Establishment of New Guinea Force and Miscellaneous GHQ Correspondence Relative to NGF
G-3 Journal, 31 July 1943.

NEW GUINEA FORCE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.67

SUBJECT: RIGHTING UP OF FORCES IN NEW GUINEA, DESIGNATION, COMPOSITION AND ROLE OF SUCH FORCES AT MILNE BAY.

OBJECT

1. To specify the role and functions of Australian Army units in the MILNE BAY area.

(Sgd) E.L. SHEEHAN, Col.
for Brig.

GS No.5 Force

G.H.Q., S.W.P.A. Check Sheet.

SUBJECT: Comments on G.H.Q. Operations Instr No.67

From: G-3 Planning
To: G-3
Date: 5 Aug., 1943.

1. Relative documents are:
   a. GHQ Operations Instr No.15.
   b. GHQ Operations Instr No.35.
   c. GHQ Standing Operating Procedure No.7.

2. Comments:

a. Commander, N.G.F. delegates to Commander, MILNE BAY FORTESS COMMAND none of the authority he has been assigned in connection with MILNE BAY area. This is entitling to do.

b. The composition of N.F. is not clearly defined. Under GHQ Operations Instr No.16 it included all Australian and US military forces, Army, Navy and Air of S.W.P.A. at that time serving in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA, and Commander, N.F. was to exercise operational control over NF and such other troops as might thereafter be assigned thereto. It now appears necessary to alter the above wording or to define more accurately what troops are assigned to N.F. from time to time.

c. Para 10. Refers to coordination of defense plans for MILNE BAY area in conjunction with ...............COMMANDER, 6th US Army. Commander 6th Army has no operational responsibility this should read "COMMANDER, ALAMO FORCE". Although GHQ Operations Instr No.15 states that Commander, N.F., shall have no authority to strike his forces passing through his area, by order of higher authorities, it is reasonable to assume in emergency, fighting troops in the area should conform to the defense plan, and it is right that Commander, N.F. should coordinate his defense plan with COMMANDER, ALAMO FORCE.

d. Para 12. This paragraph is not well worded. As expressed, it means that "in event of attack involving invasion of the area, Commander, MILNE BAY FORTESS COMMANID will not command Naval and Air Forces in MILNE BAY area. This is contrary to the intention of para 3x(b) of GHQ Operations Instr No.35."
Comments on NOF Ops Instns No.57 (contd) -

2. Para 12(b). This is contrary to provisions of OHQ Operations Instructions No.10.

2. Para 12(c). This is in accordance with OHQ S.O.P. No.7, Para 11 (AA officer agrees).

3. Para 13(b). The MAIVARA RIVER enters MILNE BAY half-way down the North-South coastline at the head of the Bay. GAMA RIVER enters the Bay on its North shore. The area enclosed by the two rivers embraces the two airfields and the main installations of MILNE BAY. Not clear what is meant by "allotment of co-ordination".


5. Para 13(e). No doubt this para is intended to refer only to such Engineering and Works projects as are under control of NOF. Chief Engineer (through Colonel Heidburg) considers that this is understood.

6. Para 13(f). Meaning not clear. Co-ordinator is responsible for control of shipping entering and leaving MILNE BAY. It appears contrary to this arrangement to designate Commander, Base Area, MORESBY, as responsible for such matters as through movement by water craft, etc. Suggest C-4 be asked to assume this aspect of the instruction.

(Ind) D.L.
Dear General Blamey,

I have carefully reviewed New Guinea Force Operations Order No. of 9 August 1943, and Operations Instructions No. of 25 August 1943, and find three items of major importance which are not clear to me and which should, I believe, be clarified:

(a.) General Headquarters Operations Instructions No. 24, 15 June 1943, charged the New Guinea Force with the consolidation of the coastal areas of Honomun by the seizure of enemy-occupied localities including Salamaua and Finschhafen. The New Guinea Force Orders remain silent as to the consolidation of the Muon Peninsula including the seizure of Finschhafen. In order to accomplish the desired mission and to take advantage of an opportunity for a rapid advance, I believe that the plan for the operation should be completed. Will you therefore have an outline plan forward to me at the earliest practicable date to be followed as rapidly as possible by the detailed plan of operations.

(b.) General Headquarters Operations Instructions No. 34, 15 June 1943, charged the New Guinea Force with the arrangement of overwater transportation for elements of the Allied Air Forces and A.A.S.S. O.S Advance Base Command and, by inference, Australian Lines of Communications elements which are to follow into Lu to activate airfields and port areas. The orders of the New Guinea Force remain silent as to the agency to accomplish this mission. By letter dated 15 August 1943, the Commander, New Guinea Force, was asked to state his plan for performing this mission. Would you be good enough to submit at the earliest practicable date the detailed plan for the accomplishment of this mission including priorities of shipments, the means to be employed and the specific agency which is to be charged with its execution.

(c.) Paragraph seven, New Guinea Force Operations Instructions No. 68 delegated to the Commander, I Australian Corps, the authority to arrange details of air support and naval support for the operation. The coordination of the New Guinea Force with the Allied Naval Forces and the Allied Air Forces can be affected only by the Commander-in-Chief at General Headquarters. The Commanders of all three forces will be present in Port Moresby during the operation where they will be available for immediate consultation. Any attempt to delegate this responsibility would, I am sure, result in ultimate confusion. This does not, of course, prevent coordination of details by local commanders.

Most sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

General Sir Thomas Blamey, G.C.B., K.C.B.

