucker said that, since the Army insisted on being responsible for relief in the immediate future, the fields open to UNKRA were limited, chiefly to planning and to some forms of technical assistance. The Australian Government had been one of those which was anxious that UNKRA should take a significant role as soon as possible. One field in which this could be done without intruding on military responsibilities would be in the provision of coastal ships. UNKRA was investigating the possibilities of obtaining suitable ships from Japan. Major-General Lloyd said that when he was in Australia in May he had discussed with Australian government officials the possibilities of obtaining some suitable ships from Australia. He had felt very hopeful at the time, but since then UNKRA had heard nothing more. Mr Casey said he would have the matter taken up immediately and would see what could be done. (The matter is covered in my Memoranda No 167 of 23rd March and No 300 of 22nd May, and your Memorandum No 22 of 4th May.)

7. Sir Arthur Rucker indicated to Mr Casey that, in order to have any effect, the UNKRA programme should extend over several years — not less than three — and that further contributions would be needed after the present \$220 million were spent. Mr Casey pointed out that no government — certainly not the Australian — had committed itself to a long-range programme.

8. Major-General Lloyd, speaking on behalf of Kingsley as director-general of IRO, raised the question of the £10 per head which the Australian Government had agreed with IRO that it would pay that organization for every adult it brought into Australia. The Australian Government was taking the view that "adult" meant anyone 21 years of age or older; whereas IRO believed that the intent of those who drew up the agreement had been that "adult" meant anyone for whom an adult fare had to be paid. Mr Kingsley had wanted the matter taken up with Mr Casey so that it could be considered on a broad international basis rather than on narrow technical or accountancy grounds. Mr Casey said he was not familiar with the question, and in any case he would not express an opinion without first knowing the views of his colleague Mr Holt. Any request for additional funds came at a bad time because the Australian Government was trying to cut down expenditure.

9. Before leaving Fusan Mr Casey issued a press statement. This was sent to you in our Memorandum No 477.

J. Plimsole
Australian Representative

(For Immediate Release

PUSAN

10 August 1951

STATEMENT BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE R. G. CASEY, AUSTRALIAN MINISTER
OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs of Australia, left Pusan today after a three-day visit to Korea.

He said that, thanks to the courtesy of the American and Korean authorities he had seen and done all that was possible in the time. He had had opportunities of meeting and talking to the President, Mr. Syngman Rhee, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the speaker and other officers of the National Assembly, and had seen Korean, American, British and Australian troops on the front.

Mr. Casey said he was leaving Korea with a real appreciation of the vigorous and patriotic defence of their own country that had been displayed by the Koreans. Bearing in mind the fact that the Republic of Korea had only had its own Government for a very few years - and that the Korean army had only existed for about two years - Mr. Casey said that the Korean national spirit was most remarkable and was inadequately appreciated by the world.

Certainly the defence of Korea against aggression had been most strongly aided by United Nations forces of 17 countries, predominantly of course by the United States of America. The United Nations efforts to support others and in stern opposition to Communist aggression might well prove to be the turning point in the establishment of the United Nations organization which had now established itself in the minds of the free peoples of the world as a vital instrument for the preservation of freedom.

Mr. Casey paid tribute to the President of Korea and to the American authorities who had made his visit possible and profitable.

For Immediate Release

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Mr. Casey paid tribute to the President of Korea and to the American authorities who had made his visit possible and profitable.

504/1.

25th June, 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:-

The Director-General of Posts & Telegraphs,
Postmaster-General's Department,
Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE, C.2, VIC.,

Exchange of Mail with the Republic of Korea.

Further to my memorandum 504/1 of 1st June, 1951, on the subject.

2. In paragraph 4 of my memorandum under reference it was stated that the question of jurisdiction of the Republic vis-a-vis the U.N. High Command was being taken up with Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP. Tokyo has now received a Note from GHQ in answer to its queries on this matter, in which Diplomatic Section points out that the United Nations Command has no control over Korean civilian affairs of this nature and would in no way undertake to express itself upon the decision to resume such postal service as has been proposed to the Australian Postmaster-General. The general problem has been referred to the Commander of the 8th Army.

3. The Diplomatic Section, however, continues that the United Nations High Command is currently utilising in full all means of transportation through Japan to Korea, and the 8th Army controls all transport from Korean ports to the interior. Therefore, a decision to reinstitute postal services at this time could have little practical significance if the 8th Army is not in a position to provide transport for such services. General Headquarters has been advised that, at present, military requirements are such that transport is available only for relief parcels and official messages. General Headquarters has undertaken to inform the Mission when military operations will permit the utilisation of space for postal services of a more general nature.

....

4. A copy of Diplomatic Section's Note is attached.

9

Secretary.

NSC:PJT

Memo No. 492

File No. 7/22/12



AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TOKYO.

13th June, 1951

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

EXCHANGE OF MAILS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I refer to your memorandum No. 153 of 17th April and my memorandum No. 399 of 12th May, concerning the proposed exchange of mails with the Republic of Korea.

2. In paragraph 2 of my memorandum under reference, it was pointed out that the question of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea relative to the United Nations High Command in civilian matters was being taken up with General Headquarters, SCAP. Attached is copy of Diplomatic Section's note in answer to our queries on this point. The Diplomatic Section points out that the United Nations Command has no control over Korean civilian affairs of this nature and would in no way undertake to express itself upon the decision to resume such postal service, as has been proposed to the Australian Postmaster-General. The general problem has been referred to the Commander of the 8th Army.

3. The Diplomatic Section, however, continues that the United Nations High Command is currently utilising in full all means of transportation through Japan to Korea, and the 8th Army controls all transport from Korean ports to the interior. Therefore, a decision to reinstitute postal services at this time could have little practical significance if the 8th Army is not in a position to provide transport for such services. General Headquarters has been advised that, at present, military requirements are such that transport is available only for relief parcels and official messages. General Headquarters has undertaken to inform the Mission when military operations will permit the utilisation of space for postal services of a more general nature.

N.S. Currie
N.S. Currie
for Head of Mission

P

C O P Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

Diplomatic Section

The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Australian Mission in Japan and has the honour to refer to the latter's note of May 22, 1951, concerning the reinstatement of airmail and parcel post service between the Republic of Korea and the Commonwealth of Australia.

This Headquarters appreciates the Mission's request for clarification on the position of the United Nations Command relative to this matter and has referred the general problem to the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea. It should be understood that the United Nations Command has no control over Korean civil affairs of this nature and would in no way undertake to express itself on the decision to resume such postal service as has been proposed to the Australian Postmaster-General.

However, as a practical matter, the United Nations Command is currently utilising in full all means of transportation through Japan to Korea and the Eighth Army controls all transportation from Korean ports to the interior. Therefore, a decision to reinstate postal service at this time could have little practical significance if the Eighth Army is not in a position to provide transportation for such service.

At the present time, this Headquarters has been advised that military requirements preclude the availability of transport for any items of postal service other than those relief parcels and official messages which have been allocated cargo space in the train of military transport. Whenever military operations permit the utilisation of space for postal service of a more general nature, the Eighth Army has been instructed to advise the United Nations Command and the Mission will be duly informed.

Tokyo, May 26, 1951.

To the
Australian Mission in Japan
TOKYO.

504/1

1st June, 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Director-General of Posts & Telegraphs,
Postmaster-General's Department,
Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE.

Exchange of Mail with the Republic of Korea

Reference your memorandum of 4th April, 1951,
File No. G.221/1/51 on the above subject.

2. The questions you raised concerning the exchange of mail with the Republic of Korea were submitted to the Australian Mission in Tokyo who have now given us their views after consultation with GHQ, SCAP, and the Japanese Government. The Mission advises that the following information is only in the nature of an interim reply pending more complete answers from the competent authorities in Japan.
3. It is the opinion of the Australian representative on U.N.C.U.R.K. that the Ministry of Communications of the Republic of Korea is able to undertake international financial obligations of a lasting nature and he points out that the Republic of Korea has been accepted for membership of the Universal Postal Union. The Ministry of Communications has been operating internal postal services in South Korea in those areas which are not the scene of military operations and is operating them at the moment. A certain amount of international mail is also being handled by means of aircraft owned and operated by North-West Airlines.
4. As to the limits of jurisdiction of the Republic vis-a-vis the U.N. High Command, the Republic of Korea is a sovereign Government and is recognised by Australia as such and exercises control over civilian matters within the area of its jurisdiction i.e. of all territories in the Korean Peninsula below the 38th Parallel. Consequently, the decision upon the restitution of postal services within this area would seem to be no concern of the U.N. High Command. Our Mission in Tokyo is taking this point up with GHQ, SCAP.
5. It is understood from the Qantas representative in Japan that prior to the outbreak of the Korean war all mail travelling between Korea and Australia was handled by the Japanese Postal Service and forwarded respectively to Korea and Australia as part of Japanese mail. The Japanese Postal Service then charged the respective Governments for such costs as were incurred on their behalf. If this kind of arrangement can be worked out between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Service, then it appears that this would shift the risk of dealing with the Korean Ministry of Communications on to the Japanese Postal Service should your Department still entertain doubts regarding the ability of the Korean Ministry of Communications to fulfil any obligations which it may undertake.

6. Regarding the possibility of a direct connection with Australia being supplied at Okinawa, where the route of the North-West Airlines to Manila intersects with the route of the Qantas Charter services between Australia and Japan, it would seem most unnecessary to use this link and make another stopping place on the Qantas route as it seems that a more direct connection can be made in Tokyo where the North-West Airlines aircraft to and from Korea uses the same airport as the weekly Qantas service to Tokyo. The Qantas representative here assures our Mission that his company does not propose to establish a further stopping place at Okinawa.

7. As to your question (III), the Australian Mission in Tokyo has drawn attention to the fact that your Department has in the past corresponded directly with the Japanese Postal Service regarding matters connected with carriage of mail between Australia and Japan. If your Department approves of this practice then there does not seem to be any objection to any new arrangement regarding Korean mail being worked out in this manner. However, it is pointed out that our Mission has on one occasion in the past been called in to sort out a problem regarding air mails at a stage when the Mission knew nothing of the background to the problem, because previous negotiations had been conducted directly between your Department and the Japanese Postal Services. Attached is a further memorandum from Tokyo giving a report of the interview.

.....

An informal interview has been arranged between Mr. Kanazawa, Chief of the International Mails Section of the Japanese Postal Services and a member of the Australian Mission in Tokyo, with a view to making informal enquiries regarding the possibility that the Japanese Postal Services should reinstate the system which was in operation before the outbreak of the Korean war as outlined in para. 5 above.

8. Regarding your question (IV) it would seem that if your Department can work out an arrangement with the Japanese Postal Service on the above lines, then the latter with accept responsibility for settlement of air conveyance with your Department.

When further information has been received as a result of the approaches to the Japanese Government through GHQ, SCAP, you will be advised immediately.

(SGD.) RALPH HARRY

(R.L. Harry)
for Secretary.

Memo No. 417

File No. 7/22/12



AUSTRALIAN MISSION IN JAPAN,
TOKYO.

18th May, 1951

504/1

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

EXCHANGE OF MAIL WITH REPUBLIC OF
KOREA

I refer to your memorandum No. 153 of 17th April, 1951, and to my memorandum No. 399 of 12th May, 1951, concerning the proposed exchange of mail with the Republic of Korea. Today, at my instigation, Mr. Dunn, the Qantas representative in Japan, had an informal talk with Mr. Kanazawa, the Chief of the International Mail Section of the Japanese Ministry of Postal Services (Please see paragraph 5 of my memorandum under reference). I was unable to be present.

2. Mr. Kanazawa stated that the Japanese authorities were certain to react favourably to any suggestion made by the Postmaster-General's Department that the Japanese Postal Service should act as an intermediary in handling airmail between Korea and Australia. His opinion is that the most convenient way of doing this would be for the Japanese to regard mail addressed to Australia coming from Korea as part of Japanese mail and forward it to Australia as such by using their own bags, etc. Mail travelling in the other direction could be handled similarly. The Japanese Government would then charge the Australian and South Korean Governments an "in transit" handling charge. Mr. Kanazawa points out that at the moment only letter cards addressed to Korea are being handled by the Japanese authorities and requests that Australian mail addressed to Korea be restricted to letter cards. He also indicated that no parcel post is in operation between Japan and Korea for the moment and that there is no airmail parcel service between either Japan and Australia under the present arrangement.

3. Mr. Kanazawa confirmed the information contained in paragraph 5 of my memorandum No. 399 to the effect that the Postmaster-General's Department has corresponded directly with the Japanese Postal Service in the past and he sees no objection to this course being followed again.

4. Mr. Dunn gathered from his conversation with Mr. Kanazawa that the Japanese Government would only accept the responsibility for recovering from the Republic of Korea such "in transit" handling charges as were incurred by the Japanese Postal Service on behalf of the South Korean Government, and would not be prepared to accept the responsibility of paying air conveyance costs on behalf of the South Korean Government with a view to recovering this money at a later stage. It would seem that this would have to be the subject of negotiation between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Republic of Korea.

5. Any further information which comes to hand on this issue will be forwarded to you at once.

M. S. Curme
for Head of Mission

P

Mr Phillips

Pls draft maintenance
w/ly & PMS's
etc

9/2/5/0



NSC/HD

File No. 7/22/12

MEMORANDUM NO. 399/1951



AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TOKYO.

12th May 1951

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Exchange of Mails between Australia and
the Republic of Korea

I refer to your memorandum No. 153 of 17th April, 1951, concerning the proposed exchange of mail with the Republic of Korea. The problems raised in your memorandum are being taken up with the competent authorities and we hope to be able to provide you with more complete answers as soon as they are available. In the meantime this memorandum should be taken as an interim reply. The Postmaster-General's Department has raised the question of the ability of the Ministry of Communications at Pusan to enter into international financial obligations of a lasting character. I have discussed this question briefly with the Australian representative on the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and his opinion is that the Ministry of Communications of the Republic of Korea is able to undertake such obligations, and he points out that the Republic of Korea has been accepted for Membership of the Universal Postal Union. The Australian representative to UNCURK also informs me that the Ministry of Communications has been operating internal postal services in South Korea in those areas which are not the scene of military operations and are operating them at the moment. A certain amount of international mail is also being handled by the Ministry of Communications and is carried from Korea (as you pointed out in your paragraph 3), by means of aircraft owned and operated by North-West Airlines.

2. There seems to be some confusion in the minds of the Postmaster-General's Department as to the limits of jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea vis-a-vis the United Nations High Command, and it should be pointed out that the Republic of Korea is a sovereign Government and is recognised by Australia as such, and exercises control over civilian matters within the area of its jurisdiction, i.e. of all territories in the Korean Peninsula below the 38th Parallel. Consequently, the decision upon the reinstatement of postal services within this area would seem to be no concern of the United Nations High Command. This point is being taken up with GHQ, SCAP.

3. I understand from the Qantas representative in Japan that prior to the outbreak of the Korean war all mail travelling between Korea and Australia was handled by the Japanese Postal Service and forwarded respectively to Korea and Australia as part of Japanese mail. The Japanese Postal Service then charged the respective Governments for such costs as were incurred on their behalf. If this kind of arrangement can be worked out between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Service, then it appears that this would shift the risk of dealing with the Korean Ministry of Communications on to the Japanese Postal Service should the Postmaster-General's Department still entertain doubts regarding the ability of the Korean Ministry of Communications to fulfil any obligations which it may undertake.

4. In paragraph 3 of your memorandum, reference is made to the possibility of a direct connection with Australia being supplied at Okinawa, where the route of North-West Airlines to Manila intersects with the route of the Qantas Charter service between Australia and Japan. It would seem most unnecessary to use this link and make another stopping place on the Qantas route as it seems that a more direct connection can be made in Tokyo where the North-West Airlines aircraft to and from Korea uses the same airport as the weekly Qantas service to Tokyo. The Qantas representative here assures me that his company does not propose to establish a further stopping place at Okinawa.

5. Regarding your question (3), I understand that the Postmaster-General's Department has in the past corresponded directly with the Japanese Postal Service regarding matters connected with carriage of mail between Australia and Japan. If the Department approves of this practice then there does not seem to be any objection to any new arrangement regarding Korean mail being worked out in this manner. However, it should be pointed out that this Mission has been called in ^{on one occasion in the past} to sort out a problem regarding air mails at a stage when the Mission knew nothing of the background to the problem, because previous negotiations had been conducted directly between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Services. I have arranged an informal interview with Mr. Kanazawa, Chief of the International Mails Section of the Japanese Postal Services, with a view to making informal enquiries regarding the possibility that the Japanese Postal Services should reinstitute the system which was in operation before the outbreak of the Korean war, i.e. as outlined in paragraph 3 above. Information gained from this interview will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

6. With regard to your question (4), it seems that, if an arrangement can be worked out between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Service on the above lines, then the latter will accept responsibility for settlement of air conveyance costs with the Postmaster-General's Department.

7. The subject matter of your questions (3) and (4) contained in paragraph 3 of your memorandum have been taken up formally with the Japanese authorities through GHQ, SCAP, and any information which we receive from this source will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

8. A copy of your memorandum No. 153 has been sent to the Australian Representative on UNCURK for his comments, and these will be forwarded to you when received.

U. S. Curran
for Head of Mission

NSC/HD

File No. 7/22/12

MEMORANDUM NO. 399/1951

12th May 1951

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Exchange of Mails between Australia and
the Republic of Korea

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5. Regarding your question (3), I understand that the Postmaster-General's Department has in the past corresponded directly with the Japanese Postal Service regarding matters connected with carriage of mail between Australia and Japan. If the Department approves of this practice then there does not seem to be any objection to any new arrangement regarding Korean mail being worked out in this manner. However, it should be pointed out that this Mission has been called in to sort out a problem regarding air mails at a stage when the Mission knew nothing of the background to the problem, because previous negotiations had been conducted directly between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Services. I have arranged an informal interview with Mr. Kanazawa, Chief of the International Mails Section of the Japanese Postal Services, with a view to making informal enquiries regarding the possibility that the Japanese Postal Services should reinstitute the system which was in operation before the outbreak of the Korean war, i.e. as outlined in paragraph 3 above. Information gained from this interview will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

6. With regard to your question (4), it seems that, if an arrangement can be worked out between the Postmaster-General's Department and the Japanese Postal Service on the above lines, then the latter will accept responsibility for settlement of air conveyance costs with the Postmaster-General's Department.

7. The subject matter of your questions (3) and (4) contained in paragraph 3 of your memorandum have been taken up formally with the Japanese authorities through GHQ, SCAP, and any information which we receive from this source will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

8. A copy of your memorandum No. 153 has been sent to the Australian Representative on UNCURK for his comments, and these will be forwarded to you when received.

N. S. CURRIE

for Head of Mission

File No. 504/1

Memo No. 187

CANBERRA A.C.T.

18th April, 1951

MEMORANDUM for:

The Official Secretary,
Office of the Australian
High Commissioner,
Australia House,
LONDON

Exchange of Mails with Republic of Korea.

The Postmaster-General's Department has advised that a communication has been received from the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea, in which information is sought concerning:

- (a) the use of Australian Air Lines for the carriage of air mail posted in the Republic of Korea and addressed to European countries; and
- (b) the establishment of a Parcels Post Service between the Republic of Korea and Australia.

2. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea all postal articles (including parcels) posted in Australia, and intended for delivery in North and South Korea were forwarded via Tokyo, Japan and the Japanese Postal Administration arranged the necessary onward transmission, by air or surface as desired to destination.

Since 27th June, 1950, all postal facilities to Korea have been suspended.

3. The Postmaster-General's Department states that the establishment of a parcels exchange with Korea and the pursuance of the suggestion that Australian controlled air services might be used for the conveyance of air mail from Korea to Australia or other countries presupposes the acceptance by Korea of certain financial liabilities for certain of the services supplied. The Postmaster-General's Department is by no means certain that the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea has the authority to undertake commitments of this nature or that it represents a stable Government which could legitimately claim to accept engagements of a permanent character on behalf of the country. From the terms of the letter on air mail it would seem that some civilian mail is now moving out of the country by means of an American air company with the title of North West Orient Air Lines. So far as concerns a direct connection with Australia this could perhaps be supplied at Okinawa where the route of the North-West Orient Air Lines to Manila intersects with the route of the Qantas charter plane service between Australia and Japan. Use of the Qantas line would, however, involve the responsible financial authority in Korea in payment to the Australian Postal Administration any mail conveyance services rendered under this heading, unless the Japanese Postal Administration undertook to act as it did formerly in the capacity of an intermediary service, and enclosed any articles from Korea in its own mails to Australia.