Commander, Allied Land Forces

General Blamey replied to Gen MacArthur in letter dated 31 Aug. '43.
(see G-3 Journal, 2 Sept., '43)
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

NAVY OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

MELBOURNE,
S.C. 1
30 MAY 1942

029460

The Naval Officer-in-Charge,
TOWNSVILLE.

I am directed by the Naval Board to forward herewith, for information and action as necessary, copy of Operation Instructions No. 7, dated 25th May, 1942, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific Area.

Encl:

Secretary.

Copy to:

R.A.C.A.S.
D.H.O. Q'ld.
TOWNSVILLE
Cairns.
SECRET.

Operation Instructions)

No. 7.

All Australian and United States military forces, Army, Navy and Air, of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, now or hereafter serving in the PORT MORESBY AREA, effective at once or when hereafter assigned, are placed under the operational control of the General Officer Commanding the NEW GUINEA FORCE.

In the exercise of this authority the General Officer Commanding the NEW GUINEA FORCE, while coordinating and perfecting the planning of all forces in preparation for defence, will not, except when attack is imminent or in progress, disturb the execution of the general plans of the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Australia.

The General Officer Commanding the NEW GUINEA FORCE will continue to operate under the direct command of the Commander Allied Land Forces.

OFFICIAL:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief.

S.J. CHAMBERLAIN,
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commander Allied Land Forces
Commander Allied Air Forces
Commander Allied Naval Forces
Commanding General, USAFIA
Engineer Officer
C-1
C-2
C-4
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Officer
Signal Officer

ENCLOSURE (A) TO COMSOWESPACFOR Most Secret ltr. AL6-2/A4-3 Serial 0072 dated May 27, 1942.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

NAVY OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

MELBOURNE, S.C. 1

044867

20 AUG 1942

The Naval Officer-in-Charge,
TOWNSVILLE, QLD.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 15 "NEW GUINEA FORCE".

I am directed by the Naval Board to forward herewith for information, copy of the abovementioned Instructions which have been received from the Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

[Signature]

Secretary.

To:-

N.O.I.C. Port Moresby.

" Townsville.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.
Brisbane, Qld.
6 August, 1942.

SECRET.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

No. 15.

1. Operations Instructions No. 7, this Headquarters, 25 May, 1942, specifying unified command for the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" and paragraphs 1, b and c, Memorandum, this Headquarters, 2 July, 1942, Subject: "Reinforcement of 'PALL RIVER'," are hereby revoked.

2. All Australian and United States military forces, Army, Navy and Air, of the Southwest Pacific Area now serving in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA are designated as the "NEW GUINEA FORCE." The General Officer Commanding Allied Land Forces in AUSTRALIA NEW GUINEA is designated Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE".

3. The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE", will exercise operational control over all military forces constituting the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" and such other troops as may hereafter be assigned thereto. In the exercise of this authority, the Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE", while co-ordinating and perfecting the planning of all forces in preparation for defense, will not, except when attack is imminent or in progress, disturb the execution of the general plan of the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General, U.S.A.S.O.S.

4. The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" shall have no authority over striking forces proceeding through his area by orders of higher authorities. He shall, however, utilize all available means at his disposal to insure the success of the mission of such striking forces.

5. It is not expected that the normal routine instructions of the Commanders, Allied Air, Naval and Land Forces and the Commanding General, U.S.A.S.O.S. will be routed through the Commander "NEW GUINEA FORCE". It shall, however, be the duty of local commanders of those forces to keep the Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" informed of all such instructions as will affect tactical operations.

6. The Commanders, Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General, U.S.A.S.O.S. will each designate an officer to command all units of their respective forces, or forces under their operational control, included within the "NEW GUINEA FORCE". The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE", in the exercise of his authority will, in all matters concerning them, deal through these representatives of other forces.

7. The General Officer commanding the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" will continue to operate under the direct command of the Commander, Allied Land Forces.

8. The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" may make such geographical sub-divisions of his command as may be required for tactical purposes. In each geographical sub-division, wherever units of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and U.S.A.S.O.S. are represented, a commander will be designated by such force commander and the command relationship between the officer exercising local unified command and the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and U.S.A.S.O.S. will be as indicated in paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 7 above for the "NEW GUINEA FORCE".
The mission of the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" is

(a) Protect the operation of Allied Air Forces operating from and through air bases in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA.

(b) Prevent further hostile penetration into AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA and in conjunction with the Allied Air Forces, maintain active reconnaissance and deny Japanese use of sea and land areas adjacent to PORT MORESBY, MILNE BAY and the island groups to the north and southeastward of the latter. Prevent at all costs penetration of the Japanese to the southwestward of the crest of the OWEN STANLEY RANGE.

(c) Maintain active patrol operations across the OWEN STANLEY RANGE in the direction of LAE--SALAMAU and BUNA-GONA. Prepare at the earliest practicable date, assisted by transport and other aviation of the Allied Air Forces, a striking force of at least two battalions eastward of the crest of the OWEN STANLEY RANGE along the route, PORT MORESBY-KOKODA, and capture KOKODA airdrome. The eventual objective of this force, upon later orders from this headquarters, in conjunction with other forces is to capture the BUNA-GONA area. Maintain and augment present forces operating from the vicinity of WAI and BULORI, continue harassing attacks against and be prepared in conjunction with other forces, on later orders of this headquarters, to assist in the capture of LAE and SALAMAU.