The Postmaster-General's Department raises the following queries -

- (1) Does the Ministry of Communications at Pusan represent an Administration which can be accepted as qualified to enter into direct engagements with other Administrations?

The Postmaster-General's Department doubts, in the absence of some authoritative order from the High Command of the United Nations forces in Korea, if the present requests from the Korean Ministry of Communications can be accepted as authoritative.

- (2) Does the United Nations High Command in Korea desire that normal postal interchanges should be resumed with the territory under its control, what forms of postal service does it propose to authorise (e.g. are registered articles and parcels exchanges to be authorised) and what authority will accept responsibility for settlement of international accounts in respect of transit, terminal charges (on parcels) and compensation (for loss of registered articles)?

- (3) Is it proposed that the Japanese Postal Service will act as intermediary for the circulation of mail to Japan and, if so, could that service be authorised to enter into negotiation with this country in the matter?

It is noted that this query comes within the list of subjects upon which the Japanese Government is permitted to correspond with accredited foreign missions in Japan as advised in SCAP Memorandum of 13th February, 1951.

- (4) Is approval likely to be given for the use as proposed of the Australian air route to and from Japan for the carriage of Korean air mails? If so what authority will accept responsibility for settlement with the Postmaster-General's Department in respect of air conveyance costs?

4. It would be appreciated if you would consult with the United Kingdom authorities and suggest that their representative accredited to the Republic of Korea might be requested to give his views on these several questions.

9
(R. L. Harry)
for Secretary

File No. 504/1

Memo No. ¹⁵³.....

CANBERRA A.C.T.

17th April, 1951

MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Mission,

TOKYO

Exchange of Mails with Republic of Korea.

The Postmaster-General's Department has advised that a communication has been received from the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea, in which information is sought concerning:

- (a) the use of Australian Air Lines for the carriage of air mail posted in the Republic of Korea and addressed to European countries; and
- (b) the establishment of a Parcels Post Service between the Republic of Korea and Australia.

2. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea all postal articles (including parcels) posted in Australia, and intended for delivery in North and South Korea were forwarded via Tokyo, Japan and the Japanese Postal Administration arranged the necessary onward transmission, by air or surface as desired to destination.

Since 27th June, 1950, all postal facilities to Korea have been suspended.

3. The Postmaster-General's Department states that the establishment of a parcels exchange with Korea and the pursuance of the suggestion that Australian controlled air services might be used for the conveyance of air mail from Korea to Australia or other countries presupposes the acceptance by Korea of certain financial liabilities for certain of the services supplied. The Postmaster-General's Department is by no means certain that the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea has the authority to undertake commitments of this nature or that it represents a stable Government which could legitimately claim to accept engagements of a permanent character on behalf of the country. From the terms of the letter on air mail it would seem that some civilian mail is now moving out of the Country by means of an American air company with the title of North West Orient Air Lines. So far as concerns a direct connection with Australia this could perhaps be supplied at Okinawa where the route of the North-West Orient Air Lines to Manila intersects with the route of the Qantas charter plane service between Australia and Japan. Use of the Qantas line would, however, involve the responsible financial authority in Korea in payment to the Australian Postal Administration any mail conveyance services rendered under this heading, unless the Japanese Postal Administration undertook to act as it did formerly in the capacity of an intermediary service, and enclosed any articles from Korea in its own mails to Australia.

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The Postmaster-General's Department doubts, in the absence of some authoritative order from the High Command of the United Nations forces in Korea, if the present requests from the Korean Ministry of Communications can be accepted as authoritative.

(2) Does the United Nations High Command in Korea desire that normal postal interchanges should be resumed with the territory under its control, what forms of postal service does it propose to authorise (e.g. are registered articles and parcels exchanges to be authorised) and what authority will accept responsibility for settlement of international accounts in respect of transit, terminal charges (on parcels) and compensation (for loss of registered articles)?

(3) Is it proposed that the Japanese Postal Service will act as intermediary for the circulation of mail to Japan and, if so, could that service be authorised to enter into negotiation with this country in the matter?

It is noted that this query comes within the list of subjects upon which the Japanese Government is permitted to correspond with accredited foreign missions in Japan as advised in SCAP Memorandum of 13th February, 1951.

(4) Is approval likely to be given for the use as proposed of the Australian air route to and from Japan for the carriage of Korean air mails? If so what authority will accept responsibility for settlement with the Postmaster-General's Department in respect of air conveyance costs?

4. Would you please consult with the competent authorities on these questions and inform us urgently of your comments following your consultations.

7
(R. L. Harry)
for Secretary

Commonwealth of Australia



Postmaster-General's Department

Please address reply to
Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs,
and quote No.

G.221/1/51

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TREASURY GARDENS
MELBOURNE, C.2.
VICTORIA

Telephone: Central 5551
Telegrams: "Postal" Melbourne

File No. 504/1

- 4 APR 1951

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Exchange of Mail with Republic of Korea.

Attached are copies of communications received by this Department from the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea, in which information is sought concerning -

- (a) the use of Australian Air Lines for the carriage of air mail posted in the Republic of Korea and addressed to European countries; and
- (b) the establishment of a Parcels Post Service between the Republic of Korea and Australia.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea all postal articles (including parcels) posted in Australia and intended for delivery in North and South Korea were forwarded via Tokyo, Japan, and the Japanese Postal Administration arranged the necessary onward transmission, by air or surface as desired to destination.

Under date of 27th June, 1950, telegraphic advice was received from Tokyo to the effect that postal services between Japan and Korea had been suspended and, following a telephonic conversation with Mr. Pyman of your office, action was taken to suspend all postal facilities to Korea. This position still obtains.

The establishment of a parcels exchange with Korea and the pursuance of the suggestion that Australian controlled air services might be used for the conveyance of air mail from Korea to Australia or other countries, each presuppose the acceptance by Korea of certain financial liabilities for certain of the services supplied. It is by no means clear to this Department that the Ministry of Communications, Pusan, Korea, has the authority to undertake commitments of this nature or that it represents a stable Government which could legitimately claim to accept engagements of a permanent character on behalf of the country. From the terms of the letter on air mail it would seem that some civilian mail is now moving out of the country by means of an American air company with the title of North West Orient Air Lines. So far as concerns a direct connection with Australia this could perhaps be supplied at Okinawa where the route of the North-West Orient Air Lines to Manila intersects with the route of the Qantas charter plane service between Australia and Japan. Use of the Qantas line would, however, involve the responsible financial authority in Korea in payment to the Australian Postal Administration any mail conveyance services rendered under this heading, unless the Japanese Postal Administration undertook to act as it did formerly in the capacity of an intermediary service, and enclosed any articles from Korea in its own mails to Australia.

Your comments would be appreciated on the following points:-

- (I) Does the Ministry of Communications at Pusan, Korea, represent an Administration which can be accepted as qualified to enter into direct engagements with other Administrations. (The last advice on the subject received from your Department on 6th February, 1948 - your file No. 503/3 - indicated that a resumption of normal postal service with other countries was at that stage approved by the United States Army Military Government in Korea, and that any consequential financial obligations would be settled upon approval by the United States Army Military Government in Korea. The parcels exchange service never became operative under this order on account of the

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continuance of the suspension of parcel post service between Hong Kong - the intermediary for this country's parcel mail and Korea. Later as the outcome of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea the Japanese Ministry of Postal Services advised this Administration under date 13th July, 1950, that all mail exchanges with Korea were suspended. It seems to be doubtful, in the absence of some authoritative order from the High Command of the U.N.O. Forces in Korea, if the present requests from the Korean Ministry of Communications at Pusan can be accepted as authoritative.

- (II) Does the U.N.O. High Command in Korea [#] desire that normal postal interchanges should be resumed with the territory under its control, what forms of postal service does it propose to authorise (e.g. are registered articles and parcels exchanges to be authorised) and what authority will accept responsibility for settlement of international accounts in respect of transit, terminal charges (on parcels) and compensation (for loss of registered articles)?
- (III) Is it proposed that the Japanese Postal Service will act as intermediary for the circulation of mail to Japan and, if so, could that service be authorised to enter into negotiation with this country in the matter?
- (IV) Is approval likely to be given for the use, as proposed by Korean Ministry of Communication of the Australian air route to and from Japan for the carriage of Korean air mails? If so what authority will accept responsibility for settlement with this Administration in respect of air conveyance costs?

It is appreciated that advice on the foregoing points will probably involve reference in the first instance to an Australian representative in Japan for elucidation of the points with S.C.A.P.

Your comments in due course would be appreciated.

G. T. Chippindale
(G. T. CHIPPINDALE)
Director-General.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

514/1

MR. JG

O.15297.

DECODE TO:

Dated: 25th October, 1950.

Australian Legation,
M A N I L A.

1030.

224.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Speaking in Supply debate last night Leader of the Opposition said that trouble was flaring up in Philippines where administration was corrupt. Chifley denounced South Korean Government as corrupt and guilty of torture and brutalities. He said Communists had climbed on backs of nationalist movement in Asia and that Communism could only be fought with honest government. Prime Minister replying said Australia had recently exchanged diplomatic missions with the Philippines. Chifley now accused a government with an accredited representative in this country of being corrupt. This was indeed a novelty in international relationships, such a novelty that it pleased him because it showed that such a relationship should be under a more civilised control. The above was reported in Canberra "Times" but does not appear to have been covered in Melbourne or Sydney papers.

External Affairs.
Prime Minister's Department.

25th October, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

504/1

MW:EGM:

O. 12535 - 12558

Sent: 1st September 1950
1700

ENCRYPTED TO:

- | | |
|--|--|
| Australian Embassy,
<u>WASHINGTON</u> 483 | Australian Trade Commissioner,
<u>HONG KONG</u> 202 |
| Australian Embassy,
<u>PARIS</u> 199 | High Commissioner's Office,
<u>LONDON</u> 4231 |
| Australian Embassy,
<u>MOSCOW</u> 68 | Australian Embassy,
<u>THE HAGUE</u> 195 |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>OTTAWA</u> 166 | Australian Legation,
<u>ROME</u> 188 |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>PRETORIA</u> 89 | |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>KARACHI</u> 172 | |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>COLOMBO</u> 176 | |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>WELLINGTON</u> 230 | |
| Australian High Commissioner,
<u>DUBLIN</u> 10 | |
| Australian Mission,
<u>BERLIN</u> 110 | |
| Australian Mission,
<u>TOKYO</u> 399 | |
| Australian Legation,
<u>RIO DE JANEIRO</u> .. 53 | |
| Australian Legation,
<u>TEL AVIV</u> 46 | |
| Australian Legation,
<u>MANILA</u> 201 | |
| Australian Embassy,
<u>DJAKARTA</u> 346 | |
| Australian Consul General,
<u>BANGKOK</u> 98 | |
| Australian Consul,
<u>NOUMEA</u> 90 | |
| Australian Legation,
<u>CAIRO</u> 89 | |
| Australian Commissioner,
<u>SINGAPORE</u> 488 | |

Copies received	
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O. 12333-12358

- 2 -

RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

From Immigration.

Minister Immigration has issued Press statement yesterday regarding amendment passport procedure in view trend world affairs and necessity safeguard national interest and welfare individual Australians.

Amendment announced is that in future Australian passports as general rule will not repeat NOT be made valid for "orbit and certain other countries" but if particular applicant has legitimate reasons for visiting those countries and is not security risk question marking passport valid those countries will be considered.

For your information and immediate action your office all Australian passports issued in future except as mentioned below are to be made valid for "British Commonwealth (see Note 2) and all foreign countries excepting U.S.S.R., Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaira, Soviet-occupied Germany, Soviet-occupied Austria, Albania, Roumania, China, Korea, Indo-China".

Passports already issued and coming under notice in future are to have their validity similarly restricted either by insertion of necessary words on Page 4 after existing endorsement or if no room that page by notation there "see page" and endorsement next vacant page "Not valid for" then list countries mentioned above. Please procure amended rubber stamps locally.

All applicants to be informed of above restrictions when lodging applications. Those who after being so informed still indicate desire to visit any of the countries listed are to be required to complete statutory declaration stating nature of visit. Copy of declaration and application then to be referred Canberra for security check and consideration by Minister. If and when you are expressly advised no security objection passport may be made valid for countries desired but not before.

Particulars may be referred by reply paid cablegram at applicant's expense if necessary.

Amendments Consular Instructions follow".

Washington please inform New York and San Francisco, Pretoria, Ottawa and Delhi please inform Trade Commissioners London, Hague, Rome, Paris please inform Migration Officers.

MIN. & DEPT: IMMIGRATION
E.A.
P.M.'s DEPT:

4th September 1950

CABLEGRAM.

WT:KC

I.10401.

Dated July 13 1950.
0840.Recd: July 13 1950.
1100.

DECRYPTED FROM:

Australian Mission,
T O K Y O.

5/11/50

319. CONFIDENTIAL.

At an ad hoc meeting of the United Nations Commission on Korea in Tokyo on July 12 the following information was imparted. Jamieson and four members of the Secretariat left for Pusan on 8th July. Dr. Liu, the Chinese delegate, arrived at Tokyo from Taejon on 12th July. He is here on government orders and may assume the post of head of the Mission. The Turkish delegate will leave 13th July for Taejon to take Liu's place. The Chinese alternate and the El Salvador delegate will leave for Pusan on 13th July. Thus there will be a quorum at Pusan. The Philippine alternate will leave for Pusan possibly 15th July.

2. Katzin made accommodation arrangements in Pusan and expressed gratitude to the Australian Mission for arranging with the Presbyterian Mission for the use of its residence at Pusan.

3. Dr. Liu is reported to have expressed the opinion that the position is still fluid. Northern forces were about 30 miles from Taejon and it was considered likely that the South Korean Government would move soon to Taejon. He said that members of the Commission had recently visited the north eastern flank of the front which he described as fairly stable. He said that the South Koreans were fighting well and holding their own. This he attributed to lack of North Korean armour in that area. General Kim, a former enlisted Colonel of the Japanese Army, is in command of that area and is said to be doing excellently. Dr. Liu said that considerable progress had been made in reorganizing the "Koreans".

4. Dr. Liu described the Syngman Rhee cabinet as apathetic and incapable of forming any plans to meet the situation. Some high civilian and military officials captured by the North Korean forces were trained and were actively co-operating with the Communists. Several former staunch Nationalists were now broadcasting propaganda from Seoul for the North.

5. Dr. Liu stated that large-scale corruption and atrocities had been committed by both sides. The Northerners had executed South Korean members of certain political and patriotic groups, while the Southerners retaliated with the execution of 100 Northerners.

CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

I.10401.

The handcuffing and shooting of six Americans has been authenticated. It is thought that when the Commission re-convenes at Pusan, the first act will be to directly appeal to both parties to observe the international rules of warfare.

6. Dr. Liu described the problem of infiltration by the North Forces as a major one. Many Northerners were slinking through the lines and causing confusion even with the civil population of the South. Many were disguised as police. Lack of stabilized line made it hard for American air power to operate with the maximum effect. He said on a number of occasions, friendly positions had been bombed or strafed by mistake.

Min. & Dept. E.A.
A/Min. & Dept. Defence.
P.M.'s

July 13 1950.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 10262

:EGM:

Dated: 10th July 1950
1200
Rec'd: 11th July 1950
0830

TELEGRAM FROM:

Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

301. UNCLASSIFIED.

Mrs. Jamieson was due to return to Australia in late August but evacuation from Korea has upset plans. As accommodation position here is difficult and as most personal belongings were left in Korea, request approval send Mrs. Jamieson and children home by air.

Request urgent reply.

E. A. 's DEPT:

11th July 1950

504/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

KC.

I.9904

Dated: July 4 1950.

Recd: July 5 1950.
0830.

CABLEGRAM FROM:

Australian Mission,
T O K Y O.

Unnumbered. UNCLASSIFIED.

My telegram 275.

All persons mentioned in your telegram 241 are safe and well in Japan and will be brought to Tokyo in course of next few days. Five other Australians, the Rev. Fathers Managan, Crosbie, Hawke, Hayward and Baker, believed by us to be attached to St. Columban's seminary, are reported to have chosen to stay in Korea.

Min. & Dept. E.A.
A/Min. & Dept. E.A.
P.M.'s

July 5 1950.

6041

CABLEGRAM.504/1
I. 9794

GG:HP

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated: 1st July, 1950.
1940Australian Mission,
TOKYO.Rec'd: 3rd July, 1950.
8.30 a.m.271. RESTRICTED.

Following message received by United Nations
Commission on Korea.

Rear party in Tokyo from advance party.

Begins -

Advance party arrived Actan yesterday a.m.
Position calm. Immediately called for the establishment
of a skeleton but fully representative Commission which is
feasible under local conditions. Remaining members have
been requested to proceed soonest. We consider essential
Commission's presence here primarily for moral reasons.
Liu, Chairman China, Jamieson Australia, proceeded last
night to the seat of Government and will return earliest
and report to Commission. Australian Observers have also
gone to Government seat where they will temporarily remain.

2. Leaflets dropped over Actan stating that United
Nations had appealed to the United States forces to assist
the Republic of Korea very beneficial effect on the local
populace.

3. Brionval address this a.m. Actan Government officials
on Security Council and Commission's activity was released to
the local press.

4. Facilities now permit immediate limited functioning of
the Commission.

5. All Australian Missionaries this Area safely
evacuated.

6. India's support of Security Council's resolution
warmly welcomed by Koreans and Americans here.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
A/G. " " " " Defence.
P.M.'s Dept.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

504/1

KC.

I.9739.

Dated: July 1 1950.

Recd: July 1 1950.
2145.

CABLEGRAM FROM:

Australian Mission,
T O K Y O.

269. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 246.

It is now confirmed that Mrs. Lane and two children are in Osaka. Mr. Lane is in Japan but exact location not known. Mrs. Yule is in Osaka. Miss Tait is in Bofu. All are well. There is not confirmed news regarding others but they are probably in Japan. Evacuation is proceeding and it is not believed that any Presbyterian Missionaries were in or near areas of hostilities.

E.A.
P.M.'s

July 3 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

504/1

I. 9685.

HT.L.

Dated: 30th June, 1950.
1400.
Rec'd: 30th June, 1950.
2330.

DECODE FROM:

Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

260. PRIORITY. RESTRICTED.

We are giving you all possible confirmed information, but we cannot check all press reports and repeated requests add to the congestion.

2. The Communication position is extremely difficult. This is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Commander went to Korea himself to study the situation. In Japan also, communications between Tokyo and the evacuation areas in Fukuoka are extremely congested owing to priority to military calls. The American authorities have promised to keep us informed and have suggested that the repetition of enquiries only congests signals.

3. At my request, General Robertson immediately despatched two officers this morning from Kure to the Headquarters of the 24th Division and reception camps. One officer to be responsible for evacuees, and the other to maintain communication between the U.N. Commission and Lake Success through this Office until a direct channel can be established. We are arranging our own system of direct communication and have supplied the Liaison Officers with our list of Australians and their location in Korea.

4. With reference to your telegram 245, advance groups of the United Nations Commission on Korea left Japan early to-day and arrived a few hours later at a point in Korea, presumably Pusan. The group consisted of Dr. Liu, Messrs. Jamieson, Lrionval, Kondapi, Gaillard, Major Peace, Squadron Leader Rankin and Mr. Liao interpreter.

5. Your telegram 246. It is confirmed that Misses Dunn, Withers, and McNab have been evacuated to Bofu in Japan. Information on the others will be available as soon as United States Army lists are consolidated.

....

Min and Dept. L.A.
A/Min and Dept. Defence.
P.M's

1st July, 1950.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

504/11

O. 8854.

Dated: 29th June, 1950.

2120.

JG:GG

DECODE TO:

Australan Mission in Japan,
T. O. K. Y. O.

246. UNCLASSIFIED.

Reference our telegram 244. Australian citizens

from Korea.

Australian Presbyterian Mission now informs us that they have received telegram from Japan to effect that all their members from Korea have arrived in Japan. Please confer.

E.A.
P.M.'s. Dept.

30th June, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

504/1

AP:JCH

I.09617

ENCODE FROM:

Dated: 30th June, 1950
1820
Recvd: 30th June, 1950
0330 hours.