(d) Develop at the earliest practicable date in the vicinity of MILNE BAY an amphibious force, equipped with small boats, for coastwise operations. With the amphibious force and overland detachments, and in conjunction with the Allied Air Forces, operate along the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA with the objective of securing the coast line from EAST CAPE to TUFI inclusive and be prepared, in conjunction with other forces upon later orders from this headquarters, to assist in the capture of the BUNA-GONA area.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND.
Major General, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

S. J. CHAMBERLIN
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
ASST. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Distribution:
Commander, Allied Land Forces.
Commander, Allied Air Forces.
Commander, Allied Naval Forces.
Commanding General, USASOS
Operations Staff.
1. Operations Instruction No. 7, this Headquarters, 25 May, 1942, specifying unified command for the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" and paragraphs 1 b and c, Memorandum, this Headquarters, 2 July, 1942, Subject: "Reinforcement of FALL RIVER's," are hereby revoked.

2. All Australian and United States military forces, Army, Navy and Air, of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area now serving in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA are designated as the "NEW GUINEA FORCE." The General Officer Commanding Allied Land Forces in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA is designated Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE."*

3. The Commander "NEW GUINEA FORCE," will exercise operational control over all military forces constituting the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" and such other troops as may hereafter be assigned thereto. In the exercise of this authority, the Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE," while coordinating and perfecting the planning of all forces in preparation for defense, will not, except when attack in imminent or in progress, disturb the execution of the general plan of the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General U. S. A. S. O. S.*

4. The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" shall have no authority over striking forces proceeding through his area by orders of higher authorities. He shall, however, utilize all available means at his disposal to insure the success of the mission of such striking forces.*
5. It is not expected that the normal routine instructions of the Commanders, Allied Air, Naval and Land Forces and the Commanding General, U.S.A.S.O.S. will be routed through the Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE". It shall, however, be the duty of local commanders of those forces to keep the Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" informed of all such instructions as will affect tactical operations.

6. The Commanders, Allied Air and Naval Forces and the Commanding General, U.S.A.S.O.S. will each designate an officer to command all units of their respective forces, or forces under their operational control, included within the "NEW GUINEA FORCE". The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE", in the exercise of his authority will, in all matters concerning them, deal through these representatives of other forces.

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8. The Commander, "NEW GUINEA FORCE" may make such geographical sub-divisions of his command as may be required for tactical purposes. In each geographical sub-division, wherever units of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and U.S.A.S.O.S. are represented, a commander will be designated by such force commander and the command relationship between the officer exercising local unified command and the local commanders of the Allied Air and Naval Forces and the U.S.A.S.O.S. will be indicated in paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 7 above for the "NEW GUINEA FORCE".

9. The mission of the "NEW GUINEA FORCE" is:

a. Protect the operation of Allied Air Forces operating from and through air bases in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA.

b. Prevent further hostile penetration into AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA and in conjunction with the Allied Air Forces, maintain active reconnaissance and deny Japanese use of sea and land areas adjacent to
PORT MORESBY, MILNE BAY and the island groups to the north and southeastward of the latter, Prevent at all costs penetration of the Japanese to the southwestward of the crest of the OWEH STANLEY RANGE.

c. Maintain active patrol operations across the OWEH STANLEY RANGE in the direction of LAB-SALAMANUA and BUNA-GONA. Prepare at the earliest practicable date, assisted by transport and other aviation of the Allied Air Forces, a striking force of at least two battalions eastward of the crest of the OWEH STANLEY RANGE along the route, PORT MORESBY - KOKODA, and capture KOKODA airfield. The eventual objective of this force, upon later orders from this headquarters, in conjunction with other forces is to capture the BUNA-GONA area.

Maintain and augment present forces operating from the vicinity of WAU and BULOLO, continue harassing attacks against and be prepared in conjunction with other forces, on later orders of this headquarters, to assist in the capture of LAB and SALAMANUA.

d. Develop at the earliest practicable date in the vicinity of MILNE BAY an amphibious force, equipped with small boats, for coastwise operations.

With the amphibious force and overland detachments, and in conjunction with the Allied Air Forces, operate along the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA with the objective of securing the coastline from EAST CAPE to TUPI inclusive and be prepared, in conjunction with other forces, upon later orders from this headquarters, to assist in the capture of the BUNA-GONA area.
HISTORICAL DIVISION
General Headquarters
South West Pacific Area

SUBJECT: NEW GUINEA garrison forces.

SOURCE: Memo from General MacArthur to Commander Allied Land Forces, dated 25 Jan 43.

HOLDING AUTH: G3 Adm, CHQ. Filed in Journal 25 Jan 43.

EDITED BY: Pilot Officer L. C. Pratt, 1 Jun 43.

RELATED DOCS: = = =

SERIES: = = =
INDEX: = = =

1. A study of NEW GUINEA FORCES Operations Instruction No. 59 and confirmatory data submitted by Land Forces Headquarters, BRISBANE, indicates that it is the intention of the NEW GUINEA FORCES to maintain infantry garrisons at the following localities substantially as follows -

(a) GOODENOUGH ISLAND -
1 Company AMF.

(b) MILNE BAY AREA -
Mile Bay proper - 5 bns AMF
Porlock Harbor - 1 bn less 2 coy's AMF
Wanigela Mission - 1 coy AMF

(c) ORO BAY - BUNA - GOA AREA -
9 bns, 41st US Div.

(d) PORT MORESBY -
3 Bns AIF
1 Br, Papuan Inf.
NC Volunteer Rifles.

2. Letter, this Headquarters, 16 Jan 43 states that the above garrison for GOODENOUGH ISLAND was deemed inadequate and a restudy of the requirements was suggested with the objective of providing a suitable garrison for the purpose stated. Early action would be appreciated.

3. Prolonged service in the malarial and other tropical disease infested areas, as at MILNE BAY and in the north coastal region of NEW GUINEA, quickly reduces the effectiveness of even the best troops. The loss of weight and the general physical exhaustion caused by the unaccustomed humidity and heat makes the individual peculiarly susceptible to disease, and in a short time this general debility, or the ravages of some tropical disease make him ineffective as a soldier. The consequent reduction in
In strength and morale of organized units due to this attrition nullifies their effectiveness as fighting forces and requires replacement and reorganization of whole units. It is important, therefore, that careful consideration be given both to the type of troops utilized for these garrisons as well as to the period of time any particular group shall remain in them.

There are now but five infantry divisions for overseas offensive action in the SWPA and it is imperative that these divisions be maintained as effective fighting forces available for early offensive action. Special consideration must therefore be given them to insure their readiness for action, and it is believed that, except as an emergency measure, none of these divisions should be assigned to garrisons in the infected regions of NEW GUINEA and that when so assigned as an emergency measure their period of service be of the shortest possible duration.

4. MILNE BAY is the key to our position in NEW GUINEA. It must be provided with garrisons of sufficient strength to insure its protection retention. Admittedly it is desirable, due to its unhealthy location, to limit the garrison to a minimum consistent with the immediate requirements for defense, and it is presumed that the availability of air transport at PORT MORESBY to supply reinforcements quickly to MILNE BAY was an important consideration in limiting the garrison. However it is believed that the five disb immediately available at MILNE BAY, assuming the possibility of prompt reinforcement by air, is too small a garrison for adequate security. To obviate the deterioration in effective strength from the causes discussed in Par 3, it is suggested that some locality, such as the saddle between MULLINS HARBOR and MILNE BAY or some point in the STIRLING RANGE be utilized as a living area for portion of the garrison. Assuming improved communication, it is believed that a larger garrison could then be maintained at MILNE BAY without incurring prohibitive sick rates and yet be readily available through rapid communications. If concentration for the defense of MILNE BAY...
5. For reasons set forth in par 3, the present commitment of the infantry of the 41st US Division to the defense of the Buna-Buna-Gona area should be treated as an emergency measure. Plans should be made for its early relief and in the interim, in order to conserve its combat efficiency, it is suggested that a plan somewhat as follows be put into effect —

(a) Only approximately one half of the Infantry Combat Teams of the Division to be stationed in the Buna-Buna-Gona area, the remainder of the infantry garrison of nine battalions to be composed of AMF units.

(b) The remaining half of the combat teams of the 41st Division to be stationed initially at Port Moresby.

(c) After a period of approximately four to six weeks, the units of the 41st Div in (a) above to be relieved by those in (b) and returned to Port Moresby.

(d) The complete relief of the entire 41st Division from the defense of the North coast of New Guinea, and its replacement by AMF units after a period of approximately three months in order that it might intensify preparations for future offensive action.

(e) Light equipment only of the 41st Division to be moved to the Buna area. Heavy equipment required to be furnished from other sources and to become part of permanent garrison equipment. Any necessary American equipment which may be required for this purpose will be furnished on request.

Similarly the Australian units comprising the north coast garrison could be alternated between Port Moresby and the North coast of New Guinea.

6. The 17th Aust Inf Bde is also one of the few units whose primary role is considered to be overseas offensive action, and its service should similarly be carefully controlled.

7/ It is requested that these considerations immediately be studied with a view to early action. Advice of your considerations and action you propose to take would be appreciated."

— quoted in full.
NEW GUINEA FORCE OPERATIONS ORDER No.3

PORT MORESBY

REFERENCE MAPS.

PORT MORESBY

CENTRAL DIVISION

NEW GUINEA & PAPUA

INFORMATION.

1. ENEMY. A Sea Patrol despatched from PORT MORESBY in early May ascertained that no large enemy concentrations exist in either LOUISIAD ARCHIPELAGO or SAMURAI area. No isolated enemy parties were encountered.

2. The enemy has occupied MANUS, NEW IRELAND, BOUGAINVILLE, and TULAGI.

3. LAE and SALAMAU are still occupied by the enemy, the former being used extensively by bomber and fighter aircraft. No real offensive action has been taken by the enemy against our covering force in that area, but there are indications of a possible attempt to occupy the BULOLO Valley by infiltration along existing tracks, continued possibly by the landing of paratroops. The occupation of the BULOLO Valley would constitute a possible threat against PORT MORESBY.

4. There are further indications of enemy interest in the overland tracks leading from the BUNA area to PORT MORESBY. This route is the best overland route in NEW GUINEA mainland and is the only one which leads direct to PORT MORESBY.

5. In the event of a determined attack on PORT MORESBY the main sea attack may be co-ordinated with infiltration overland.

6. The plan of a combined attack on PORT MORESBY could include three main thrusts:

(a) CENTRAL - Directed against PT. MORESBY town-JOYCE BAY. Object- to contain our forces, capture the harbour and its installations, and penetrate along the RD. - MORESBY - ROUNA. The use of A.F.V.'s, in this thrust is possible.

(b) RIGHT FLANK (enemy) - Directed against BOOTLESS-TUPUSELEI AREA. Object- Penetration of 7 & 12 MILE VALLEYS, capture of KILIA KILIA & 7 MILE AERODROMES and cutting our L of C as far east as 17 MILE area.

(c) LEFT FLANK (enemy) - Directed against HUNDA - GALLEY REACH Area. Object- Penetration LALOKI VALLEY and capture area around the 7 MILE group of Aerodromes.