The Australian Mission,
T O K Y O.

259. PRIORITY. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 241. Please see my telegram 255.
We have not yet been able to obtain any information
about persons in Seoul or North of Seoul but G 2
General Headquarters advise that press reports of
up-rising in the vicinity of Fusan have no basis in
fact. There is, therefore, no reason to fear for
the safety of persons there. We shall advise you
further as soon as possible.

E.A.
P.M'S. DEP'T.

30th June, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

504/1

WT:MB

O. 8761.

DECODE TO:

Dated: 29th June, 1950.

Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

1415

241. IMMEDIATE. RESTRICTED.

Our telegrams 234 and 235 and your telegram 244.

Press and relatives are inquiring urgently concerning whereabouts and welfare of Australian officials, missionaries and other citizens who were in Korea at outbreak of hostilities. Please report by telegram as fully as possible all available information.

Presbyterian Foreign Missions Committee has informed us that following Australian Presbyterian missionaries were in Korea:-

- (a) In Seoul. Rev. and Mrs. George Yule and Miss McNab
- (b) In Pusan. Rev. F. Cunningham, Rev. and Mrs. H. Lane and two children, Miss M. Withers and Miss B. Dunn.
- (c) Somewhere in Korea. Miss M. Tait.

E.A. (505/13/2)
P.M's. Dept.

30th June, 1950.

WT:MB

O. 8761.

DECODE TO:

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Dated: 29th June, 1950.

Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

CABLEGRAM.

1415

ACTION COPY

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- (c) Somewhere in Korea. Miss M. Tait.

E.A. (505/13/2)
P.M's. Dept.

30th June, 1950.

ER

505/11 - a file
504/11
500/3/8
JH

Copies received

Secretary	
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

TWHP:GG

0.8724.

DECODE TO:

Dated: 29th June, 1950.

Australian Government Trade Commissioner,
H O N G K O N G.

147.

UNCLASSIFIED.

My letter of 13th June, regarding funds for Korea, ^{pieces received}
Please withhold payment if not already made.

E.A. (951/34)
P.M'S. Dept.

30th June, 1950.

504/1

Secretary	✓
AS(P)	✓
B	
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EX	✓
Adm	✓
A/s	✓
Excom.	

504/1

COPY
CG

Minister for External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

28th June, 1950.

My dear

With reference to your query about Australian citizens in Korea, the situation is as follows:

As Jamieson, the Australian Member on the United Nations Commission, did not have consular or diplomatic functions in Korea, care of Australian interests has been in the hands of the British Legation. On 26th June, a telegram was addressed to Jamieson asking him to consult the British Minister as to plans for evacuating British nationals, including Australians, who might wish to leave. The Head of the Australian Mission in Japan, Colonel Hodgson, was also instructed to take up the same matter with the American authorities in Japan. We have since learned that the United States proposed to evacuate all Allied civilians who wished to leave and some movements have been made assisted by United States army aircraft and naval vessels.

When further detailed information comes to hand, I shall not fail to let you know.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Minister for National Development
and Minister for Works and Housing,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

For other info see 505/13/2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

GC/SC

I.9469

Dated: 27th June, 1950.
1753

Recd: 28th June, 1950.
0830

DECODED FROM:

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
L O N D O N.

A.89 UNCLASSIFIED.

Korea.

All United Kingdom and Commonwealth women and children in Seoul who were willing to go, were removed to Inchon on June 26th for evacuation by sea.

Min & Dept. E.A.
A/E. Min & Dept. Defence
P.M.'s Dept.

23th June, 1950.

1753/5

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

JG/SC

0.8549
Sent: 26th. June, 1950.
8.15

ENCODED TO:

Australian Representative UNCOK.
SEOU L.

Ex.414. IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED.

For Jamieson.

Please pass following message to British Legation and
facilitate reply if necessary.

Begins:

Glad if you would advise whether any action is
being taken to evacuate British subjects and American citizens
from Korea and, if so, whether arrangements made for such
purpose cover as well, Australian citizens who may wish to
leave Korea.

Ends.

E.A.
P.M.'s Dept.

27th. June, 1950.

504/1

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MW/SC

I.5447
Dated: 15th. April, 1950.
1225
Recd: 16th. April, 1950.
0900

DECODED FROM:

Australian Mission,
T O K Y O.

**ACTION
COPY**

143. UNCLASSIFIED.

We have been approached by McKenzie Stevens, Director of Trade and Finance Division, E.C.A. Mission, Korea, regarding the projected visit of joint Korean Government and businessmen to Australia in June. Understand approach was made by United States Embassy, Seoul, to United States Embassy, Canberra, and that necessary approval had been given. However, Stevens who is in Tokyo for the United States State Department Economic Conference, today learned from Korea that there may be some hitch.

As party at present in Hong Kong and other countries before arriving Singapore, Karachi and New Delhi, please clarify the position regarding approval for party to visit Australia. Understand Mission will be interested in discussing trade with business people and have in mind buying scoured wool, wheat and barley, and selling canned and dried marine products, handicrafts and minerals and ores, including tungsten.

- Min. & Dept. E.A.
- " " T. & C. (Canb. Syd.)
- " " C. & A. (Canb.)
- Treasurer and Treasury
- Min. & Dept. National Development.
- P.M.'s Dept. (E.P.D.)
- P.M.'s Dept.

17th. April, 1950.

*copy taken
S.M.A. Files
504/1
504/14
504/17 (Pab...)
504/18 (Ma...)*

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Secretary	✓
ADP	
E	
NE	
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PI	✓
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CABLEGRAM.

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KC/LB.

Sent: 13th April, 1950.

DECYPHER TO:

1410.

Australian Delegation to the
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

167. RESTRICTED.

Your 164 and 170. Observers for Korea.

1. We think it most unlikely that Australia would supply more than three observers and we cannot make any commitment even as regards third observer until formal approach made by Secretary-General and passed on to Defence authorities.

2. In view of U.N.C.O.K. resolution which recommended that observers be selected only "insofar as possible" from members of Commission and in spirit of Assembly Resolution 297B which provided for establishment of panel of field observers "based upon the principle of equitable geographical distribution", it might be desirable to approach other States if required number cannot be obtained from Commission members.

3. We also feel that it is not necessary to have chief observer of rank of Brigadier-General. We appreciate that leaders of other observer corps, e.g. in Palestine, Indonesia, Greece, have been of this rank, but they have been in charge of observers considerably in excess of eight. We would be willing to pass without commitment formal request for leader of rank of say Colonel to Defence authorities.

External Affairs. (852/20/4).
P.M.'s. Department.

504/1

14th April, 1950.

Copies received	
Secretary	✓
ASCP	✓
E	✓
MR	✓
A	✓
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ANT	✓
UN	✓
RC	✓
Sdm	✓
A. G.	✓
Room	✓

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

WT/LE.

~~The contents of this message are classified 'Secret' under the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982.~~
I. 8112.

ACTION COPY

DECODE FROM:

Dated: 5th April, 1950.
2004.
Rec'd: 7th April, 1950.
1100.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

250. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chang, Korean Ambassador, and attache will arrive at Sydney on 24th April. He has arranged scheduled air flights including visits to Canberra and Melbourne, but we have told him that these may have to be adjusted to fit in with your arrangements. He leaves by B.O.A.C. on 1st May and will visit Korea before returning to the United States.

A/Minister and Department of External Affairs,
P.M.'s. Department.

7th April, 1950.

504/1

Copies received	
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COPY.

504/1

(6) Relations with Australia.

President Rhee on 4th July spoke to me of the need for expanding Korean trade and asked whether Australia would explore the possibility of a commercial link. He worked around to asking our reaction to a proposal to send a Korean goodwill representative to Australia as part of a wider programme to gain greater support and recognition for his country. The Korean Ambassador in Washington, for example, would go to Canada, but as Australia was off the beaten track, a special envoy would have to be chosen. He mentioned two possibilities - one, a Dr. Pyung, whom he described as an academic and non-politician. The other was Mr. Chang Taik Sang, Metropolitan Police Chief before the establishment of the Government and briefly Foreign Minister thereafter.

In reply I said that we welcomed the idea of trade contacts and in general closer relations with all our Pacific neighbours. As for the suggestion of a goodwill visit, I promised to obtain the reaction of the Government. President Rhee said that his suggestion should be regarded as personal and tentative.

CABLEGRAM.

ACTION COPY

NW/jv

DECYPHER TO

Sent March 3, 1950
0.2947/8
1450

AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE,
UNCOK, SEOUL.....EX.165

AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TOKYO.....73

CONFIDENTIAL.

Korean Goodwill Mission to Australia.

Your memorandum 7 of 14th February, 1950. Korean Ambassador, Washington, approached Australian Ambassador informally on 6th January to "sound out" whether Australian Government would be prepared to receive Korean representative to deal with both diplomatic and trade matters. Australian Ambassador has been informed that we would have no objection to official in consular capacity to handle trade and other matters, but we would prefer to delay any question of exchange on diplomatic exchange, even if we had no intention of reciprocity, when we have no such relations with other countries of more importance to Australia.

2. We note that this is second occasion on which you have been approached regarding goodwill mission. Similar approach was made to Australian Ambassador, Washington by Korean Ambassador on 27th February. Ambassador has been instructed to inform Korean Ambassador that we would have no objection to receiving goodwill mission which we anticipate would concentrate largely on trade and establishment of consular relations.

=====

504/1

E.A. (504/1/2) (504/1/4)
March 6, 1950

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
Cypher Message. ~~Not to be distributed outside the Department with Governmental or Instrumentally without paraphrasing. It is never to be downgraded below 'Restricted'~~
CABLEGRAM.

ACTION COPY

C:KC

0.2915.

Sent: 2nd March 1950.
1800.

ENCYIPHER TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

504/1

85. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 152.

Korean Goodwill Mission to Australia.

Similar approach made to Jamieson in Seoul by Korean Foreign Minister, Colonel Limb, 11th February.

You may inform Korean Ambassador that we would have no objection to receiving goodwill mission. ~~We anticipate mission would concentrate to receiving goodwill mission.~~ We anticipate mission would concentrate largely on trade and perhaps establishment of consular relations mentioned in our telegram 83.

E.A. (504/1/2)(504/1/4).

3rd March 1950.

Copies received	
Secretary	✓
AS(P)	✓
E	
ME	
A	✓
LC	
P	✓
Sec	103
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U	✓
ER	✓
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

This is an unclassified version of a
Cypher **CABLEGRAM** to be
used outside a British Commonwealth
Government Department or Instru-
mentally without paraphrasing. It is
never to be downloaded below 'airtel'.

0.2749.

504/1

CC:GG

ENCYPHER TO:

Dated: 28th February, 1950

AUSTPALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

83. CONFIDENTIAL.

Korean representation in Australia.

Your 25.

We would prefer not to receive a representative from Korea as diplomatic representative. We would have no objection to an official in a consular capacity to handle trade and other matters. It would be difficult for us to agree to a diplomatic exchange even though we had no intention of reciprocating when we have no such relations with other countries of more importance to Australia. Please explain that we would prefer to delay any question of exchange on diplomatic level for the time being.

E.A.(504/1/4)

28th February, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

GC:GG

504/1
0.2749.

ENCYIPHER TO:

Dated: 28th February, 1950.

AUSTRALIAN FMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

83. CONFIDENTIAL.

Korean representation in Australia.

Your 25.

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E.A.(504/1/4)

28th February, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

**ACTION
COPY**

This is an unparaphrased version of a Cypher Message. It is not to be distributed outside a British Commonwealth Government Department or Instrumentality without paraphrase. **Dated** it is never to be downgraded below 'Restricted'.

NER

DECYPHER FROM:

**The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.**

I. 2908

**27th February, 1950
2033**

**28th February, 1950
4.00**

Recd.:

152. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Minister from Ambassador.

Korean Ambassador today requested me to pass on to you an enquiry from his Government as to whether Australia would be willing to receive a good-will mission from Korea of 2 or 3 persons to enable Korea to express to Australia its appreciation of Australian action in the United Nations in relation to Korea. The Korean Ambassador expressed the desire for an early indication of your reaction.

MIN. AND DEPT. OF E.A.

1st March, 1950.

MR	
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504/1

COPY/MH

504/1

Australian Delegation
U.N. Commission on Korea,
Seoul, Korea.

February 14, 1950.

MEMORANDUM for:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

NO. 7 CONFIDENTIAL.

The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Colonel B.C. Limb, having expressed a desire to see me I called at his office on February 11th. Colonel Limb began by recalling Australia's sponsorship in the ad hoc Political Committee of the resolutions requesting Security Council reconsideration of Korea's application for U.N. membership. He referred to Australia's interest in Korea as evidenced by her representation on three U.N. Commissions and to her having acted as joint sponsor of the Resolutions of December 12, 1948 and October 21, 1949 on Korea. For the second time he formally congratulated me on having been elected rapporteur for UNCOK this year.

Colonel Limb then stated that his Government would very much like to appoint a goodwill envoy who would visit Australia and New Zealand, and other adjacent countries. The purpose of the visit as he outlined it would be to exchange greetings and establish a further personal basis of contact on the governmental level. He also felt that it might perhaps be possible to discuss possibilities of trade. Colonel Limb did not mention the subject of a Pacific Pact, but this may well have been at the back of his mind.

As far as I could gather, the Korean Government has no particular person in mind at the moment. It was made clear, however, that should the Australian Government receive this idea favourably, the greatest care would be taken to see that an envoy of the right type was chosen.

The Foreign Minister asked me if I would sound out your views on this matter. He also requested me to keep the matter strictly confidential.

(Sgd.) A.B. Jamieson

For AHS minutes etc. please 504/1/4

CABLEGRAM.

I.1400

Dated: 27th. January 1950

1.50

Recd: 31st. January 1950.

0950

--/SC

DECODED FROM:

Australian Consul-General,
MANILA.

504/1

Sav. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.Korean Ambassador.

The Korean Special Ambassador for the Presidential inauguration assignment came to see me this morning. Although his assignment is completed, he has stayed on in case the Baguio Conference takes place and he is expecting instructions from Seoul to stay until March if necessary.

I asked Professor Pyun, a loquacious little man of markedly Japanese appearance, what he made of the China situation. He replied that Britain's attitude was entirely understandable. British investments had to be safeguarded and this obliged her to be realistic and not idealistic in her approach. American policy, however, was much harder to justify. He laid the blame for the collapse of the Chiang regime on the Chinese liberals and the United States of America. For many years, influential liberals such as Sun Fo had decried the Kuomintang as reactionary, corrupt and incompetent. They had not kept these criticisms to themselves but had "poisoned the ears of their foreign friends" with them. These liberals were the main contact which Westerners had with China. Their reiteration of the theme that Chiang and his clique were corrupt and that the only hope for China lay in handing the Government over to the Liberals who would then make peace with the Communists had deeply impressed American thinking and had given American policy a quite unfair slant against Chiang Kai-shek.

In life, said Professor Pyun, the choice is rarely between good and evil but between bad and worse. Chiang and his clique were probably corrupt but the liberals were no better as indeed they showed when some of them got into office. Chiang remained the great national leader, the only figure who could unite China and in pulling him down, the Americans had done China and themselves a great disservice.

General Marshall was much to blame. American insistence on truces with the Communists enabled them to build up their forces. Had America not attempted to force a coalition on to Chiang, China would not be Communist today. The Chinese people bitterly resent this interference and this, more than promptings from Moscow, is the explanation for the many anti-American demonstrations which took place in such cities as Shanghai.

Professor Pyun attributed the Communist military successes to the fact that the people of China, who had never been warlike, were sick of fighting after the twenty years through which they had just passed. He emphasized however, that there were substantial bodies of troops scattered piecemeal throughout the country who were loyal to Chiang and that the great majority of Chinese people still looked up to him as the national leader.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

He ended up making a plea for moral and material support from Australia for such a plan against Communism as Korea. If Korea was to be saved from the fate of the Kuomintang, it was vital that the Government should have the moral support of the democratic countries. Material assistance such as had been discussed at the Ceylon Conference was also vital.

Min. & Dept. E.A.

31st. January 1950.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

JC:HP

0.1019

TELEGRAM TO:

Sent: 24th January, 1950.
1650

British Consul-General,
SEOUL.

EX. 65. From Immigration.

Permission has been given for Miss Sin Yung Hong
C/- Australian Presbyterian Mission 777 Chwa Chun Dong
Pusan to enter Commonwealth to undertake post graduate
studies in nursing period two years. Travel facilities
may be granted and Korean Foreign Affairs Department advised
if necessary.

IMMIGRATION (50/2/734)

25th January, 1950.

Copies received

Secretary

PI

Pac

ANT

UN

ER

Adm

A/cs

Room

1/24/50

FOR MR. DEKTER:

KOREAN APPROACH RE ACCREDITATION OF KOREAN REPRESENTATIVE
TO AUSTRALIA.

Reference attached telegram No. 25 from Washington.

2. Political Background.

The Government of the Republic of Korea was formally inaugurated on 15th August, 1948, following elections held in South Korea during May under the observations of UNTCOK.

United States occupation forces were withdrawn on 30th June, 1949.

Australia recognised the Republic of Korea on 15th August, 1949. The Republic has also been recognised by U.K., U.S. and other countries. (It has been reported that in all twenty-one countries have recognised Korea but this has not been confirmed by New York.)

In February, 1949, the regime in South Korea was described by Shaw as "a young, not very efficient, semi-totalitarian state. The President has wide powers which he endeavours to wield dictatorially." Recent information from Korea suggests this appreciation still holds. The Government is, moreover, extremely anti-Communist.

3. Australian Representation in Korea.

Australia has no representative accredited to the Government of the Republic of Korea and Australian interests are at present in the hands of the British Minister in Seoul.

Australia is a member of UNCOK and Mr. A.B. Jamieson is Australian representative on this body.

4. Australian Interests in Korea.

(a) Strategic.

Korea has no direct strategic value to Australia. It might possibly be argued that indirectly it is of value to this country in that so long as South Korea remains non-Communist, Western expansion of Communism may be contained. Communist successes on the China mainland, however, have offset any strategic value the country may have offered.

(b) Trade.

In February, 1949, there was one Australian businessman in the country but according to Shaw he was due to leave Korea within a few weeks.

Moroney (Commerce and Agriculture) is now checking up concerning present trade relations and any possibility of future trade and will be advising us.

As far as selling goods to Korea is concerned, the question of payment seems to be the most important factor. Division of Korea has left the economy of the South in an unenviable position and trade will probably have to be financed with ECA funds.

On 18th July, 1947, we were informed by the Australian Embassy, Washington, that the following exports were available from Korea:-

Wicker baskets, fish creel, graphite, tungsten, fluorite, mica, ginseng, lead, zinc, porcelain, clay, fish and marine products

/including

27 combined as
of 13.1.50

lavor (?), agar-agar, sharks' fin, leaf tobacco, raw silk, handicraft goods, lacquer ware and molybdenum.

(c) Other Interests.

There are a few Australian Prebyterian missionaries at Pusan and some Roman Catholic priests who are all registered with the British Legation in Seoul.

5. Comments.

It can be seen then that Australia's interest in South Korea is not motivated by economic or strategic purposes. Our interest is rather to assist that country through UNCOK to attain unity and to prevent its being used again as a base for an aggressive power.

The Government of the Korean Republic has now, through its Ambassador in Washington, asked whether Australia would be prepared to receive a representative from Korea to deal with diplomatic and trade matters. The Koreans would probably hope to gain from such a move added prestige and probably certain goods, like flour and wool, which presumably Australia could supply.

There would appear to be no good reason to reject this overture but whilst we could agree to appointment of a Korean representative to Australia we need not necessarily accredit an Australian representative to Korea. In fact, I strongly submit that Australian interests do not warrant appointment of such a representative. Our interests could be adequately safeguarded through Tokyo and/or through the British Minister in Seoul as at present.

If we did agree to exchange of diplomatic representatives, Jamieson should not be accredited to the Government as well since he is a member of a body supposedly above the Government. We should therefore require two representatives in Seoul where our interests are at present being adequately represented by Jamieson.

When UNCOK is withdrawn the matter could be reconsidered but I doubt whether in the foreseeable future there would be sufficiently strong cause for having a diplomatic representative in Seoul.