6. The retention of as large a reserve as the protection of the vital coastline will permit, is essential. It dictates the provision of a DIV. RECCE UNIT and a DIV. ARMY RESERVE.

OWN TPS.

7. Certain Allied Naval and Air Forces remain in NEW GUINEA Area and, in conjunction with the wireless net-work, will provide good warning of major enemy movements, and offensive action against any enemy convoy attempting to reach our S.E. coastline.
7. Det. No. 1 Ind. Coy. is still on ROUGANVILLE 13, and is in touch with this H.Q. Otherwise all the Dots from the outer islands of NEW GUINEA have been withdrawn or captured by the enemy. The whole area however, is under observation by Allied Air Force.

8. The tracks inland from the BUNA area are now under contin—uous observation by P.I.B. and the A.N.G.A.U. watching posts in that area.

The role of P.I.B. is armed recce., but they cannot be expected to offer any real resistance to a determined advance by the enemy.

Portion 39 Bn. is being concentrated in the SOGERI Valley - KOKODA area, to prevent any movement South of KOKODA with the additional role of forces reserve.

The code name for this operation is " MAROUBRA " (Vide Operation Instructions No. 13.)

9. The protective force is still in occupation of the RORON Aerodrome Area. In addition, a new aerodrome is being constructed at MILNE BAY and a special protective force is now in that area.

Code name for this operation is " FALL RIVER " (Vide Operation Instruction No. 17.)

This latter aerodrome will be admirably placed for action against a convoy proceeding to S.E. NEW GUINEA and, once in action, may have to be put out of action by the enemy before a large-scale attack is launched against PORT MORESBY. This would mean a dispersal of enemy force and such an operation, may give early warning of an attempt to land at PORT MORESBY.

NEW GUINEA FORCE is being reinforced and the ORDER OF BATTLE attached as Appx A, shows the following :-

(1) PORT MORESBY Garrison.
(11) Detachments from N.G.FORCE resources to provide for protection of Aerodromes outside PORT MORESBY Area.
(111) Detachments from N.G.FORCE resources to prevent enemy penetrations via KOKODA.
(1IV) MANA FORCE based on W.A.U Role - harassing tactics in the MARKHAM VALLEY.

PORT MORESBY Garrison is being organised on a divisional basis as shown in Appx A.

11. Troops stationed in PORT MORESBY Town, have been organised as an Inf. Coy (Z Coy) for ground defence. Personnel of Units concerned will come under Command 30 Inf. Bde while carrying out Z Coy Role. (Vide Operation Instruction No. 15.)

12. No immediate assistance in defence can be counted on from members of Naval Staff and A.A.F. stationed in PORT MORESBY. The majority of these personnel will be required to continue with their present duties in PORT MORESBY, or at new positions in rear. All surplus personnel will move to A.A.F. Camp, SOGERI Valley, where they will be organized, trained, and used as reserve troops.

INTENTION.

13. MORESBY Garrison will :-

(a) Destroy all enemy attempting to land on our beaches.
(b) Defend PORT MORESBY and its installations to the last degree of resistance.

METHOD.

14. BDE AREAS.

Bde areas, F.D.L.'s and inter—bde bdys are shown vide Sketch attd. as Appx "B"
20 Inf. Bde.- Beach defence in sector and prevention of penetrations via:

(a) Rd. MAPPA MAPPA - FAIRFAX Harbour.
(b) T.MULBIE - H.MULBIE.
(c) Rd. MORESBY - ROUND.
(d) 3, 4, and 6 MILE Valleys.
(e) Right flank protection.

14 Inf. Bde.-

(a) Beach defence in sector.
(b) Prevention of penetration from BOOTLESS and TUPUSELEI areas via 7, 8, 9, and 12 MILE Valleys.
(c) Left flank protection.

FLANK PROTECTION:
16. Bdes will prepare positions on the lines shown in Appx "A" so that they will be ready for occupation should the necessity arise.
14 Inf. Bde. will be conversant with the right flank position in case an enemy attack should contain 30 Inf. Bde. from the front and make it necessary for a portion of 14 Inf. Bde. to occupy it.

39 BN.- PROTECTION UNDER CMD.
17. Reference: Operation Instruction No. 18. Main body 39 BN. will remain under command 30 Inf. Bde. until further orders. The Bde. plan will allow for its immediate available to assist in defence of that area, but an alternate plan must be made in case it has to be withdrawn under cmd N.C.Force at short notice.

ARTY- FD.
18. ALLOCATION AND ROLES:

(a) 13 Fd Regt (less tp B) } In support 30
   Ind. 3.7 How Tp } Inf. Bde.
(b) 2 Tp 13 Fd Regt } In support 14
   55 Bty 14 Fd Regt } Inf. Bde.
(c) Reserve:
   14 Fd Regt (less 55 Bty)

ARTY AREA TASKS.

53 0406 0497 0506 0507
(1) Flank Protection:
   Approaches via MLCR FARM 0714
   HORSE SHOE RANGE 0513
   RAIN HILL 0312
   TABLE TOP 0159

(11) Beach & Penetration:
   From R.A.G. PT. 9899 to R.A.RI 0295 both incl.

54 1104 1105 1204 1205
(1) Flank Protection:
   Approaches NORTH R.L.O.NK from BRIDGE 1112 to MLCR
   FARM 0714.
   Approaches Left Flank from
   Rly 2101 to MT. SELDOM 192.

(11) Beach & Penetration:
   From PYR.R.WD PT. 1192 to X Tracks
   177996 both incl.
Reserve Artillery will support by observed concentrations.