DJH/CG

12th January, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

509/1

This is an unparaphrased version of a Cypher Message. It is not to be distributed outside a British Commonwealth Government Department or Instrumentality without paraphrasing. It is never to be downgraded below 'Restricted.'

:NER

I.298

DECYPHER FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Dated: 6th January, 1950.
1926
Recd.: 8th January, 1950.
9 a.m.

25. Confidential:

For Prime Minister from Ambassador.

Dr. Chang, Ambassador for Korea, called on me informally this morning and asked me to "sound out" whether Australian Government would be prepared to receive a representative from Korea to deal with both diplomatic and trade matters. Chang emphasised admiration Korea held for Australia and the earnest desire of the Korean Government to have closer link with our country.

During the conversation, the Ambassador expressed his fear of Japan's future moves. He was naturally concerned at developments in China, but also felt that anything in the nature of a lenient peace agreement would encourage Japan to revive her former aggression. Chang said, "I know Japan - watch out. As soon as General MacArthur leaves, they will be back to exactly the same outlook as they were before." He also spoke of the need for some security pact in the Pacific, but this and view on Japan were purely his personal observations and did not convey official viewpoint of his Government.

PRIME MINISTER.

9th January, 1950.

CABLEGRAM.

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I.298

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PRIME MINISTER.

9th January, 1950.

DJH
Pls see me about this
TC 10/7
504/1
504/1/4
E.S.R. *R/S with Felipe 10/1*

Copies	
Secretary	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
AS(P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
E	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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AUSTRALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL
MANILA.

6th January, 1950.


Manila 5/50.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

Korea.

I sat next to the Korean Special Ambassador for the Inauguration of President Quirino, Professor Pyun Yung Tae, at dinner on 31st December, 1949. The Ambassador spoke in very friendly terms about Australia and said the Korean Government wished to send a representative there. Unfortunately, they had no money for such luxuries. Indeed, he himself had so little money that he was compelled to live in the Y.M.C.A. which was virtually a hostel for destitute seamen. However, the Koreans were hardy mountaineers who had defeated all their enemies at one time or another and they were spending their resources, not in needless show but in building up their country to be strong enough to take over the puppet state of North Korea.


Consul-General.

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL
MANILA.

504/1

6th January, 1950.

Manila 5/50.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

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lu

Consul-General.

27th September, 1949.

Reference: 2350/4/3.

Memorandum No. 678.

Memorandum for:

The Secretary-
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

RECOGNITION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(Ref. your Memo. No. 390, file No. 504/5)

We are informed by the representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations that the following 21 states have so far accorded de jure recognition to the Republic of Korea:

Australia	France
Belgium	Greece
Bolivia	Haiti
Brazil	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Chile	Philippines
China	Turkey
Costa Rica	United Kingdom
Cuba	United States
Dominican Republic	Vatican City.
El Salvador	

J. Kimball
for Minister.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Rec'd

19 SEP 1949

12 September, 1949

File No

504/1

Memorandum No. 1049/49

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.
Australia

Korea

Further to our telegram No. 842 of 12th September, we are enclosing under separate cover the letter of 3rd September from the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dr. Evatt.

We have taken the liberty of informing the Australian Mission to United Nations of the nature of the contents of Mr. Limb's letter.

D.W. McNicol

D.W. McNicol
Second Secretary

- ① should letter be sent to Minister?
- ② should we have copy made?

CKM

DD

DK

ESR

Mr. Deser

Pass letter to Secretary

Passed 21/9

DK

P

CABLEGRAM.

This is an unparaphrased version of a Cypher Message. It is not to be distributed outside a British Commonwealth Government Department or Instrumentality without paraphrasing. It is never to be downgraded below 'Restricted.'

**ACTION
COPY**

HP/GC

I.13503

Dated: 12th September, 1949
1639Recd.: 13th September, 1949
1205

DECYPHER FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.842. RESTRICTED.

For Minister from Makin.

The Korean Ambassador has asked me to convey to you a personal letter of 3rd September from the Korean Foreign Minister, B.C. Limb, requesting your careful consideration of "the threat to and actual violation of the peace in Korea by the Soviet Union acting through its Communist military agents," and that the Australian Government "will be prepared to sponsor or to support a programme at the General Assembly which will bring an end to this organised military violence".

The letter refers to Soviet support and recognition of the North Korean Government as a violation of the General Assembly resolution of 12th December, 1948, the Charter and principles of International law, cites recent instances of military operations instigated from the North, and concludes with the following paragraph:

"Unless Your Excellency's Government, in concert with other Governments of similar views, can find a solution for this dangerous situation within the near future, there is a grave danger that these Soviet-directed and sponsored military forces will make even larger attacks upon the territory, people and the defence forces of the Republic. The results of such attacks would be incalculable; and the dangers inherent in such a situation cannot be minimized. While reserving to itself all rights of self defence, as well as the right at some later date, if that should prove necessary, to appeal to the United Nations Security Council, my Government presents this statement of facts to you, having especially in mind Article 1, Article 10, and Article 35(2) of the Charter of the United Nations".

Letter will be forwarded by next bag.

MIN.& DEPT. E.A.

13th September, 1949.

Copy

Secretary

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Pac. ✓

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

504/1

(original on 504/1/5)

22nd August, 1949

Memorandum No. 971/49.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Recognition of Republic of Korea

Attached is a copy of a letter received from Dr. John M. Chang, Ambassador of Korea, in reply to our letters of 11th and 15th August informing him of the contents of your telegrams 419 of 11th August and 429 of 15th August.

D.W.McNicol
D. W. McNicol,
Second Secretary

Encl. (1)

DWMCN.rs.

524/1

SYNGMAN RHEE DEPLORES AUSTRALIAN-PHILIPPINE DIFFICULTIES.

Dr. Rhee, President of the South Korean Republic, has deplored reports that the Philippines wanted to exclude Australia from the Pacific Pact because a Filipino ex-serviceman was prevented from visiting his wife in Australia and on account of other minor incidents. He added that they were all interested in safeguarding the Pacific area, and minor questions which cause misunderstandings could be easily adjusted. Commenting on the White Australia policy, Dr. Rhee said he did not think it was practicable.

New Delhi, 19/7/49

COPY.

File No. 504/1/2.

Memo No. 401.

Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

4th July, 1949.

MEMORANDUM for:

504/1

The Australian Mission in Japan,
TOKYO.

You may have seen a copy of Memorandum No.16 dated 20th June from Mr. Jamieson in Seoul on the subject of Korean-Australian relations. It appears from this that President Syngman Rhee has recently broached with Mr. Jamieson the question of possible trade between Korea and Australia, and is seeking the Australian Government's reaction to a suggested visit by a Korean goodwill mission.

While the possibility of future trade between Korea and Australia is one which might be usefully explored, we hardly think that a visit by a Korean goodwill mission would serve much purpose at the present time. There are also of course other reasons why we would not wish to show any special favour towards the Syngman Rhee Government, at least until we are satisfied that it deserves some more positive form of recognition than we have given it up to the present. We are unlikely to be making any movement in this direction until after the next session of the General Assembly at the earliest.

On the other hand we would not wish to reject the President's suggestion out of hand. We do not know whether he is likely to raise it again, but if he does he might be informed that the Australian Government is sympathetic with the idea of trade with Korea, and that the matter will be studied by the relevant Government departments, but that we are doubtful whether a goodwill mission could accomplish any useful purpose at the moment.

If Mr. Shaw is still in Seoul when this memorandum reaches you it might be passed on to him to be used informally if Syngman Rhee should raise the question with him.

Secretary.

COPY.

Australian Delegation,
UNCOK
Seoul, Korea.

June 20th, 1949.

X-Ref. 503/3/7. 504/1

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

#16.

Subject: Korea-Australia Relations.

On June 18th my wife and I were invited to tea with the President and Mme. Sygman Rhee. After the usual exchange of courtesies the President began a conversation with me by referring to the fact that after July 1st, 1949, the Korean Government will have the authority to determine where ECA funds will be spent and will have a considerable say in how they are spent.

Dr. Rhee continued that the United States Government has included approximately 34 million dollars to meet shipping transportation costs. Rather than see this paid to American shipowners he would like to use it to build up a Korean merchant marine or at least to set up the nucleus of one. Possession of a merchant marine would place Korea in a new position in relation to other friendly nations. It would strengthen Korea's position and broaden the basis on which it hopes to develop. It would moreover provide a counterpart to the rehabilitated Japanese merchant marine, which he felt would eventually be operating, at least in the Pacific Ocean area.

At this point the President became rather discursive on the subject of Korea's need for friends. Our American friends, he said, have provided us with a large amount of weapons and ammunition. They have helped train the Korean troops, who have now reached a pleasing pitch of efficiency and morale. But they will not give any heed to his pleas for fighter planes, on the ground that a powerful force can be flown here in four hours if necessary. The Americans felt that fighter planes in Korea would be a white elephant, but he did not agree and still hoped eventually to buy some planes of this type.

The President then took up the subject of possible trade with Australia. He said that there would be many things that Korea could buy from Australia and for certain items there would be no difficulty over payment. He had not developed any specific ideas, but had been turning over in his mind the possibility of a goodwill envoy visiting Australia. Such an envoy might not necessarily be a commercial expert but would be accompanied by someone well versed in trade and shipping problems. He was not thinking particularly of barter trade, which would be difficult because of the few things Korea could supply Australia until the results of the ECA recovery programme became felt.

The President said he wondered what the reaction of the Australian Government to his idea of a goodwill mission would be. He had taken up the idea of a similar mission to Canada through Dr. Chough Pyong Ok and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, but in view of my presence here he had felt that in the case of Australia he would rather have a talk with me.

I informed the president that I would report our conversation to you by airmail. (sgd) A.B. JAMIESON

"Z"

CABLEGRAM.

FP/RMW

I.4020

DECYPHER FROM

Dated: 10th March, 1949
2343.AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
NEW YORK.Rec'd: 12th March, 1949
0900

UN 181 ECOSOC.

1. Republic of Korea applied for associate membership of ECAFE. Council by 15 votes to 3 extended geographical scope of commission to include Korea but admission to membership is left to discretion of ECAFE..
2. Polish representative strongly attacked United States and spoke of "the Gauleiter Hodges" etc. United States represented withdrew from meeting in protest against the language used and resumed his place after Polish Representative finished.
3. Australian representative said that political issues raised by Poland were largely irrelevant since resolution included Korea as a geographical term within scope of ECAFE. It was left to ECAFE to decide which if either or both authorities in Korea should be admitted. However, he deplored Polish attack and briefly replied along lines of our statements in last General Assembly.

A/G MIN & DEPT E.A.

12th March, 1949,

P.W.R.

TREASURY

B.A.E.

504/1

CABLEGRAM.

JP:MD

DECODE FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE,
C/- BRITISH LEGATION,
SEOUL.

102756.

Dated, 18th February, 1949.
1708.

Rec'd: 19th February, 1949.
0900.

4. Restricted.

Commission 18th February decided to ask the Secretary General's consent to request Russia to transmit to the leading personalities in North Korea the desire of the Commission to make contact there. At the insistence of Australia supported by India and Syria it was agreed that the absence of Soviet reply to this message would not prevent the Commission seeking other methods of contact.

I plan to return to Tokyo 21st February.

.... Sbay.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

19th February, 1949.

504/1

Secretary	AS (P)	E	ME	A	LC	PI	Rec	ANT	UN	IEE	Adm	A/AS	Director
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CABLEGRAM.

/RMW

0.1548

ENCYIPHER TO
AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TOKYO.

Sent: 3rd February, 1949
2100

CONFIDENTIAL.

28.

KOREA.

1. Section of report of Delegation on Korean Question and speech of Australian delegate to first committee are being forwarded by air.

2. We feel that Australian representative should endeavour to concentrate attention of the Commission on the attainment of Korean unity by methods described in paragraph 4 (b) of resolution i.e. removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea.

3. Please keep in touch with Indian delegate and act in concert when possible.

=====

MIN & DEPT E.A. (852/20/4)

4th February, 1949.

504/1

Copies received	
Secretary	—
AS(P)	—
E	—
MR	—
A	—
LC	—
PI	✓
Pac	✓
ANT	—
UN	—
ER	—
Adm	—
A/c	—
Exec	—

CABLEGRAM.

SW/RMW

I.1744

DECYPHER FROM

Dated: 1st February, 1949
1830AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TOKYO.Rec'd: 2nd February, 1949
0830IMMEDIATE.CONFIDENTIAL.

46. Your 25. KOREA.

In accordance with your explicit instructions I shall endeavour to fly to Seoul with Jamieson by the first possible plane, namely, Thursday, February 3rd, to attend the meetings of the United Nations Commission on Korea. I will do so most unwillingly because of the visit to Tokyo this week of important United States Group including the Secretary of War, Royall, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, General Wedemeyer, Head of the North East Asian Division of the State Department, Bishop, and the Assistant Secretary of Labour. Important policy decisions for Japan will be made by this delegation whom I had planned to see on February 3rd and February 6th and whom I should then have no opportunity to meet. If you consider such meetings sufficiently important to warrant my remaining in Tokyo please telegraph most immediate. Jamieson would proceed alone and I could make later survey.

2. I am concerned at my lack of background on Australia's attitude to the Korean question. We have not been able to secure copies of United Nations Assembly discussions on Korea, see your memorandum No. 25 of February 19th nor have I had a reply to telegram No. 7 of January 6th enquiring whether Australia will recognize the South Korean Government. I should have immediate instructions on this point. In the absence of information I do not understand Australia's action as United Nations Assembly in sponsoring the resolution on Korea which did not seem in line with the findings of our delegate on the temporary commission. My personal inclination would have been to have had strong misgivings about committing ourselves to a Government which may find itself in a few years time in a similar position to that of the present Kuomintang Government in China. We appear to have committed ourselves however by the sponsorship of the resolution and it would be logical for Jamieson as Australian member of the permanent commission to go to Seoul accredited Australian Consulate General or Charge d'Affaires.

3. You are aware that the communications link between Tokyo to this outpost is by telephone which cannot be regarded as secure. Should Jamieson's appointment be a long term one, there is besides the problem of maintaining his family that of providing proper communications and clerical assistance. He will certainly require to return to Tokyo within a month from his departure.

4. We will take spare copies of interdepartmental cypher and decypher 1941 held by this Mission which will

Copies received

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AS(P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
E	<input type="checkbox"/>
ME	<input type="checkbox"/>
A	<input type="checkbox"/>
LC	<input type="checkbox"/>
UN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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Adm	<input type="checkbox"/>
A/cs	<input type="checkbox"/>

2.../be....

copy taken for 504/1

504/1

CABLEGRAM.

2.

I.1744

kept at the British Legation Seoul together with one timetable, in number 406 and out 289 which should be used without second indicator or group, message commencing on line one group two of a new page for each message.

5. Please arrange for credit of United States dollars 1,000 to be established in Seoul for the use of the Australian member on the Commission for telegraph and other authorised expenditure.

..... Shaw.

=====

MIN & DEPT E.A. (ATTN.)

2nd February, 1949.

(NO DISTRIBUTION.)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

This is an unparaphrased version of a Cypher Message. It is not to be distributed outside a British Commonwealth Government. Defeat about or instrumental without paraphrasing. It is never to be downgraded below 'restricted'.

EF:MD

0.971.

DECYPHER TO:

Dated 22nd January, 1949.
1210.

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

42.

IMMEDIATE.

RESTRICTED.

Your UN. 35. UNICOMP.

Our interpretation in light of Resolution on Korea describing jurisdiction is that agreement of Government in South Korea is not necessary.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (892/1/2)

24th January, 1949.

504/1
503/4

Loj
Secretary
AS/P
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CABLEGRAM. SECRET.*see P. 3.*

MD

I.895.

SAVING TELEGRAM FROM:

Dated: 7th January, 1949

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
L O N D O N.

Rec'd: 18th January, 1949

H.7. SAVING. UNCLASSIFIED.

My telegram 3rd December H.313, Saving.

SOUTHERN KOREA.

Following is summary of main events up to the end of November, 1948.

1. Relations between the National Assembly and the Government.

(1) In mid-October, Government presented to the Assembly a draft "local Administration Law" one of whose features was a provision that the police throughout the country should be under control of National Police Headquarters. The Assembly amended this to put police under authority of local prefects. Despite the fact that the President returned the bill asking that this amendment be dropped, the Assembly passed it by 102 votes to 16 as they had amended it.

504/1
(11) A resolution appeared on the Assembly agenda for 5th November calling upon the Government to accept responsibility for the Yosu revolt (see my savingram H.429) and to take a number of steps to prevent further outbreaks of this kind. During the debate which followed many members demanded the dismissal of the present Cabinet. These demands were pressed so determinedly that on 6th November the President addressed the Assembly on the subject and declared his confidence in the present Ministers and maintained that under the Constitution the Government should remain in office for four years. He appealed for less criticism and more co-operation. His speech had little effect. Succeeding speakers continued to demand re-organisation of Cabinet, and when put to the vote all but one clause of the Resolution were passed by large majorities.

(11) At a press Conference on 5th November the President said, "We are not living under a responsible Cabinet system such as exists in Great Britain, France and Japan. For four years from now our country will be under my administration. To overthrow the Government, therefore, is to damage the national prestige. The words overthrow the Cabinet cannot exist in our country."

(1V) In a broadcast on 10th November the President bitterly castigated his political opponents and maintained that those who asked for Cabinet changes were playing straight into the hands of the Communists. On the following day in a debate on this broadcast many members denounced as unconstitutional the President's retention of Ministers who did not enjoy the confidence of the Assembly.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

- 2 -

I.895.

(V) At a press conference on 12th November the President reaffirmed his determination to keep his present Ministers in office so long as he pleased, but hinted that he might make changes after the United Nations Assembly had dealt with the Korean question.

(V1) In a further broadcast on 17th November the President indulged in a further outspoken attack on his critics.

(V11) Resolution reported in my savinggram H.313 received majority support owing to fear felt by the Assembly as a result of the grim events of the Yosu revolt.

It is now reported that when the bill requesting the United States Army to remain in Korea came up for discussion on 20th November, 16 members of the Assembly who insisted upon the withdrawal of the United States Army from Korea left the meeting in protest.

On 22nd November the Cabinet resolved that the Minister for External Affairs should formally request United States Government to maintain troops in Korea until National forces adequate to defend country against external aggression could be organised.

2. Continued Communist Activity in South Korea

(1) On 15th November Minister of the Interior informed the National Assembly that a further revolt had broken out in the Otae Mountains, 45 miles North East of Seoul, and that fierce fighting was going on in that area between armed Communists and the police. He added that situation in Chonju, about 120 miles south of Seoul was also causing the Government much anxiety.

(11) Forces of Pyongyang Government which recently replaced the Red Army guards on the 38th parallel have been carrying out frequent raids inflicting numerous casualties on the security forces of the Seoul Government as far as 20 miles south of the parallel.

(111) Recent military successes of Chinese Communists have depressed the ordinary people who fear the horrors of Yosu and Suncheon may be repeated elsewhere, and have correspondingly elated the Korean Communists.

(1V) Government countermeasures include -

(a) Wholesale political arrests (3,000 in Kwangju area alone during first 10 days of November).

(b) Expansion of police force by the enlistment of 15,000 more men.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

- 3 -

I.895.

(c) A draft Law for the Preservation of National Peace providing for severe penalties for all persons and associations which have subversive aims.

(d) A draft Army Reorganisation Law.

(e) A draft National Defence Force Law providing for creation of armed force of 90,000 men composed of patriotic Youth Organisations.

(f) Military training will also soon be made part of programme of all colleges and schools.

3.

Representation abroad.

(1) Press reports indicate that provision is being made in the 1949 Budget for the following diplomatic and consular posts abroad.

Embassies -

Nanking, Washington, London, Paris, Manila

Consulates - General -

Singapore, Los Angeles, Shanghai, New York, Osaka, Peking, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Fukuoka, Formosa.

Consulates -

Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shimonoseki, and places to be chosen later in Australia, India and Italy.

(11) Dr. Chang Han-pum has subsequently been appointed as the Ambassador for Seoul in Nanking, and left for his post on 27th November.

(111) Mr. Min Hi Sik has been appointed to be Consul-General at Los Angeles.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " " DEFENCE.

18th January, 1949.

ESR - file

FOR MR. McINTYRE

KOREA - APPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S FUND.

Reference attached cables 29 to and 35 from Australian Delegation to the United Nations.

2. It is suggested that their 35 is wrong in suggesting that the position in China is similar to that in Korea. In China the I.C.E.F. administration conferred with the Chinese Government in order to try to get its approval for the use of medical supplies for children anywhere in China, including Communist-occupied areas. At that time there was only one Chinese Government, which was accorded de iure diplomatic recognition by all members of the U.N. as the Government of all China. There was no communist "Government of China" claiming or receiving recognition as such.

3. In Korea on the other hand there are at present two independent administrations both claiming that they are de iure the Government of the whole of Korea.

(a) The Pyongyang "Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in North Korea has received recognition as the Government of all Korea by the Soviet Union and also by Outer Mongolia, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Up till now this Government has ^{otherwise} not received recognition even for its de facto authority, e.g. the U.S. military government in South Korea has, instead, forwarded all communications to the Soviet Occupation authorities in North Korea. Now that the Soviet occupation troops have been withdrawn (the completion of their withdrawal was announced on 25th December 1948) some form of recognition will presumably have to be given to the Pyongyang regime if we want to negotiate with it.

(b) The Seoul "Republic of Korea" claims that it is the de iure government of all Korea. The joint Australian-Chinese, American resolution accepted by the General Assembly on 12th December recommended in its para. 9 -

"that Member States and other Nations in establishing their relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph 2 of this resolution."

Para. 2 of the resolution reads as follows:-

(The General assembly)

"declares that there has been established a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult, and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea, and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

This means that virtually Australia, along with the other countries voting for this resolution, is committed to recognising the "Republic of Korea" (i.e. South Korea) as a state, and its Government as the lawful government having effective control and Jurisdiction over Korea South of the 38th Parallel."

4. The Seoul Government has now received recognition from China, the Philippines, The United Kingdom and the U.S. We have not yet received the text of the recognition accorded by China and the U.S., but it would be unlikely that they would recognise it as the Government of all Korea, as cable 35 suggests. The U.K. were careful in their recognition to make it clear that they considered ~~that~~ the territory of "The Republic of Korea" confined to the area south of the 38th Parallel. The Note delivered to the S. Korean Foreign Minister by Mr. Holt, the U.K. Charge d'Affaires in Seoul, stated that: -

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom having regard to the terms of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 12th December, 1948 recognise the Republic of Korea as an Independent Sovereign State whose territory is that part of the Korean Peninsula in which free elections were held under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission, and recognise the Government which your Excellency represents as being the lawful Government of that State. Accordingly His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are desirous of entering into formal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea."

5. Our attitude as regards South Korea has not yet been defined (it is understood the Minister is considering the matter at the moment), but the following points are pertinent: -

i. We should be going beyond the 12th December Resolutions, and would be reducing the hopes of a United Korea, if we recognised the Seoul Government as the Government of all Korea.

ii. If North Korea applies for aid from the Children's fund it would not require the consultation and consent of the South Korean Government.

iii. If North Korea applies, some form of recognition would have to be given to the Pyongyang Government.

iv. If South Korea is recognised as a state, and its Government as a lawful Government (i.e. de iure recognition) limited recognition might still be given to North Korea e.g. by recognising the de facto authority of the Pyongyang regime, which would enable the I.C.E.F. to deal with it direct.

504/1

~~503/4~~

JAS

22/1/49

CABLEGRAM.

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Cipher Message. It is not to be distrib-
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FF/30

DECRYPTER FROM
HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
LONDON

I.1036
1922
Rec'd January 20, 1949
1005

230. IMPORTANT. CONFIDENTIAL. From External.

Your telegram No. 202.

Korea.

On 18th January I learnt that Commonwealth Relations
Office had pressed Foreign Office to postpone announcement
of recognition of Korean Government until Commonwealth
Governments could be consulted and Foreign Office did
postpone announcement so that telegram H.20 could be despatched
although Foreign Office view was that as decision is implementation
of resolution of general assembly and matter had been fully
discussed between delegations consultation was not necessary.
I have made point in your telegram under reference today 19th
January.

=====

504/1

MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
January 20, 1949

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Officer	
Secretary	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Secretary	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

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Government Department or its
agency without paraphrasing. It is
never to be downgraded below 'Restricted'

MAL:MC

O. 744.

DECODE TO:

Dated 19th January, 1949.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
LONDON.

3.00.

Secret. Important. 202.

We have seen telegram No. H.20 from Commonwealth
Relations Office indicating following decision of United Nations
assembly adopted on 12th December United Kingdom Government
proposes to accord recognition to Government of Korea.

It should be pointed out to United Kingdom authorities
that question of future of Korea is of considerable importance to
Australia and that Australian Government would expect formal recognition
of present Government in Seoul should be preceded by consultation
between United Kingdom and Australia.

Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. Defence.

20th January, 1949

504/1

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CABLEGRAM.

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never to be downgraded below 'restricted'

EGM/FF

I.976
Dated 18th Jan. 1949
2044
Recd. 19th Jan. 1949
1435

DECRYPTER FROM:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

UN35. Confidential.

Your 29, U.N.I.C.E.F. North Korea.

Would you regard a programme in North Korea
as requiring consultation and consent of Government of
South Korea as Government concerned in accordance with
Assembly Resolution 57(1) 1,2 (c) and like North China?
Presumably U.S.A. and China would since they have recognised
Government of South Korea as Government of whole of Korea.

Min & Dept of E.A. (892/1/2)

504/1

19th January 1949.

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FOR THE SECRETARY.

Australia's Attitude to South Korean
Government.

Reference attached cable (7 of 7th January)
from Tokyo.

You will recall that the joint Australian-
Chinese-American Resolution accepted by the General
Assembly on 12th December recommended in its Para 9 -

"that Member States and other Nations in
establishing their relations with the Government
of the Republic of Korea, take into consideration
the facts set out in paragraph 2 of this resolu-
tion."

2. Para 2 of the resolution read as follows:-

(The General Assembly)

"declares that there has been established
a lawful Government (the Government of the Repub-
lic of Korea) having effective control and juris-
diction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commis-
sion was able to observe and consult and in which the
great majority of the people of all Korea reside that
this Government is based on elections which were a valid
expression of the free will of the electorate of that
part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary
Commission and that this is the only such Government
in Korea."

3. Attached draft cable submitted for your
approval.

7th January,
1949.

504/21

N. China Daily News.

20 June 1947

Dual Nationality of Chinese in Hongkong

HONGKONG, June 18 (Reuter)

Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, c.B.E., warned against the continuance of unrestricted Chinese immigration into Hongkong and delivered a strong attack on the recognition of dual nationality in the colony.

Speaking before a Hongkong Rotary Club meeting, Mr. Woodhead, who is an Old China Hand, said dual nationality was in conflict with British nationality laws and dismissed as pure myth the prevalent opinion that unrestricted Chinese immigration was a right derived from some Anglo-Chinese agreement.

Hongkong, he said, has been swamped with more than one million more people than before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, and the spreading of the present civil war is likely to lead to a further influx of Chinese.

Entry of Undesirable Elements

"So unrestricted is the flow of immigrants, that daily police reports reveal that large numbers of professional criminals and banishees are able to enter the colony unchecked," he declared.

"It is obvious that as long as Hongkong appears to offer attrac-

tions such as stabilized currency, security of life and property, control of food prices, and freedom of speech and publication, immigration will continue to exceed emigration."

Mr. Woodhead, who prior to the Pacific War was Editor of the authoritative magazine "Oriental Affairs" in Shanghai and also a columnist of the influential, large-circulation "Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury," cited figures to prove that the large stream of Chinese entering the colony is taxing utility services and causing food and housing shortages.

Population Figures

"On the 1,600,000 estimated inhabitants in December, 1941, some 750,000 were refugees who sought shelter here following the Japanese occupation of Canton and other ports in South China. Until this influx, the estimated population of Hongkong had never exceeded some 800,000.

On V-J Day," he pointed out, "the population of Hongkong and Kowloon and the leased territories had fallen from an estimated 1,600,000 at the time of the colony's surrender, to between 400,000 and 600,000.

"Within six months of V-J Day, Chinese were entering the colony at the rate of 100,000 a month, and

the Report for Hongkong for 1947 estimates the population at the end of last year at 1,800,000," Mr. Woodhead stated.

Continuation of this mass immigration would, in the opinion of Mr. Woodhead, make conditions in the colony intolerable. He cited overworked public utilities, overcrowded hospitals and schools—and the problems of diseases such as tuberculosis.

Dual Nationality

Mr. Woodhead, in his talk before the members of the Hongkong Rotary Club, said he hoped he would be "forgiven" for stating that in his opinion the factor of dual nationality in the colony was the second most important problem facing Hongkong.

"No man can serve two masters," he said, adding that Hongkong Chinese residents, British subjects by birth or naturalization but regarded by the Chinese Government as Chinese nationals, are in almost every emergency "torn between conflicting loyalties."

Mr. Woodhead is leaving here for the United States on July 6. He is not yet certain of returning to Hongkong.

A.H.L. ✓
F.B.H. ✓
H.M. Hm
T.A.P. P
OS ✓
E.S.R.

530/2.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

"Z"

1.1946Z
 Dated 7th December, 1948
 2245
 Rec'd. 8th December, 1948
 1405 hours.

FM:JSH

DECYPHER FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.

AUSTDEL 341. IMMEDIATE.

1. Korea debate began in First Committee on 6th December, rejected by 34 votes to 6. Czechoslovakian proposal that representative of North Korean Government be allowed to participate in Committee's debate. Violence of Soviet attacks on Korean Commission and South Korean Government had alienated several representatives (such as Australia, India, Canada and New Zealand) who at the beginning of the debate had been prepared to give the Northern region a hearing under defined conditions. Committee by 39 votes to 6 agreed to allow Delegate from Government of Republic of Korea to participate in the Committee's debate without the right of vote.

2. Australian representative introduced joint resolution on 7th December. He stressed the importance of the Far East and the Pacific, and placed Korea against this background. Australia's policy was based on the welfare of the Korean people themselves and could be summed up in three words - Independence, Democracy, Unity. Praised work of temporary Commission who had collated great deal of useful information on conditions and opinion in the South. It was to be regretted that equal information was not available for the North where the authorities had refused all access to the United Nations. Praised co-operation of United States occupation authorities. Outlined Australian policy along lines of joint resolution.

A/G MIN. & DEP'T OF E.A.
 MIN. & DEP'T OF DEFENCE.

8th December, 1948.

504/1

FOR MR. McINTYRE

AUSTRALIAN POLICY IN THE
FAR EAST

The Canberra Branch of the A.I.I.A. has been asked to prepare notes on official policy towards various aspects of post-war international reconstruction, and this is the proposed note on Australian policy as far as East Asia is concerned.

2. Could you please glance through it to see if there is anything you think ought not to go out?

ONS/RON

21st October, 1948.

File No. 504/1

AUSTRALIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE FAR EAST

The Australian Government's interest in the Far East since the conclusion of the Pacific War is illustrated by the fact that the Commonwealth is now represented in the area by an Embassy in Nanking, a Consulate-General in Shanghai, an Australian Mission in Tokyo, and a Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, who is concurrently the Commercial Counsellor for South China attached to the Embassy in Nanking. Australia is also represented on the United Nations Temporary Commission in Korea, and on the Far Eastern Commission in Washington; the Head of the Australian Mission in Japan is concurrently the representative on the Allied Council for Japan representing jointly Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and India; and the Australian B.C. O.F. contingent forms an important part of the Allied Occupation Force in Japan.

JAPAN

2. Australian policy towards Japan is aimed at the reaching of an early Peace Settlement in accordance with the basic objectives of the Allied Powers, as laid down in the Potsdam Declaration of 26th July, 1945, and in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, which was adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 19th June, 1947.

THE POTSDAM DECLARATION:

3. In the Potsdam Declaration it was laid down, inter alia:-

"That there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest;

that until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory, to be designated by the Allies, must be occupied;

that the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of the democratic tendencies among the Japanese people;

and that Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war."

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION BASIC POST-SURRENDER POLICY

4. The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan stated the following ultimate objectives:-

The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform are:-

- (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.
- (b) To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such government in Japan should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:-

- (a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.
- (b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarised. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.
- (c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.
- (d) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.

At the time of adoption of this paper the following Australian statement was placed on record with F.E.C.:-

"The policies laid down in this paper are subject to and without prejudice to discussions which will take place during the negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Japan."

The Australian representative at the meeting said Australia adopted the paper on this understanding.

STATEMENTS BY DR. EVATT:

5. The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs has expressed agreement with these basic objectives, and has stressed that the three aspects of the Japanese problem - security from future aggression, democratization, and the assurance of a viable economy - are interrelated.

6. On 26th February, 1947, he stated:-

"Japan must never again be permitted to develop the means of waging aggressive war. First and foremost therefore, we have placed security secondly, we believe that a country which has a genuinely democratic form of government is unlikely to embark on a policy of aggression and is more likely to pursue means of adjusting its interests to those of other countries Allied aims for Japan fall into three main classes, namely military, political and economic."

7. He stated further on 6th June, 1947:-

"It is plain that the future control and supervision of Japan will be the most important question for the peace conference to decide. By no pretext should Japan be permitted to imitate the example of Germany after World War I and again emerge as a menace to the security of the Pacific or South East Asia

"But a merely negative policy towards Japan would be quite inadequate. There is no reason why the Japanese people, provided always that there is adequate control, should not gradually develop into a peaceful democratic state. Constructive reform of Japan's social, political and economic pattern is equally important, and particular stress is being laid on the formulation of provisions to deal with the review of the Japanese constitution and the gradual democratisation of that country, including the continued encouragement of trade unions, progressive reform of the educational system and a more drastic reform of the system of land tenure than that already instituted."

PROCEDURE:

8. The Australian Government has insisted that Australia, in view of her war effort in the Pacific, and her greatly increased status in the international field, should be a party principal in any Japanese Peace conference. Her views on the procedure for the Peace Conference, which were accepted by the other British countries represented at the Canberra Conference in August, 1947, are as follows:-

- (i) The Peace Conference should be called as soon as possible.
- (ii) The talks should begin on a policy-making governmental level.
- (iii) On the analogy with the Far Eastern Commission, all members of the United Nations who made a direct contribution towards the winning of the Pacific War should be represented.
- (iv) Voting on matters of substance should be by a two-thirds majority i.e. the practice and principle of the veto should not be admitted.

DEVELOPMENTS IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN:

9. The delay in calling the Peace Conference has inevitably resulted in a tendency towards uni-lateral decisions affecting the whole future of Japan. The U.S. in an attempt to draw up plans for ensuring a viable economy for Japan and thus lessening the burden on the American tax-payer, has recently despatched groups of businessmen and experts to Japan to consider the economic situation and make recommendations. Both the Strike and Johnson Reports suggested a higher level of heavy industry for Japan than most Allied countries had anticipated. Dr. Evatt in a speech before the House of Representatives on 8th April, 1948, pointed out that some U.S. commentators had even gone so far as to suggest that Japan should be given the capacity to re-arm, to be used as an instrument in a future struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

10. Dr. Evatt went on:-

"I say that it will be an evil day for Australia if Japan is given capacity to re-arm. Whatever promises Japan may give, or may be thought to be ready to give, there is no securing the safety of Australia against a repetition of what took place in 1942 unless the broad principles of the Potsdam Declaration are carried out, and Japan's capacity to wage war is not restored.

This does not mean that Japanese people are to be enslaved and not given a reasonable standard of living. The very opposite should be the concern of those who look at the human beings that constitute this important nation. It is right that Japan should be a workshop, and that Japanese people should have their industries. It would be completely wrong if Japan were able to be reconverted into an arsenal which might possibly be used in one direction, but which might ultimately be used according to the wishes of the Japanese leaders and turned in the direction of South Pacific to the detriment of this country."

KOREA

11. At the Cairo Conference between the United States, the United Kingdom and China, it was stated on 1st December, 1943, that "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Potsdam Declaration of 26th July, 1945, re-affirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration, and the Soviet Union accepted the Potsdam proposals in their declaration of war against Japan on 8th August, 1945. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States subsequently, at the Moscow Conference, 27th December, 1945, agreed that a Joint Soviet-U.S. Commission representing the Soviet and United States Occupation Forces in Korea, should meet and consult with democratic Korean parties and social organisations regarding the setting up of a provisional Korean democratic government. The Joint Commission's proposals were to be submitted for the joint consideration of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, for the working out of an agreement for a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

12. The Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission was set up, and sat from March-May, 1946, and May-August, 1947, but failed to reach agreement, chiefly owing to the Soviet's refusal to recognise certain South Korean parties, which had opposed the Moscow communique, as "democratic." The United States accordingly referred the Korean question to the United Nations General Assembly.

DISCUSSION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

13. Two resolutions on Korea, proposed by the United States, were passed by the General Assembly on 14th November, 1947. The first of these resolved that a United Nations Commission should observe the due election of Korean representatives who should be invited to take part in the consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations. The second established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of 9 members (including

Australia) to supervise elections and aid in establishing a National Government of Korea.

14. The Soviet group voted against these resolutions and the Ukraine, which was elected a member of the Commission, refused to take part.

15. Dr. Evatt outlined the Australian Government's policy on Korea in the debate, and stressed that the magnitude of Australia's war effort entitled her to be regarded as a party principal in the Japanese Peace Settlement, and in any preliminary negotiation, such as those concerning the future of Korea. He said that he considered that the Powers interested, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, should begin immediate conversations with a view to an agreed settlement. If this course proved impossible, and if the Peace Conference could not be convened very promptly, Australia would support the United States proposal in principle, reserving the right to further analysis as to the composition of the Commission and its precise powers and duties. Australia subsequently voted for the U.S. resolution, and agreed to take part in the work of the Commission.

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND DECISIONS TO CONSULT INTERIM COMMITTEE:

16. U.N.T.C.O.K. started its sessions in Seoul (U.S. Zone) on 12th January, and approaches were made to the Ukraine and the Soviet Occupation Authorities in North Korea, in the hope that they would co-operate with the Commission's work. The Commission, through its sub-committee II, of which Mr. S.H. Jackson, the Australian representative, was Chairman, also consulted with Korean political leaders of various shades of opinion.

17. On the 6th February the Commission decided, in view of the negative attitude of the Soviet authorities, and in the light of consultations with Korean personalities, to consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, as to whether it was open to or incumbent upon the Commission to implement the programme

outlined in the Assembly's Resolution II of 14th November in that part of Korea occupied by the United States Army.

DISCUSSIONS IN THE INTERIM COMMITTEE:

18. On 26th February, 1948, the Interim Committee (on which of course the members of the Slav bloc are not represented) adopted a United States Resolution to the effect that it was in its view incumbent upon U.N.T.C.O.K. to implement the programme as outlined in Resolution II, "in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission," by 31 votes to 2, (Canada and Australia, both of whom are represented on the Commission), with 11 abstentions.

19. The Australian and Canadian representatives opposed the United States proposal on the grounds that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the 14th November, 1947, envisaged the holding of elections throughout the whole of Korea and that the Interim Committee had no authority to change the terms of the General Assembly's resolution. The Australian and Canadian representatives said that there was grave danger that the holding of elections under United Nations auspices in the south zone alone would intensify and perpetuate the division of Korea. Australia emphasised that a decision risking such serious consequences should be taken only by the Assembly itself.

KOREAN COMMISSION AND SOUTH KOREAN ELECTION OF 10th MAY.

20. On 1st March, Lieutenant-General Hodge, the United States Commander in Korea, announced that elections would take place in South Korea on 9th May (the date was later altered to 10th May).

21. On 12th March U.N.T.C.O.K. adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of the Interim Committee's resolution by 4 votes to 2 (Australia and Canada), with 2 abstentions. The resolution was to the effect that the Commission would observe the elections to be held on 9th May, "provided the Commission has ascertained that the elections will be held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and

assembly would be recognised and respected."

22. The Australian delegate, Mr. Jackson, in a public statement on 12th March, declared that Australia opposed the resolution on grounds that -

- (i) She adhered to the stand taken in the Interim Committee opposing the holding of elections in South Korea only;
- (ii) Additional grounds for opposition existed in that a vital development had occurred which might have altered the views of the Interim Committee, i.e. the fact that almost all parties in Korea, including those led by Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik, had boycotted the elections, which would be supported only by the extreme right group. The Interim Committee had provided for such a contingency by emphasising that the Commission "has the authority and discretion to discharge its duties in Korea wherever and to the extent that circumstances permit."