Reserve guns will be prepared to engage BEACH AND PILLBOX.

- Observation tasks on C.D.F.
  16 pdr., equipments of 13 Fd Rgt will remain sited for BEACH defence by direct fire.
  All guns will be given predicted fire tasks as counter to smoke or fog. A Co-ordinated and detailed Artillery fire plan will be issued separately.

ARTY. A.T.K.

Artillery Tp will be in reserve at locality 0602 and will be prepared to protect the movement of enemy A.F.V.'s and other vehicles inland at the following positions:

Primary: Fd MORESBY - ROUNA at PINEAPPLE RIDGE
Secondary: SMITHS SADDLE 0699.

ARTY. M.G.

Light Artillery Sub-units, having the primary role of Aerodrome defence in the MORESBY Area, will be prepared to occupy positions from which Fd Artillery Beach guns can be protected against low flying attacks.

M.G.'S AND MORTAR.

When Coys are not able to present a continuous front along the beaches to be held, the basis of Beach Defence provided by Fd Artillery will be supplemented by Mobile Fire columns consisting of:

One pl or sec M.G.'s
One sec or det Mortars 3" (""
One Inf pl or det

Dispersion of these columns will be avoided and complete alternative positions will be prepared.

They will be incorporated where practicable with Artillery, Sec or Sub-sec, and will be sited to cover beaches and obstacles from emplacements at or near sea level. Sufficient Inf for local protection of Artillery and M.G.'s only, will be provided.

Inf. Bdes. will each arrange to cover the entrance to OYSTER BAY 120°, by M.G. fire.

M.G.'s and Mortars will be laid normally to engage opportunity targets within their area of responsibility. They will be given fixed lines as counter to smoke, fog and darkness.

BEACH LIGHTS

Allocation (to be increased on arrival fresh equipment)

- 13 Fd Rgt - 10 pdr equipments ca 1
- 20 Inf Bde - 20
- 14 Inf Bde - 4

BEHL's will be defiladed from the sea and co-ordinated with the fixed line of Fd or M.G.'s.

ACTION ON C.D.F.

F.D.H.C.'s will open fire when enemy landings in their respective sectors are detected, and landing craft are within effective range of their weapons only.

A proportion of available weapons only will open fire on each of the first or "feeder" waves of attack and detachments concerned will then change to alternative positions.

BEHL's will be turned on as the enemy reaches the zone covered by fire of weapons concerned in each sector, and off when enemy remnants withdraw. Use of Beach lights as searchlights will be avoided.

All weapons will engage the main attack only, on any sector, simultaneously.
(a) Observed targets:
- Mortars and S.A. fire
  - The most rapid effective rate of fire, consistent with the necessity for conserving amm. for later targets.
- Arty
  - Obscured targets:
  - FIRE will be opened as far as practicable by noise of enemy encountering obstacles on Fixed Lines as follows:
    - Mortars and S.A. fire — rapid 1 min.
    - Arty — normal 2 mins.
    - Intense 1 min.
    - Rapid 2 mins.

**ATK MINES.**

25.  **Allocation**

| 14 Inf Bde. | 1000 |
| 30 Inf Bde. | 2000 |

**RIFLE UNIT.**

26.  Recce Coy is being formed by withdrawing personnel & equipment from Inf Bdes. This is a temporary arrangement and subject to variation at a later date. The role of the Coy will be:

- **Primary** — Protective recce and delaying action.
- **Secondary** — Protective recce in area TUFUSELHE—KILN.
- **Tertiary** — Reserve with particular reference to the 7 and 12 KILN Valleys.

**RESERVES.**

27.  (a) Force Reserves

1. All units stationed in SOKEHI Valley.
2. Details A.A. if and when available.
3. Portion 39 BN. if stationed outside Bde areas.

(b) GORESHI Garrison.

1. Recce Coy (see Para 25)
2. 7 & 14 Td Coys.
3. Other other units left in Bde areas.
4. No detailed not required for A.I., defence.

**Assembly area** — JOHN'S GULLY 9900.
**Role** — Protection right flank.

**SECURITY.**

28.  Description must be exercised in the promulgation of information given above re operations of our own tps in outlying stations. In the early stage of these operations accuracy is vital.

Operations will be referred to by their code names.

**FIELD WORKS & OBSTACLES.**

29.  **Policy.** Both forward and reserve positions will be rendered as impregnable as time will allow and continuous improvements of works and camouflage will be effected.

Obstacles and preparations for demolitions will be kept in good order by frequent inspections, followed by action.

Construction of parados and parapets will be avoided, soil will be removed, and, where practicable, used to construct dummy positions.
PRIORITY OF WORK.
30. (a) BEACH WIRING, weapon pits, and emplacements.
(b) Reserve area wiring and weapon pits.
(c) Development of posts and comms systems.
(d) Alternative posts and emplacements.
(e) Tactical wiring.
(f) Rd blocks and minefields.
(g) Dummy posts.

WIRING.
31. All beach, flank, and reserve positions will be protectively and tactically wired for 'all round' defence.
Open beaches and mangrove coastal line defended, will be wired:
(a) tactically between Low and High water marks
(b) defensively above High water mark.
Requisition for additional material required will be submitted soon after detailed recce have been completed.

DEMOLITIONS.
32. Wide Operation Instruction No.1.

PATROLS.
33. Flank standing patrols will be established in:
(a) POOREBADA area by 30 Inf Bde.
(b) TUPOUMLAI area by 14 Inf Bde.
They will be occupied from 1800 hrs to 0600 hrs daily and continuously when occupation of Battle stations is ordered.
Role:
(i) Security
(ii) Provision of early intelligence of enemy flank activity.