23. On 10th April U.N.T.C.O.K. passed a resolution to the effect that it had satisfied itself as a result of extensive field observations that there existed in South Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognised and respected; it would accordingly observe the elections to be held on 10th May.

24. Some 71.5% of the total electorate (95.2% of the registered voters) voted in the election, which resulted in the return of 94 members belonging to the extreme right-wing parties and 85 independents, as well as 19 members of small splinter groups. (This result was not unexpected in view of the fact that the elections had been boycotted by all the moderate and left-wing political leaders.)

25. On 25th June, 1948, U.N.T.C.O.K. passed a resolution recording its opinion that "the results of the ballot of 10th May, 1948, are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission, and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea."

"NATIONAL ASSEMBLY" AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT.

26. The elected representatives met in Seoul and declared themselves a "National Assembly" for all Korea, proceeded to adopt a constitution for the "Democratic Republic of Korea," and elected a so-called "National Government" under Dr. Syngman Rhee as President, and with General Bum Sik Lee as Prime Minister. The United States Occupation Authorities handed over the military government powers to this new Government on 15th August, and the Government has been accorded de facto recognition by China, the Philippines and the United States.

27. The Australian Government's attitude put forward by its representative on U.N.T.C.O.K., Mr. A.B. Jamieson, who had succeeded Mr. S.H. Jackson, was that the Commission could not recognise the Seoul Assembly and Dr. Rhee's Government as the "National Assembly" and the "National Government" referred to in the General Assembly resolutions. The Commission clearly could not support the contention that Rhee's Government was a "National Government" for the whole of Korea, as the Commission itself had observed elections held only in South Korea. The Commission's remaining function was to report factually to the General Assembly.

28. The Australian Government therefore held that the Commission should not be connected in any way with the transfer of administrative authority from the United States Military Government to Dr. Rhee's Government. However, the majority of the members of U.N.T.C.O.K. decided that its Chairman should attend the 15th August celebrations.

29. The Commission subsequently decided to set up a drafting Committee (on which Australia is represented) to complete the drawing up of its report on the 10th May elections. This Committee started work at Lake Success on 7th September. Its report was due to be submitted to the 3rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly at its meeting in Paris

CHINAPOLITICAL RELATIONS:

30. The Australian Government has been anxious to preserve with China the friendly relations that grew out of a common participation in the war against Japan. The Legations of the two countries have recently been raised to Embassy status (as from 16th February, 1948.)

CIVIL WAR:

31. While the Australian Government's desire is to see a united, democratic and prosperous China, it is not able and has not desired to intervene in China's internal matters, including the civil war.

32. The Australian Government's fixed policy is one of not allowing the export of arms to any country outside the British Commonwealth, and therefore no arms have been supplied to either of the contestants in the Chinese civil war.

U.N.R.R.A.:

33. Australia has made substantial sacrifices to help the Chinese people through contributions to U.N.R.R.A., and a considerable number of Australians were employed in China by U.N.R.R.A. It is generally recognised that the Australian staff employed in this work were of a high standard. Particular examples of Australian contributions to Chinese relief and rehabilitation were the provision of fishing vessels and ice-making plants for the Fisheries Project at Shanghai, and the manufacture of 50 locomotives for use on the railways in parts of China remote from the civil war.

34. Under the Post-U.N.R.R.A. relief and U.N.E.S.C.O. plan for granting educational assistance to students from South East Asia the Australian Government is offering one senior fellowship and two scholarships to China, to be taken up in the year 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

JHP/MB

I.8410

Dated 10th February, 1948.
12 noon

DECODE FROM -

The Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

Dept. 71.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Jackson informs me he will broadcast from
Seoul on Korean affairs at 1930 Seoul time Tuesday
evening, wave length 7935 megacycles.

E.A.
Information

10th February, 1948.

504/1

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.24546
Dated 17th December, 1947.
11.30 a.m.
Recd. 18th December, 1947.
8.30 a.m.

MB

DECODE FROM -

The Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

Dep. 481.

Shaw left Tokyo this morning, expected time of arrival at Canberra breakfast Friday, 19th. Jackson left Tokyo for Seoul Tuesday, 16th, by air, expected to return during week-end.

E. A. (Attn.)

18th December, 1947.

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CABLEGRAM**SECRET.**

THE QUOTATION OF THIS CABLEGRAM WITHOUT PARAPHRASE EXCEPT IN A SECRET DOCUMENT WILL COMPROMISE THE CYPHER USED, REGARDLESS OF CONTENT IT MUST ALWAYS REMAIN SECRET.

HE:HP

I.21866

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated: 5th November, 1947.

1754

Rec'd: 6th November, 1947.

3.30 p.m.

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

UN.1082. Assembly 139. IMMEDIATE.Korea.

The following is the text of the Resolution by the Political Committee 5th November.

The General Assembly:

Recognising the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea;

Believing that the national independence of Korea should be re-established and all occupying forces then withdrawn at the earliest practicable date;

Recalling its previous conclusion that the freedom and independence of the Korean people cannot be correctly or fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the Korean people and its decision to establish a United Nations temporary Commission on Korea (hereinafter called the "Commission") for the purpose of facilitating and expediting such participation by elected representatives of the Korean people.

1. Decides that the Commission shall consist of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria and Ukrainian S.S.R.
2. Recommends that the elections be held not later than 31st March, 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which representatives constituting a national assembly may establish a national Government of Korea. The number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportional to the population and the elections should be under the observation of the Commission.
3. Further recommends that as soon as possible after the election the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation.
4. Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of a National Government that Government should in consultation with the Commission.
 - (a) Constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein;
 - (b) Take over the functions of Government from the Military Commands and civilian authorities of North and South Korea, and

*Note:- Australian participation in
with Commission - 500/3/5.*

(c).....

R46/20/3

CABLEGRAM**SECRET.**

-2-

I.21866

- (c) Arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within 90 days.

5. Resolves that the Commission shall facilitate and expedite the fulfilment of the foregoing programme for the attainment of the national independence of Korea and withdrawal of occupying forces taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. The Commission shall report with its conclusions to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments.

6. Calls upon the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities.

7. Calls upon all members of the United Nations ^{to} refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean people during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence except in pursuance of the decisions of the General Assembly and thereafter to refrain completely from any and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Korea.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS(ATTENTION)

6th November, 1947.

Feb 20/3

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

GCA/PE/HE.

I. 21446/5.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 29th October, 1947.
2322.AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.Received 31st October, 1947.
8.30 am.UN.1048. Assembly 127.K O R E A.

1. Political Committee 29th October discussed Soviet Resolution that Committee "invite elected Representatives of the Korean people from Northern and Southern Korea to take part in the discussion of the question."
2. Gromyko said vital interests of Korean people should not be discussed in absence of their Representatives. Quoted example of invitation of Jews and Arabs to attend Palestine Committee, and "strange phenomenon" of difficulties always raised against representation of United Nations of peoples who were struggling for freedom, e.g. Indonesians. Fundamental difference between United States and Soviet proposal was that former called for all measures to accomplish Korean independence being taken before withdrawal of troops, whereas latter called for withdrawal first to enable Korean people to settle their problems independently.
3. Dr. Ewart pointed out that Soviet and United States proposals both contemplated withdrawal of troops and self-Government, and therefore it would be preferable for the two powers to make further attempt at Agreement. He was, however, opposed to more delay, which would be caused if Representatives of Korean people were to be chosen and brought to New York. It would be a serious matter nevertheless to reject Soviet proposal outright. Some form of Korean consultation should take place. United Nations Commission on the spot would be best authority to consult with Koreans, who were entitled to hearing.
4. Dulles (U.S.A.) then proposed amendment to Soviet Resolution providing that Koreans participate in consideration of matter and that "in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to ensure that the Korean Representatives will in fact be duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees from Military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission Korea, to be ~~be~~ in Korea with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea."
5. Dulles said his amendment accepted Soviet resolution that United Nations could deal with Korea and also Soviet position that question could not be settled without consultation between United Nations and true Representatives of Korean people. Soviet suggestion, however, was impractical as it would be impossible to hear in New York Representatives of approximately 500 political parties and social organisations. Best method would be for United Nations Commission for Korea to deal with thorny problem. Dulles pointed out question of selecting Representative Koreans had nullified efforts of Joint Commission and similar difficulty would confront United Nations Committee if Soviet Resolution were adopted.
6. France also urged United States and U.S.S.R. make further effort to reach understanding. Agreed with principle of sending United Nations Commission to Korea but stated that, in voting on United States Amendment, France would abstain because

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-2-

I. 21446/5.

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the Committee was running risk of taking decision at this early stage on question of substance when Soviet Resolution was rather question of procedure.

7. Wellington Koo made a rather confused speech. He supported proposal for Korean participation provided Koreans represented Korea as a whole. In view of "extraordinary" situation, however, China thought that best method of implementation of consultation would be by means of United Nations Commission on the spot. China therefore supported United States amendment after proposing deletion of words, "from Northern and Southern Korea".

8. Gromyko opposed United States amendment, and charged that United States were "afraid" to have Representatives of Korea present.

9. Dr. Evatt warned again of interminable delays if Korean Representatives come to New York, and said that their presence at this stage was not necessary. International Declarations already provided for independent, unitary Korea, and all Koreans were in agreement on this. Real need for Korean consultation would come in consideration of details and implementation, and this should take place with Commission, as provided in United States amendment. Australia considered Korean problem was part of Japanese Peace Settlement but had not insisted on this view to avoid delay.

10. Other speakers during day were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Byelo-Russia and Ukraine for Soviet Resolution. Canada, Belgium and Haiti against. Debate continues tomorrow.

External Affairs (attn)

31st October, 1947.

R46/20/3

D/BL/PM

CABLEGRAM.

I.21343.

DECYPHER FROM -

Dated: 28th October, 1947.
1833.

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

Recd.: 29th October, 1947.
2.40 p.m.

I M M E D I A T E.

UN.1041. Assembly 119. KOREA.

The following is the text of Dr. Evatt's
statement to Committee 1 today:-

The future of Korea is a matter of concern to the Japanese settlement affecting both East Asia and the Pacific. Korea became part of the Empire of Japan after its annexation in 1910, and legally Japan will retain sovereignty until she formally cedes it in Peace Treaty. The question before the Committee is whether the United Nations should itself take the initiative in establishing a Korean Government.

The broad pattern of Korea's future has been planned by various Allied declarations. The Cairo Declaration stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This was confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration which was accepted by Japan when she signed the terms of surrender. The Moscow Conference of December 1945 went further, and set out concrete steps to be taken to achieve Korean independence. A joint commission of the United States and U.S.S.R. representatives was to assist in the establishment of a provisional Korean Government and submit proposals to the Governments of the United States of America, U.S.S.R., China and the United Kingdom for the establishment of such a Government and for placing Korea under a Four Power Trusteeship for a period of up to five years.

Australia's interest in Korea is twofold -

- (1) Australia's armies played a major part in the defeat of Japan, fighting in numerous areas from December 1941 until the final surrender of Japan.
- (2) The Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy took part in action on nearly all fronts against the Japanese.

She gave big supplies of food, munitions, and war materials for her own use and that of her Allies. The magnitude of her war effort entitles Australia to be regarded as a party principal in the Japanese Peace Settlement, and in any preliminary negotiations such as those concerning the future of Korea. Australian and other British Commonwealth Forces are still in Japan under the able leadership of General Macarthur, who is Supreme Commander, and where American Forces constitute the main element of his Command.

The Soviet Representative at the Plenary Assembly argued that Article 107 of the Charter completely bars the United Nations from considering Korea. That is a misreading of the Article. It is true that the Charter

CABLEGRAM.

I.21343.

2.

contemplated that Peace Settlements would be made outside the Organization. In spite of that the United Nations is not debarred from considering situations arising from settlements or from failure to make them.

However, there are two working rules which this Assembly should recognize if its prestige is to be maintained.

1. The Assembly of the United Nations should not undertake any arrangements that it cannot fulfil efficiently.
2. The Assembly of the United Nations should not, except as a last resort intervene in relation to matters which are likely to constitute an integral part of the Peace Settlement.

When the Charter was drafted, the San Francisco Conference did not foresee long delay that would occur in signing the treaties of peace. This delay and absence of settlements with major enemy powers is a severe impediment to the work of the United Nations, because neither European nor Eastern Asian regions can begin long-term planning on any sound basis until the political and economic conditions of peace settlements have been laid down.

I agree with the Soviet Representative that agreement along the lines of the Moscow Declaration would have been desirable. Two powers have now had nearly two years to carry out in Agreement the duties imposed on them by the Declaration, and if agreement could not be reached in that time, it is unlikely that further recourse to the same procedure would be successful.

The logical place for the next step to begin is the Japanese Peace Conference where representatives of all the powers which made a direct contribution towards Pacific victory would be represented. But I suggest conversations at once - here and now - between the two countries now in control in Korea. If, neither of these courses is immediately practicable, Australia would not oppose the establishment of a United Nations Commission for Korea.

The membership of the Commission should primarily be contributed from those powers which made a direct contribution towards Pacific victory. Such a Commission could and should be regarded as a preliminary part of the entire Japanese Peace Settlement, the actual ceding of sovereignty being left to the Peace Treaty.

Australia desires a settlement in Korea that will be in the interests of Korean people and will help to establish the basis of a just and lasting peace in this region of Asia. The new Korean State should be established in such a way as to promote a growth of democracy in that country and allow her to achieve sound economic, political, and social development in peaceful association with all her neighbours and the rest of the world.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3.
CABLEGRAM.

What should this Committee do?

1. We should request the Powers interested, especially the United States of America and U.S.S.R. to begin immediate conversations, here and now, at the United Nations, with a view to an agreed settlement.
2. If it appears that the course I suggest is impossible and if the Peace Conference cannot be convened very promptly, I will support the United States of America proposal in principle.
3. As to the composition of the Commission and its precise powers and duties, I reserve my right of further analysis.

p Mutilated.

ACTING MIN. & DEPT. OF E.A. (ATTN.)

30th October, 1947.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

AH/PM.

I.21361.

DECYPHER FROM -

Dated: 28th October, 1947.
2305.
Recd.: 30th October, 1947.
8.30 a.m.

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

UN.1045. Assembly 12.2. KOREA.

1. Political Committee began discussion of Korean question 28th October.
2. Dr. Evatt spoke after United States and Soviet. See my immediately preceding telegram for text.
3. Dulles introduced United States draft resolution on Korea. After sketching history of Korean problem from Cairo Declaration to Moscow Conference, he stressed frustrations of Joint Conference, both sessions of Joint Commission (finally adjourned 18th October, 1947, after sixty-two meetings), the Hodge-Chisticov and Marshall-Molotov exchange of letters, and United States proposal of 26th August, 1947, for Four Power meeting in Washington. Frustrations were reason why Marshall made statement on Korea to General Assembly on 17th September, 1947. Dulles pointed out the nine days after Marshall's statement Soviet Delegation to Joint Commission at Seoul proposed simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Korea. United States Resolution was not one of censure for past but looked to future. Dulles then described Resolution and stated that it offered Koreans best hope for independence.
4. Gromyko said that the United Nations should not deal with Peace Settlements. If, however, Assembly decided to consider question of Korea, Soviet Union was prepared to express its views and put forward its own proposals. United States wished to make it appear that Soviet Union was to blame for delay in settling problem. But it was the United States which had made it impossible to set up provisional Korean Government and so implement Moscow terms, as all Soviet proposals on Joint Commission had been rejected. Gromyko then requested that Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal should be considered first. He also proposed that "elected" representatives of Korean people should be invited to participate in discussions of Committee and Assembly.
5. Laoge (Poland) spoke after Dr. Evatt and stated that Korean problem should not be considered by United Nations, but that if it was, elected Korean representatives should be present. He supported Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal.
6. Wellington Koo after pointing out China's vital interest in Korean independence, stated that it was China who proposed Korea's independence at Cairo. Depressing story of long delay and failure of Joint Commission had induced China in April, 1947, to propose Four Power Meeting to overcome deadlock. As Four Power Meeting not possible recourse to United Nations seemed now best method. China agreed with principle of simultaneous withdrawal, but only after Four Power consultation to determine conditions of withdrawal so as to avoid anarchy and civil war. China did not think Korean

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AH/PM.

I.21361.

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problem should await Japanese Peace Treaty as it was impossible to tell when Peace Conference would take place or how long it would last, and problem was urgent. It would be wiser to invoke United Nations' aid now. China supported principle of Korean participation in discussion but representatives should be really selected by Korean people, so that they could state views of Korea as a whole.

7. Manuilsky said that consideration of Korea by United Nations would only introduce additional complications. However, he supported Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal and for "genuine" representation of Korean people.

8. Yugoslavia supported removal of item from agenda, simultaneous withdrawal and representation of Korean people.

9. Cadogan stated that as Two Power negotiations had failed to produce results and Four Power talks had not been accepted by Soviet Union, United Kingdom supported United States proposal. He pointed out impossibility of deciding immediately which Koreans were truly representative, and stated that Korean representation in United Nations discussions was unnecessary, as United Nations was merely setting up machinery for holding of elections to establish representative Government in Korea. Soviet proposal for withdrawal was "delightfully simple" but sudden removal of Forces might leave a vacuum and it would be necessary to determine appropriate conditions of withdrawal.

10. Debate was adjourned until 29th October pending submission in writing of proposals regarding procedure foreshadowed by Soviet Group.

E.A.

30th October, 1947.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

HP. APH.

I. 20542

Dated 17th October, 1947

DECYPHER FROM --

Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK

UNNUMBERED.

KOREA.

1. United States intends to introduce resolution in Assembly recommending that occupying powers in Korea hold elections in their respective zones not later than 31st March, 1948 under the observation of the United Nations and that without waiting for elections the occupying powers should arrange for early simultaneous and proportional reduction of their respective forces to the extent practicable and that after the establishment of the National Korean Government, occupation forces should set early date for complete withdrawal of all forces from north and south Korea. Establish United Nations temporary Commission on Korea.

(A) to be present in Korea throughout elections in each zone with freedom of travel and observation.

(B) to be available for consultation on elections, organization of National Assembly, formation of National Government and conclusion of agreements on withdrawal of forces.

(C) to keep United Nations informed. There is no guarantee as to composition of Commission.

2. We have pointed out that while welcoming full discussion of Korea we feel that Korea is essential and integral part of Japanese settlement and should in the first instance be dealt with by powers directly concerned in that settlement. The Assembly includes many Nations which made no direct contribution to the Pacific victory and some which were by no means friendly neutrals and one which was enemy state. The Minister is making every effort following the attitude of the British Commonwealth Conference to obtain definitive date of Peace Conference for Japan having reported on Canberra Conference work to the Press, Truman and General Marshall. He has also communicated position informally and confidentially to General MacArthur who is also taking steps to expedite decision.

DEPT. OF E.A.

17-10-47

P46/20/3

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

FF.APH.

O.16924

Dated 8th October, 1947

DECYPHER TO -

Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK

600.

Following suggestions on Korea may be useful:

It appears that most politically conscious Koreans are strongly opposed to Trusteeship, and it is unlikely therefore that a solution along these lines would be successful. Australia might press for UN Commission of Enquiry to sort out the facts on the spot from the conflicting reports of USA and USSR. Its findings would go to USA-USSR Joint Commission in the first instance and be referred back to Assembly if agreement not reached.

2. Objectives of Commission of Enquiry would be -
- (a) Holding of elections with neutral observers.
 - (b) Early evacuation of occupation forces.
 - (c) Guarantee of Korean independence and territory by interested powers.
 - (d) Constitutional guarantees of human rights and free electoral system.
 - (e) Possibly UN Advisory Board to assist elected Korean Government, without power to control actual policy.

DEPT. OF E. A.

9-10-47

P40/20/3

746 / 20/3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

DBB/TF

I. 19201
Dated 25th Sept. 1947
1215.
Recd. 26th Sept. 1947
2 a.m.

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

Department 326.

Proposed visit to Korea by Jackson.
S.C.A.P. with some pressure would probably agree to short visit to Korea by Mission Representative ostensibly on Consular business but not openly to investigate conditions. S.C.A.P. states difficulty in agreeing to such visits arises from possible requests from the U.S.S.R. in the circumstances would you wish me to press for visit by Jackson in about 3 weeks time or await some further clarification of the position regarding the possible establishment of inter-Government control body.