34. Recce patrols will be sent into flank areas on frequent occasions in order to gain topographical etc information and give junior leaders and men first hand knowledge of these areas.

ADM.
35. Separate Arm Instructions are being issued.

WATERCOMUNICATION.
36. ForlU H.Q. will remain at present location but an operations and intelligence centre for PORT MORESBY operations is being established at 1360G6. All matters connected with operations and intelligence within the PORT MORESBY operational area, will be dealt with at this centre. In the event of an enemy attack in that area, this centre will be used as a Forward Force H.Q.

C.D.F.
37. Beach Sector C.D.F. are allocated as follows:

30 INF BDE. 14 INF BDE.
RED GREEN RED RED RED WHITE
GREEN RED RED RED RED GREEN
RED WHITE RED WHITE WHITE RED
WHITE RED WHITE

38 Ack.

Issued by DR
TO S
Distribution (over)

Lt-Cr. GENERAL STAFF N.G. PORT.
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<tr>
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<td>14 Fd Regt</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>N.G. FORCE Sigs</td>
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<td>14 Inf Bde</td>
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<td>L.H.Q</td>
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<td>N.O.I.C</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>R.A.A.F</td>
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<td>20-21</td>
<td>WAR DIARY</td>
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<td>22-23</td>
<td>Spare</td>
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APP. A to NEW GUINEA FORCE OPERATION ORDER NO. 3.

ORDER OF BATTLE (Provisional)

(A) MORESBY GARRISON DIVISION

(1) DIV TPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAV</th>
<th>Moreseby Dv. Recce Unit</th>
<th>Being Formed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTY</td>
<td>13 Fd Regt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 Fd Regt. Sig Sec.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219 L.A.D.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Fd. Regt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Fd. Regt. Sig. Sec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>217 L.A.D.</td>
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<td>Tp. 3.7. R.ows.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C Tp 17 A/Tk. Bty.</td>
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</table>

| ENGRS | 7 Fd. Coy. | Temp. attached |
|       | 14 Fd. Coy. | N.G. FORCE |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SIGS</th>
<th>Det. N.GF Sigs.</th>
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</table>

| INF    | 30 INF BDE GP. |
|       | H.Q. 30 Inf Bde. |
|       | 30 Inf Bde Sig Sec. |
|       | 30 Inf Bde Def Fl. |
| ONE Coy 39 En. | |
| 49 En. | |
| 53 En. | |
| 14 Fd. Amb. | |
| 109 Ind Bde Op Wk/shp. | |
| 109 Ind Bde Op Ord Fd Fl. | |

| INF    | 14 INF BDE GP. |
|       | H.Q. 14 Inf Bde. |
|       | 14 Inf Bde Sig Sec. |
|       | 14 Inf Bde Def Fl. |
| 3 En. | |
| 36 En. | |
| 55 En. | (less two coys & one N.E.G. Fl.) |
| 3 Fd Amb. | |
| 255 L.A.D. | |
| 113 Ind Bde Op Wk/shp. | |
| 113 Ind Bde Op Ord Fd Fl. | |

(11) FIXED DEFENCES.

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<tr>
<th>ARTY</th>
<th>Hy. Bty - PAGA</th>
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<td>ENGRS</td>
<td>Frt. Engrs.</td>
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(111) N.G.FORCE UNITS to come under Command MORESBY GARRISON DIV. For Ground Defence.

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<th>ARTY</th>
<th>H.Q. N.G.F. A.A. BDE.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101 C.A. Bn. (A.A.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>H.Q. A.A. Regt.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Det. A.A. Regt. Sig. Sec.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 A.A. Bty.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>23 A.A. Bty.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>67 A.A.S.L. Coy.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ORDER OF BATTLE (Provisional)

(CONTINUED)

(111) H.G. FORCE UNITS to come under Command

HORESBY GARRISON DIV., for Ground Defence.

ARTY
H.Q. Lt. A.A. Regt.
Det. Lt. A.A. Regt. Sig. Sec.
3 Lt. A.A. Bty (less one tp.)
17 Lt. A.A. Bty.
One Tp. 9 Lt. A.A. Bty

ENGRS.
Army Tps. Coy

(B) MONA FORCE.

ARTY
One two gun stn. 3" 23 A.A. Bty.
One tp 3 Lt. A.A. Bty.

ENGRS.
E Coy 43 Engr. Bn.

INF
M.Q.F. AA MNG Tp.

PALL RIVER FORCE.

ARTY
One two gun stn 3" 23 A.A. Bty.
One Pl 101 CA En. (AA)
9 Lt. A.A. Bty (less one tp)
Det Lt. A.A. Regt. Sig. Sec.
Det Lt. A.A. Regt. Wk/shp Sec.

ENGRS.
E Coy 46 Engr. Bn.

SIGS
Det N.G.F. Sigs.

INF.
Two Inf Coys 55 En.
One M.M.G. Pl 55 En.

MED.
Special 20 Bed Hosp.
A.A.S.C. Det N.G.F. A.A.S.C.

(C) MAROUBRA FORCE.

39 En. (less one Coy)
F.I. En.

(D) KANGA FORCE.

H.Q. Kanga Force
5 Ind Coy
Reinf Pl 1 Ind Coy
M.G.V.R.
"A" Mortar Pl.