E.A. (attn)

P

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

NVP:EGM:

I. 19357

DECYPHER FROM:

XB00208 XGN457

Dated: 28th. September 1947
1925AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
MOSCOW.Rec'd: 29th. September 1947
8.10 A.M.

311.

Korea.

All papers published Press reports from Korea giving text of long statement made at session of joint Soviet American Commission on September 26th by the Head of Soviet Delegation General Shtikov. The main points of the statement are:-

(1) The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly insisted on precise fulfilment of agreement between the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Foreign Ministry reached at Moscow in December 1945, which contains basic allied programme for return of Korea and which has support of majority of Korean people.

2. In Northern Korea much has been done towards democratisation but there have been no democratic reforms in Southern Korea where Democratic parties which support Moscow decisions are persecuted.

3. The Soviet Delegation denies fabrications that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic intends to seize Korea or establish the Soviet system there.

4. Korea can be free and independent only when it has its own Democratic Government and when the United States and Soviet troops have been withdrawn. Therefore "Soviet Ministry declares that if the United States Delegation agrees to the proposal for the withdrawal of all troops at the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be ready to leave Korea simultaneously with United States Forces."

E.A.

29th. September 1947

P49/20/3

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

DBB/FF

I. 19201
Dated 25th Sept. 1947
1215
Recd. 26th Sept. 1947
8 a.m.

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Mission,
TOKYO.

Department 326.

Proposed visit to Korea by Jackson. Realize
S.C.A.P. with some pressure would probably agree to show
visit to Korea by Mission Representative ostensibly
on Consular business but not openly to investigate
conditions. S.C.A.P. states difficulty in agreeing to
such visits arises from possible requests from the
U.S.S.R. In the circumstances would you wish me to
press for visit by Jackson in about 3 weeks time or
await some further clarification of the position
regarding the possible establishment of inter-Government
control body.

E.A. (attn)

947/20/3

Secretary	✓
AS (P)	✓
E	✓
ME	✓
A	✓
LC	✓
Pac	✓
UN	✓
ES	✓
Adm	✓

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

/HM
DECYPHER FROM --
THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON :

I. 18659
XM14
Sent 17th September 1947
0933
Rec'd 18th September 1947.

275.

MOST IMMEDIATE :

KOREA.

Last night State Department advised United Kingdom Embassy informally that Secretary of State had decided to include Korea in his review today, the speech being still unfinished.

State Department said they regretted that they had not been able to have the informal talk with United Kingdom Embassy which they had contemplated but there would be no time for it now.

E. A. 18th September 1947.

P46/20/3

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

GGM/HE.

I. 18240 /233.

XB00110.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 10th September, 1947.

2100.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
L O N D O N.

Received 11th September, 1947.

2.10

D No. 754.

TOP SECRET

My telegram D No. 663 of 31st July.

K O R E A.

Deadlock in joint United States - Soviet Commission has not been eased. Conditions in Korea have become explosive as the rift between the Right and Left deepens and the United States Government consider that the situation cannot be allowed to drag on as at present.

2. On 26th August the United State Department therefore proposed that the Korean situation be discussed by the State Department and Embassies in Washington of China, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., the four powers adhering to Moscow Agreement on Korea of December 1945. The United States Government put forward the following proposals for discussion:

(A) That elections be held in both Northern and Southern Korea by means of secret multi-Party ballot based on universal suffrage.

(B) That each Legislature set up as a result of these elections appoint members of the Korean National Assembly in proportion to the population; i.e. roughly two from the Southern Zone to one from Northern Zone. This Assembly to meet at Seoul to establish a Provisional Government for United Korea.

(C) That this Provisional Government then meet in Korea with Representatives of the Four Powers to discuss on a basis of equality -

- (1) what assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this assistance is to be given and
- (ii) date for withdrawal of occupation troops from both zones.

3. United States Government also proposed that United Nations observers should be present at all stages of this programme to witness wholly representative and completely independent character of actions taken.

4. The Chinese Government and His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom accepted the United States invitation to Washington discussions. We proposed after consultation with the Australian Government that the United Kingdom Ambassador should be accompanied at the meetings by the Australian Ambassador or other Australian Representative because of the special interest of the Australian Government in the future of Korea.

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5. The Soviet Government have however rejected the United States invitation on the ground that discussion by four powers would not be in accordance with the Moscow Decision and also that the possibilities of reaching agreement in the Joint Commission have not been exhausted. The Soviet Government regrets the "unilateral action" taken by Mr. Marshall in issuing invitations to the United Kingdom and China.

6. Before the Soviet refusal had been received the United States Government were considering the idea, should Washington Talks Plan break down, of referring the Korean problem to the United Nations Assembly under Article 10 or Article 14 of the Charter. The Assembly might be asked to appoint an Investigating Commission (on the same lines as the Palestine Commission) and put their Plan before it. Should the problem be submitted to the United Nations Assembly we should be inclined to favour invoking Article 10 of the Charter rather than Article 14 as being more tactful and presumably just as effective.

7. We have expressed the view to the State Department whose Far Eastern Office agrees that best hope of unifying Southern Korea and possibly of attracting Northern Korea into democratic collaboration lay in United States proposal for very large scale grant-in-aid. Far Eastern Office of State Department say that in order to conciliate congressional opinion it may be necessary to wrap up proposal of appropriation for Southern Korea with those for aid to other countries. In relation to general question of Foreign aid it must however, be noted that Korea is expected to come low on list of priorities with State Department and policy planning section is drawing up. In any case it is unlikely that congress will discuss matter before next year.

8. His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom consider that United States plan (paragraph 2 above) would present many difficulties. There is no multi-party system in existence in North Korea. Even if elections were supervised a sweeping victory would be inevitable in Soviet zone for pro-Soviet elements. Normal practice in Korean elections is to influence votes by threat and such is fear of reprisal that votes are in many cases cast as directed. In North Police would cannive at leftist pressure on votes while in South, Police would cannive at rightist pressure. Koreans seem temperamentally incapable of reconciling political differences. Minority will not accept majority decision and majority viciously oppresses minority. One point of unity is desire for withdrawal of occupation forces even at expense of civil war. 9. If as some seem probable United States Government are aware of these conditions object of their proposals may be assumed to be

- (A) To proclaim to world sincerity of their intentions
- (B) To pave way for independent action if proposals are rejected.

Independent action would strike a blow at many Korean hopes but might well be better than leaving situation to stagnate as present position is making Koreans increasingly restless.

10. United States Department now propose to discuss the position informally with Chinese and United Kingdom Embassies in Washington. United Kingdom Ambassador is keeping Australian Ambassador informed of developments.

9 SEP 1947

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

H.P.

Ref. 2/213

TOP SECRET.

9th September, 1947.

Dear Dr. Burton,


You will remember that when the Minister of State was in Canberra he discussed with Dr. Evatt the best manner in which we could secure the association of the Australian Government with the proceedings of the forthcoming talks on Korea.

We now learn that in the reply sent by the United Kingdom Government to the United States Ambassador in London a passage has been included on the following lines:-

The United Kingdom Government will be pleased to designate the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington or his authorised deputy to participate in the proposed Four Power conversations in Washington beginning on the 8th September. The United States Ambassador is asked to remind the United States Government in this connection of the special interest of the Australian Government in the future of Korea. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have undertaken to nominate Australia in their place as the Fourth Power on the trusteeship body envisaged in the Moscow statement on Korea (an intention which we communicated to Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov at the Conference). In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it is therefore most desirable that the Government of Australia should be kept fully informed of all developments regarding the future of Korea and be associated closely with the proposed discussions from the outset. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would accordingly propose that the United
/Kingdom

Dr. J. W. Burton,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

file



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

-2-

Kingdom Ambassador should be accompanied, at the discussions in Washington now suggested, by the Australian Ambassador, or other Australian representative, and they trust that this arrangement will be acceptable. Meantime the United Kingdom Government are conveying to the Australian Government the substance of the detailed United States proposals regarding Korea which form the enclosure in Mr. Marshall's letter to Mr. Molotov.

You will remember further that it was agreed between Mr. McNeil and Dr. Evatt that it should be understood that the Australian Ambassador would not intervene in the discussions except by consent, which we hoped would be forthcoming without difficulty. While, however, Dr. Evatt agreed that Australia would have no automatic rights of intervention in this conference, he expressed the hope that this would not be formally stated to the United States Government in our reply. You will see from the above text that this line has been adopted. It is, however, contemplated that an explanation on the lines discussed with Dr. Evatt would be given orally should the United States authorities enquire about the status, under our proposals, of the Australian Ambassador in the discussions.

No information is yet available as to the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and China towards the United States invitation.

Yours sincerely,

H. C. Hankinson.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

WD/LB.

DECRYPTER FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

I. 18023..
XMO05.

Dated: 8th September, 1947.
1638.

Rec'd: 9th September, 1947.
10:20.A.M.

IMMEDIATE.

1838.

Korea.

My telegram 1835.

It seems clear from Russian reply that there is no possibility of their accepting United States proposal for 4-power talks.

For Eastern officials of State Department are considering having an informal review of the position with United Kingdom and presumably Chinese and although I understand no decision has yet been reached in United Kingdom Embassy, Australia will be asked to come to an "informal meeting" within a few days to hear full text of Soviet note and probably United States reply to it. Harverchapel is keeping closely in touch.

External Affairs. (Att).

9th September, 1947.

R46/20/3

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EGM/NB

I.17905
XM0087

Dated 6th September, 1947
1248

(Delayed Transmission)
Recd. 9th September, 1947.

DECYPHER FROM -

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1.40 p.m.

IMMEDIATE.

1235.

KOREA.

My telegram 1226.

The State Department have now received the Soviet reply which is of great length and apparently covers the recent history of Korea. Although not yet fully translated it is clearly a refusal to attend a meeting on the 8th September, and expresses the wish for continuance of bipartite procedure in Korea. It is very doubtful now whether the United States will go ahead with the meeting on Monday.

E.A. (Attn.)

9th September, 1947.

P46/no/3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET.

CABLEGRAM.

JRO/JEO

DECYPHER TO

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON.

O.15244
Dated 6th September, 1947
11.50am

1078.

Please collect available data on Korea for information
of Plimsoil who may fly direct from San Francisco.

E.A.
8th September, 1947

P46/20/3

Copies received	
Secretary	
AS (P)	
E.	
MEON	
A	
LC	
PI	
Pac	
UN	
ER	
Adm	

P.47/20/3

September 5, 1947.

Dear Mr. Gibson,

I wish to thank you for your letter of 22nd August, and for the attached notes on Korea.

Captain Van der Hook's remarks concerning Korean harbours have been noted with interest. With reference to his remarks concerning Dairen, you will recall that by the Yalta Agreement of 11th February, 1945 (made public 12th February 1946), and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14th August 1945, Dairen is to be internationalised.

You will have seen from press reports that the United States proposes to call a conference at Washington, on 8th September, of the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, to consider how that agreement may be speedily implemented, following the failure of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission, sitting at Seoul, to reach agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Secretary

J. Alan Gibson, Esq., B.E., A.M.I.E. (Aust.),
19 Ruby Street,
MOSMAN, N.S.W.

P.46/20/4

September 4, 1947.

not sent -

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of 22nd August, and the memorandum by Captain Van der Hock, which was found to be very interesting. The United States, as you will have seen from Press reports, have called a meeting of the four powers, U.S., U.K., Soviet Union and China, for September 8th, to discuss the speeding-up of the achievement of Korean independence, following on from the failure of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission sitting in Seoul to reach agreement.

With reference to Captain Van der Hock's remarks concerning the Port of Dairen, it will be recalled that by the Yalta Agreement, 11th February, 1945 (made public 12th February, 1946), and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, of 14th August, 1945, the Port Arthur Naval Base is to be leased to the Soviet Union, but Dairen is "to be internationalised, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded". At the present moment this port is under Russian military occupation.

Yours faithfully,

Secretary

J. Alan Gilson, Esq.
19 Ruby Street,
MOSMAN, N.S.W.


ALAN GIBSON

SYDNEY

M 0423 EXT. 331

MA 3492

BOG 2481



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

Dear Mr Brunton,

Port Facilities in Korea

I have your letter ref P.46/20/4
for which I thank you.

In response to my enquiry Captain Van der Hoek
has amplified his ideas to some extent and I
enclose his notes herewith. I have no direct
information in regard to Korea but can corroborate
his opinion of the unfavourable position at
Shanghai from my own observations up to February
1947 and correspondence from friends since that
time.

Through another channel I am seeking further
information regarding planning and progress at
Taku harbour near Tientsin and possibly concerning
Korean ports also.

Yours faithfully,

Alan Gibson

P

Re KOREA:

Unfortunately I am not able to furnish documents, statistics and maps to support the suggested idea for an Australian Concession in Korea.

As reasons for a concession in Korea, the following may be stated:

For world development it is of the greatest importance that isolated and backward countries be given a chance to catch up with the rest of the world, by giving them the opportunity to learn new methods, obtain mechanical equipment, tools, gadgets and other modernised articles which are made elsewhere for improvement of living conditions. Examples of this nature are the settlements Hongkong and Shanghai, through which two ports China has become modernised as far as it is, because to those places were brought the tools needed for improvement to their living conditions.

Now that the city of Shanghai has been returned to China for their own control, foreign business there becomes as good as impossible through lack of stability and security and numerous difficulties created for foreign firms to operate. Shanghai is already rapidly declining.

The vast areas of North China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan with their millions of people, fertile land and mineral resources are definitely in need of assistance from more developed countries, to improve on their primitive conditions.

Well organised countries have the benefit that exchange of goods needed for the people can be safely handled through established trade channels, banks, railroads and shipping, all regulated and protected. In the countries out here the same cannot be achieved through lack of ruling power.

That brings us to the question, What can be done to achieve the object that the people of Northern Asia can have the benefit of developments made in other countries for more security for the daily needs of life.

A second very important matter is the establishment of guiding influence to avoid that developments are made in a spirit of selfish domination which will lead to destruction instead of betterment.

An answer to the above may well be that countries which have gained a certain obligation to the Northern Asiatic countries by freeing them from a selfish dominating enemy, be given a chance to assist them in their further development.

To be able to do this successfully for the long period needed to achieve progress in such matters, there needs to be a favourable beneficial interest for both parties concerned; a, The country that gets assistance should benefit through development; b, The country that be given the opportunity to assist should benefit in doing so through sale of their export goods and shipping.

A market place, well organised and safely ruled nearby the countries that need assistance, would be of first importance.

That brings up the question, Which place or places would be best suited for that purpose in Northern Asia.

The high feeling of patriotism in China makes success unlikely there.

Manchuria has as main ports Dairen and Vladivostock. Dairen would be an ideal port for an International settlement.

In the peace conference with Japan, which according to the news articles soon will begin, this port may well be the subject of great differences between Russia and the other Governments. If Dairen could be made an International Port, that surely would be of great help to world organisation.

Korea has 3 fairly good harbours, Fusan, Chemulpo and *Wonsan*

Korea is surely the country that needs assistance most of all. Her geographical position in the centre of the Northern Asiatic countries makes it the most ideal place for a market centre where goods can be exchanged. From the 3 ports named, Chemulpo near to the capital of Southern Korea, Seoul, would seem to be the ideal spot. It has railway connection with Fusan in Southern Korea and Mukden and Harbin in Manchuria. The harbour is not highly developed yet, but it would be a place for great enterprises and developments can be made gradually.

Korea too might be most cooperative to such a proposal as she would greatly benefit by it.

Another question is, What would be the most desirable and at the same time the most successful way of obtaining a protected position.

I may sum up a few:

1. There can be made Naval Base accords and commercial activities may develop gradually at such bases. It is ~~recommended~~ at present in Shanghai that the U.S.A. seeks Naval Bases at Formosa, Tsingtao and in Korea.
 2. A concession for settlement in a certain specified area, similar to the former settlement of Shanghai.
 3. To rent for a long term period, say 99 years, a certain area for an accorded sum of money or other compensation with the right to govern said area under own control.
-

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

20/3.

EM:EGM:

DECYPHER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

I. 17456
XM0099

Dated: 30th. August 1947
1646

Rec'd: 31st. August 1947
10.00 A.M.

PRIORITY IMMEDIATE.

1199.

Korea.

1. This morning's press carried announcement that acting Secretary of State Lovatt in note delivered to Molotov 28th. August proposed that Soviet, United Kingdom, China and United States participate in a four-power Conference in Washington on 8th. September to discuss future of Korea.
2. Text published this morning states that copies were being transmitted to United Kingdom and China together with invitations.
3. Assume Commonwealth Relations Office London will have cabled you full text.

K O R E A

1. We have discussed this matter with Dr. Evatt. He raised the question in what way Australia could be "associated with the proceedings."
2. As a result of our talk we suggest we should reply to the U.S.A. that our Ambassador should be accompanied and associated with the Australian Ambassador, or other representative, on the understanding that the Australian Ambassador would not intervene in the discussions except by consent, which we hope would be forthcoming without difficulty.
3. However, while Dr. Evatt agreed that Australia would have no automatic rights of intervention in this conference, he expressed the strong desire, with which we agree, that this would not be formally stated to the United States Government in our reply.
4. United States should be reminded of Australia's interests in the matter, as follows:-
 - (a) The United Kingdom has undertaken to nominate Australia in their place as the fourth power on the Trusteeship body.

Paul

2.

- (b) This intention was communicated to Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov at the Moscow Conference.
- (c) Australia's contribution to the war against Japan and the several undertakings by the United Kingdom and the United States of America that in all negotiations relating to the Japanese Settlement, Australia would participate as a party principal.

1st September, 1947

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

August 31st, 1947.

H. D. Doelw.

I enclose, for your consideration, the text of a message which we propose to send to London following our conversations between you, Lord Addison and myself this morning.

I would be grateful if you would let me know, at your very earliest convenience, whether you approve the contents of the text.

Yours sincerely
Hector Doelw.

Rt. Hon. Dr. H. V. Evatt, K.C., M.P.

Attorney-General & Minister for External Affairs,

Department of External Affairs,

Canberra.

(vst)

K O R E A

We have discussed this matter with Dr. Evatt.

He raised the question in what way Australia could be "associated with the proceedings".

2 As a result of our talk we suggest that we should reply to the U.S.A. that our Ambassador should be accompanied by ^{and associated with} the Australian Ambassador or ^{our} representative on the understanding that the Australian Ambassador would not intervene in the discussions except by consent, which we hope would be forthcoming without difficulty, on matters in which Australia is interested.

3 ~~In the circumstances Dr. Evatt~~ ^{Dr. Evatt} ~~expressed~~ ^{will} It was agreed in our conversation that Australia would have no automatic rights ^{of intervention} in this Conference but ^{he} Dr. Evatt expressed, ^{strong desire} the hope, with which we agree, that this would not be formally stated to the U.S. Government in our reply.

4. USA ^{must} ~~should~~ be reminded ^{as follows} ~~in a~~ ^{the following manner} ~~as follows~~:
A (1) His contribution to the war against Japan & subsequent ~~conquest~~ ^{reoccupation} of Moscow

(2) ~~His~~ ^{subsequent} ~~conquest~~ ^{by UN/US} ~~of~~ ^{that in all previous relations} ~~the~~ ^{fact} ~~fact~~ ^{that he founded a party} ~~principal~~ ^{Statement} ~~of~~ ^{trustworthiness} ~~known~~

Wesley
Lek...me

(6) Statement trustworthiness known

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

August 30th 1947.

4 Doc Doels

In view of the failure of the joint United States-Soviet Commission in Seoul to reach agreement the United States Government recently suggested that the Commission should furnish an agreed report to the two Governments on the status of its deliberations. The Soviet Government have now informed the State Department that they have no objection to the submission of such a report to enable each Government to decide what steps can now usefully be taken for the fulfilment of the Moscow decision.

The Joint Commission have in fact made no real progress and the United States Government consider that the joint report (which they have now suggested should be submitted not later than 5th September) can be little more than a statement that deadlock has been reached. The stumbling block, as the Commonwealth Government will be aware, is the basis upon which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organisations shall be consulted by the joint Commission. The United States Delegation have also been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the joint Commission.

The United States Government consider that they cannot in good conscience be a party to further delay in the fulfilment of their commitment to Korean independence, and on 28th August they therefore transmitted a proposal that the four powers who were party to the Moscow Agreement on Korea in December 1945, namely the United Kingdom, United States of America, U.S.S.R.

and China, should participate in conversations on the future of Korea, to begin in Washington on 8th September 1947. The United States Government proposed that the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and China should be represented by their Ambassadors or their authorised deputies.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to accept this invitation and in doing so to remind the United States Government of the special interest of the Government of Australia in the future of Korea, to draw the attention of the United States Government to the fact that the United Kingdom have undertaken to nominate Australia in their place as the fourth power on the trusteeship body envisaged in the Moscow statement on Korea (an intention which was communicated to Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov at the Conference) and to inform them that the United Kingdom ^{intend to annex} will keep the Australian ^{with} Government fully informed of all developments regarding the future of Korea. ^{held at the Conference through an}

The outline of the United States proposals as they were communicated to the Governments of the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and China is annexed.

*on receipt
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ambassadors
arrived with
the
fact*

*for full
merit*

*the conversations on the joining
a joint UK - Australian*

*As a result of
who will be
Call*

Hector L. Call

PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, U.S.S.R AND CHINA.

1. In both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.
2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional Government for a United Korea.
3. The resulting provisional government of a United Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.
4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean provisional government and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a United Independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.

DD:SR

22nd July, 1947.

Dear Miss Duncan,

I was very sorry that illness prevented my getting into touch with you again at the conclusion of my stay in Melbourne. The information which you gave us about North Korea has proved most valuable, and I hope that you may be able to spare us some time to tell us about South Korea when you arrive here for the first meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Japanese Settlement.

We would welcome your comments on PCPS I/17 and I would be glad if you would please return the other documents to me.

I shall look forward to seeing you again.

With best wishes,

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

(D. Dexter)

Miss Constance Duncan,
5 Balwyn Road,
CANTERBURY. Vic.

P47/20/3

P.46/20/1 3



11th July, 1947.

Dear Sir,

Port Facilities in Korea.

I have been instructed to reply to your letter of 10th June, 1947, addressed to the Right Honourable H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs.

Your suggestions for making arrangements to secure from Korea facilities and concessions to make a Korean port practically a home port for Australian shipping lines trading with East Asia have been noted. In a statement tabled in the House of Representatives on 5th June, 1947, Dr. Evatt stated that Australia, as a Pacific power, was naturally interested in political developments in Korea, and was keeping in close touch with the United Kingdom Government, which has a Consul-General in Seoul.

The Government is fully aware of the fact that Australia, as a major Pacific belligerent, has every right to interest itself in arrangements made concerning the future of Korea and other former territories of Japan, and to re-establish and extend her trading interests in the East Asia area.

It is not completely clear what form the facilities and concessions you suggest would take.

The information you have supplied regarding the ports of Tongku and Taiku is of interest and has been noted. Any further information concerning the main Korean ports would be appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Secretary

J. Alan Gibson, Esq., B.E., A.M.I.E. (Aust.)
19 Ruby Street,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

PC:SW

O. 11737
Sent 16th July, 1947
3.45 p.m.

DECODE TO:

THE AUSTRALIAN MISSION,
TOKYO.

391.

Australian Participation in Trusteeship of Korea.

With reference to the present discussions of the United States - Soviet Joint Commission at Seoul, it will be recalled that United Kingdom Government confirmed on 14th May that it intends to ask for Australia to be substituted for United Kingdom as fourth member of Trusteeship Body.

2. Question, therefore, arises of desirability of early despatch of Australian observer to Korea, so that fuller information can be obtained on political situation there. Please discuss question with Minister when in Tokyo. One of your staff might be sent on fact-finding mission; or suitable officer from B.C.O.F. Australian Contingent could be temporarily attached to Hodges' Headquarters, if it is not possible to have permanent representation.

E. A. (P.47/20/3)

5

16th July, 1947

ONS:SAR

P.46/20/3.

9th July, 1947.


Dear Sir,

Port Facilities in Korea.

I have been instructed to acknowledge your letter of 10th June, 1947, addressed to the Right Honourable H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs.

The points you raise are under consideration and it is hoped to send a reply to you in the near future.

Yours faithfully,


Secretary.

J. Alan Gibson, Esq., B.E., A.M.I.E.,
19 Ruby Street,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

CANBERRA.

In reply quote No.P.46/20/3

4th July, 1947.

Dear Sir,

PORT FACILITIES IN KOREA

I have been instructed to reply to your letter of 10th June, 1947, addressed to the Right Honourable H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs.

Your suggestions for making arrangements to secure from Korea facilities and concessions to make a Korean port practically a home port for Australian shipping lines trading with East Asia have been noted. ~~The Australian Government is keenly interested in the political, social and economic future of Korea, and in a statement tabled in the House of Representatives on 5th June, 1947, Dr. Evatt stated that Australia, as a Pacific power, was naturally interested in political developments in Korea, and was keeping in close touch with the United Kingdom Government, which has a Consul-General in Seoul.~~

It is not completely clear what form the facilities and concessions you suggest would take. ~~The Government would not, of course, consider asking for anything in the nature of a concession or treaty port similar to the old concessions in China, for it is hoped eventually to welcome a free and democratic Korea as an equal and sovereign member of the United Nations. The Government is fully aware, however, of the fact that Australia, as a major Pacific belligerent, has every right to interest itself in arrangements made concerning the future of Korea and other former territories of Japan, and is eager to re-establish and extend her trading interests in the East Asia area.~~

any The information you have supplied regarding the ports of Tongku and Taiku is of interest and has been noted. ~~It would be appreciated if you would supply further information concerning the main Korean ports. The future of e.g. Rashin and Seishin may well be discussed in any talks on the Japanese Peace Settlement, and recent information as to conditions in them would be very useful to us.~~

Yours faithfully,

would be appreciated.

J. Alan Gilchrist
19 Ruby
MOSMA.



*Mr Smyth
pls have retyped &
send to Sec
WJ 10/7*

OS.

As CD is likely to be on Parliamentary C.tee, WDF says to take no action at moment

Mr Dexter
Pls offer in
inf for UN
752 know
UN Div.
DD
30/6.

P46/20/3

WDF 10/7

NB. Jim Hill.

24 JUN 1947

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

The Secretary:

Miss Constance Duncan

I have recently received a letter from Miss Duncan in which she says that she would very much like to find a full-time position concerned with international affairs. She asks whether there would be any position in relation to the preparation of the Peace Treaty with Japan, in which her services could be of use.

2. Miss Duncan also states that, in paras. 56 and 58 of Dr. Evatt's speech of 6th June, he refers to the International Children's Emergency Fund and states that the Australian Government is now considering the best means for the organisation of voluntary appeals to implement the resolution of the Economic & Social Council of the United Nations with regard to a One Day's Pay Collection to augment the funds for Children's Relief. Miss Duncan says that she made a study of the condition of Korean children last year for the purpose of supplying the International Children's Fund with basic material on that country, and should be most interested in helping to organise the appeal for funds in Australia and the public education which it would entail.

Mr Shannon

3. Thirdly, Miss Duncan has a very deep interest in the problems of immigration and has had considerable experience in the selection and absorption into the Australian community of alien immigrants. She is anxious to know whether there is any channel by which she could make use of her practical experience.

4. There is no doubt at all about Miss Duncan's ability and her knowledge. She has lived for a considerable time in the East and knows the Japanese and Koreans. While I have not implicit faith in her judgment in all things and I do not suggest that she should be a member of the Parliamentary Committee on the Peace Treaty, I do think that she would be a great help in the preparation of data. She is equally well fitted to serve in the other directions which she mentions, although these may not be within the departmental orbit. Miss Duncan is a woman of great personality and her experience of the last few years has greatly developed her judgment. I should, therefore, be glad if you could consider whether her services would be of use to the Department.

F. W. Eggleston

(F. W. Eggleston).

Mr. Knight

23rd June, 1947.

I would suggest she might visit Canberra. Might also bring a first hand report on Korea would be most useful. Will you pt arrange for her to come up? M

J. ALAN GIBSON

SYDNEY

XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX

11 JUN 1947

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.
19 RUBY STREET

MOSMAN

Referred for reply direct
please.

XM 3464

J. Hewitt
Private Secretary
11.6.47 10th June, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Right Hon. Dr. H. V. Evatt P.C., M.P.
Minister for External Affairs,
CANBERRA. F.C.T.

Dear Sir,

Re Port facilities in Korea.

I have recently returned from fifteen months service with the China Mission of UNRRA spent mainly at Shanghai.

A fellow member of the Administration was Captain Van der Hook, a Hollander, and formerly of the Java-China-Japan line. He was the Chief of the Ocean Shipping Division of the UNRRA China Office and was regarded as a competent and experienced man concerning Merchant Marine Affairs.

Before I left for Australia, Captain Van der Hook pointed out to me certain advantages which could be gained by Australia in the development of shipping services to our Northern Asiatic neighbours as I might have an opportunity of putting his ideas before responsible people here.

He considered that Australian interests would be greatly advanced by making arrangements to secure from Korea such facilities and concessions as would make a Korean Port practically a home port for Australian shipping lines trading from Australia by way of Java, Singapore, the Phillipines, Hong Kong and China

PK

While conditions, both for shipping and for trading, are unfavourable at present, for many reasons such as lack of shipping and lack of goods available for export either from Australia or from Asiatic countries, there is every prospect of improvement and the advantages of re-establishing and extending our shipping and trading interests in this area will be reaped in the future. As one instance I might mention that the Chinese propose to complete two large modern ports, construction of which was commenced by the Japanese at Tangku near Tientsin in North China and at Taiku or Taichu on the Western Coast of Formosa.

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's plans for development in China also call for the development of Canton as a modern port equal in capacity to New York.

The reason for choosing Korea as a home from home port is to offset the intense nationalistic feeling in China which seems likely to place obstacles in the way of legitimate trade and business for some time to come in that country.

Captain Van der Hook considered that Australia had every right, from her war services, to ask for such arrangements to be made and thought that the matter might very well be raised during the negotiations of the Peace Treaties with Japan.

I feel that the matter is of such importance that it should be brought to your attention and would be glad to seek for any additional information that you may require through Captain Van der Hook or through other personal contacts which I formed while in China.

Yours faithfully,

J. Alan Gibson

J. ALAN GIBSON, B.E., A.M.I.E. (Aust.)

Extract from Ministerial
Statement tabled 6th June 1947.

KOREA.

122. The Joint United States-Soviet Commission in Korea, reconvened on 21st May after an exchange of notes between General Marshall and M. Molotov, is meeting for the first time since 9th May, 1946.

123. The Commission is charged, as provided by the Moscow Conference of 1945, with the threefold task of:-

- (a) working out proposals for a provisional Korean Government;
- (b) submitting these proposals to China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. for consideration;
- (c) evolving, after consultation with the provisional Korean Government, proposals for a Four Power Trusteeship for consideration by the Chinese, U.K., U.S. and Soviet Governments.

124. Australia, as a Pacific Power, is naturally interested in political developments in Korea, and is keeping in close touch with the United Kingdom Government.

AIR MAIL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Canberra, A.C.T.

21st May, 1947.

Dear Sir Frederic,

Thank you for your letter of May 15th, and for your suggestion regarding Miss Constance Duncan.

We could, as you suggest, arrange for her to come to Canberra for a few days so that members of the Department who are dealing with Far Eastern affairs might interview her, but feel that as Forsyth is still away and Dexter, who as you know is continuing his work on Peace Settlement preparations, is leaving to-day to spend three weeks in Melbourne, there is no present need for her to come up. Dexter is well acquainted with the Korean files held in the Department and would, I think, find discussions with her very useful.

We should be glad to know whether you think Miss Duncan might be regarded as a suitable candidate for the proposed Parliamentary Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement, the establishment of which has been tentatively suggested by the Minister. You might care to discuss this with Dexter while he is in Melbourne.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

JWB

(J.W. Burton)

Sir F.W. Eggleston.
18 Royal Crescent,
CAMBERWELL,
Victoria.

in Dexter.

For information

P47/20/4.3

2/5

KOREA

The joint United States-Soviet Commission in Korea, which is shortly to be reconvened for the first time since 9th May, 1946, is charged, as arranged at the Moscow Conference of 1945, with the threefold task of:

- (a) working out proposals for a provisional Korean Government;
- (b) submitting these proposals to China, the U.K., the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for consideration;
- (b) evolving, after consultation with the provisional Korean Government, proposals for a Four Power trusteeship for consideration by the Chinese, U.K., U.S. and Soviet Governments.

This forthcoming meeting was utilised by Australia as an occasion to remind the U.K. of previous expressions of Australian policy along the lines that Australia, while preferring the principle of a United Nations trusteeship for Korea, would, having regard to the rejection of an earlier proposal that a trusteeship body of at least five Powers including Australia, should be set up, agree to a proposal by the United Kingdom that it should notify the other Powers concerned when trusteeship proposals had been accepted, that it wished Australia to take its place as a member of the Four Power trusteeship body decided on at Moscow in December, 1945. A cabled reply of 14th May, 1947, from the Dominions Office, confirmed the U.K. intention to take the course outlined above.

*Note prepared for monthly
summary for Cabinet 20/5/1947
and handed to Mr. Shaw.*

P.46/20/1.

27th November, 1946.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Reference is made to the Secretary's memorandum (C.D. 326/1/5) dated 22nd November, 1946, dealing with a request for Australian support for a proposed application by South Korea for admission to the United Nations.

It would not be desirable for Australia to support the application. The Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, 1945, decided on a plan for the eventual re-establishment of Korea as an independent State. This plan recognised that there would have to be a period of tutelage and envisaged the establishment of a four-power trusteeship for a period up to five years. At the present time North and South Korea are separately administered, the former being under Soviet control and the latter under the control of the U.S.A. The Soviet and the U.S.A. formed a joint commission as a preliminary to the four power trusteeship but inability to reach agreement on important principles is delaying further progress. The political development of Korea is still quite immature and it will be some time before she may be regarded as eligible for admission to the United Nations. The request under discussion was made by one sectional interest of one section of Korea.

It is therefore recommended that the reply to Mr. Louis Yim should be along the following lines:

"It is desired to acknowledge receipt of your telegram dated 22nd November concerning the admission of South Korea to the United Nations. It is considered that it would not be appropriate at this stage for the Australian Government to take the action you request."

It is proposed to advise the Australian United Nations Delegation in New York that this request was received and that it is not intended to accede to it.

Secretary.

504/1.

→ P.

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Recd 22 NOV 1946

File No.

P46/20/1

COPY OF TELEGRAM

Addressed to : His Excellency Mr. Joseph B. Chifley,
Prime Minister of Australia, Canberra,

By : Louis Yim, Hotel Pennsylvania, New York City, U.S.A.

Dated : 22nd December, 1946.

Korea's plea for immediate independence and for membership in United Nations accepted as official document by United Nations General Assembly Now we need sponsoring Nation for Korea to get position on Assembly agenda stop We need your Delegation to sponsor Korea's plea Please telegraph instruction to your Delegation to help us stop Am Executive Member of representative Democratic Council of South Korea of which Dr. Syngman Rhee is Chairman stop Dr. Rhee instructed me to telegraph you this urgent plea I shall highly appreciate a telegraphic reply.

...Louis Yim, Hotel Pennsylvania,
New York City.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

22 NOV 1946

Referred, by direction, for favour of attention.

W. J. ...

J. Mahan

Secretary
Prime Minister's Department

UN

KOREAN AFFAIRS INSTITUTE

A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION

1029 VERMONT AVE.
NORTHWEST



TELEPHONE
NATIONAL 7866-8241

"Devoted to Freedom"

WASHINGTON 5, D.C.
October 23, 1946.

Received 9/4/47

H.E., Chairman of Australian Delegation,
The United Nations, New York City Building,
Flushing Meadows. New York, New York.

Sir:

The United Nations, founded upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter, is determined to secure equal rights and self-determination of the nations, large and small, and to ensure durable peace and security for all peoples. May I, therefore, call your attention to the case of Korea.

When Japan surrendered, the people of Korea expected their complete freedom and immediate independence.

When the Soviet and American troops landed in Korea, the people welcomed them as their liberators. They thought the occupation was only a temporary measure to effectuate the Japanese surrender in Korea.

Contrary to Korean good faith and expectations, the occupation continued. Not only that, the country is divided in two at the 38th parallel. The Northern half is under Soviet occupation, and the Southern half under American. There has been no free movement of persons and no free flow

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of commerce between the two areas. Consequently, the political, economic, and social life of the nation has been disrupted, and the wishes of the people totally disregarded. Korea is suffering many irreparable damages. The homogeneous Korean people cannot stand this division. Disorganizing the life of that liberty-loving nation is a direct violation of the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Without consulting with or asking the consent of the Korean people, in December, 1945, the three Great Powers, the United States, Russia and Great Britain, decided to place Korea under a four-power trusteeship for a period of up to five years. This agreement provided that the representatives of the Soviet and American Commands in Korea form a joint Soviet-American Commission to assist in the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean government. The Korean people were greatly disappointed over this decision, but they had to accept the trusteeship, hoping that the Allied powers would fulfill their agreement to achieve Korean independence in the shortest possible time.

But the joint Soviet-American Commission, because of the discord between the two delegations, was unable to carry out the Moscow Agreement. The conference of the joint Commission finally broke down and adjourned indefinitely on May 8th, last. It was a tragic malfeasance of its duty as guardian of Korean freedom and violated the sanctity of Korean trust. Trusteeship no longer exists.

Now, more than one year and two months after V-J Day, Korea has neither freedom nor independence. In spite of Soviet-American good intentions, Korea has become a victim of their dissension.

If the United Nations is to accomplish its high purpose of becoming a guardian of freedom, peace and security of the world, it cannot be indifferent to the welfare of any small nation. It is the responsibility and duty of the United Nations to investigate the case of Korea. Postponement of Korean freedom delays the crystallization of universal freedom and security. There must be a higher law and it must prevail instead of the dictates of the Big Powers.

Is it not the purpose of the United Nations to safeguard the liberty of a small nation, as well as that of a great nation? We cannot afford to have two sets of justice - one for the big powers and one for the small nations. We must have equality in freedom. No permanent peace can be had by denying justice to a small nation, and no lasting security can be had by ignoring the rights of the weak. Korean freedom cannot be infringed or stifled.

Furthermore, the trusteeship is supposedly set up for the benefit of Korea and not for that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the self-appointed trustees are unable to perform their duties, the United Nations should review the case and redress the grievances of the Korean people.


The people of Korea well deserve and have a strong desire for immediate freedom and independence and their inalienable rights.

The American military governor for South Korea has repeatedly said that Korea is now ready for self-government. I am confident that North Korea, too, is ready for self-rule.

Unfortunately, Korea was not given an opportunity to become a member of the United Nations and, therefore, she has no representation in that august body. She has no way in which to appeal directly to the United Nations. I firmly believe that it is not only a principle, but it is the function and responsibility of the United Nations to protect and promote human freedom and rights and to secure justice for the oppressed.

Believing international moral force is not totally dead and in the hope that a small voice may be heard and justice be done to a voiceless nation at this session of the United Nations General Assembly, I, as an individual private citizen of Korea, am addressing this open letter to you and the heads of the various delegations.

Respectfully yours,



Yongjeung Kim
President
Korean Affairs Institute.

SECRET.

NON/RS

CABLEGRAM.

I. 37692

XM0039

DECYPHER FROM :

Dated 5th December, 1945.

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Received 6th December, 1945.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
WASHINGTON.

1099. KOREA.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Office for despatch from Canberra. Begins.
Dr. Evatt has approved the following answer to Dominion

We agree with the principle of Trusteeship for a period which should be terminated when U.N.O. Assembly acting on advice of Trusteeship Council determines Korea is fit for independence. We think, however, that a United Nations Trusteeship would be far preferable to a four-power arrangement. This would be compatible with the suggestion for Advisory Council, but the Advisory Council should consist either of the Nations members of the Far Eastern Commission or at least of five powers including Australia. Proposed settlement of Italian colonies practically agreed to in London included United Nations trusteeship. A four power trusteeship is undesirable and opposed to our general policy in Pacific affairs.

War Cabinet
Defence
E.A.

6th December, 1945.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT.

No. *P/50.*

SUBJECT: _____

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Contracts, Prescriptions, etc.

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