Copies will be destroyed by fire and certificates rendered by 30 June '42.
REFERENCE MAPS

PORT MORESBY 1 inch to 1 mile
CENTRAL DIVISION 1 inch to 4 miles
NEW GUINEA & PAPUA

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY. Following the occupation of RABUAL on 23 Jan. and at GASHIYA on 3 Feb., JAPANESE combined forces made unopposed landings at SALAMAUA and LAE on 8 Mar. and at FINSCHAPPEN on 10 Mar. The concentration of naval and transport shipping in the NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN area is not sufficient for the enemy to force a passage to PORT MORESBY and attempt a landing there. However, it would be possible for them to despatch troop-carrying planes from NEW BRITAIN and NEW GUINEA bases to make an aerial landing in the PORT MORESBY area.

Enemy bombing attacks, sometimes supported by fighters, have been made on PORT MORESBY and on towns on the NEW GUINEA mainland. Very little damage has been done in PORT MORESBY. LABU, BULULU and WAU have been damaged considerably.

2. OWN TROOPS. Allied naval units and aircraft in considerable strength are operating in the NEW GUINEA area. This will prevent a surprise attack on PORT MORESBY by sea and may even prevent any such attack from taking place. However, there can be no guarantee of this; and, in the interests of Allied strategy, these forces may be removed from this area at any time.

Detachments of N.G.V.R. have withdrawn from SALAMAUA and LAE. Those in the WAI-BULULU District have withdrawn from the actual townships, but are remaining in their immediate vicinity. All dots are organised and prepared to adopt guerrilla roles and to resist the enemy wherever and whenever possible.

Dots of No. 1 Indep. Coy. at LORENGAE, KAVIENG and BUKA forced to withdraw from their original stations to the interior of the islands of HANUS, NEW HEBRIDES and BOUGAINVILLE respectively where they are to remain to undertake guerrilla tactics to harass the enemy. The dots at TULAGI and VILA remain intact.

Remnants of the RABUAL Garrison are gradually making their way to PORT MORESBY, the NEW GUINEA mainland and some to AUSTRALIA. Small parties have arrived already.

A "scarred earth" policy is being adopted in NEW GUINEA and PAPUA to prevent any valuable resources or installations to fall into enemy hands.

3. ADDITIONAL UNITS. New units now under command of M.D. are included in the order of battle attached as Appendix "A" to this order.

4. OTHER SERVICES. An R.A.A.P. Fighter Ops. Room is being established in vicinity 0609.

The Navy Staff Office has been established at WONGA 0602.
6. ALLOCATION OF UNITS. A re-allocation of 8 M.D. units is shown in the order of battle in Appendix "A".

7. MAIN DEFENSIVE ROLE. 30 Inf. Bde Gp. will be prepared to defend against air landings all areas in the PORT MORESBY area between the LOKI R. and the coast, incl. that of PORT MORESBY itself, from the North and South line through the R.A.A.F Remote Control Receiving Stn. 077077 to the North-South rd. from BOOTLESS Inlet, both incl. All dots. Dist. Tps. in this area will be responsible for their own immediate protection.

This role will be combined with that of ensuring effective beach defence to prevent an enemy landing, according to the plan set out in O.O. No. 1.

The new plan will be known as PLAN "B" to distinguish it from the previous one, to be known as PLAN "A". PLAN "B" must be so designed that a reversion to PLAN "A" can be made at 12 hours notice.

8. DEFENCE OF L.O/C. AREA

(a) All units and dots. in the L.O/C. area will be responsible for their immediate protection against enemy air landings or patrols which may filatrate into that area. Plans for the offensive and defensive action of these units and dots. will be prepared by the chiefs at the staffs concerned or by C.O.s, as applicable. These plans will be co-ordinated by "G" Staff, Admin.H.Q.

(b) In addition, 30 Inf. Bde. will maintain one rifle coy. and attd. tps. in the vicinity of the junct. of LOKI R. and EMAROGO Ck. The role of this dot. will be:

(a) To assist in the defence of the rear L.O/C. area.
(b) To undergo training.
(c) To rest and obtain benefit from the change of climate.

Dots. will be changed at the end of every two weeks. Dispositions and roles will be laid down by "G" Staff, Admin.H.Q.

(c) Port Q. Coy. is located at the junct. of rd. PORT MORESBY - ROUH and the BOOTLESS Rd. In addition to its normal engineering role, this coy. will act as a general inf. reserve.

9. A.A. DEFENCES

(a) The 3.7 inch Stn will remain at TUABUBA Hill.

The 6 3-inch guns will remain mobile and will be organised to form two stns. Two guns only should be moved at any one time. Unless the location of these stns. is known to the enemy, they will not engage single enemy reconnaissance planes.

(b) H.Q. 23 A.A. Bty. will be established in close proximity to R.A.A.F. Fighter Ops. Room. O.C. 23 Bty. will liaise with the officer in C/O. Fighter Ops. Room to determine the subdivision of duties between themselves.

(c) The protection of the A.O.B. PORT MORESBY and of the 7 HILLS Aerodrome against low-flying aircraft will be undertaken by 30 Inf. Bde Gp. C/O. R.A.A.F. PORT MORESBY is taking over the defence of the 7 HILLS Aerodrome as soon as personnel are available and suitably organised and trained.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES - BEACH DEFENCE:

30 Inf. Bde. Gp. will be responsible for the prevention of enemy landings from the sea on the coast line from the R.A.A.F. Remote Control Receiving Stn. 077077 to TUPUSELEI Hq. 200904 both incl. less PAGA PT. from incl. Slipway 998040 to incl. Native Hospital 02997 which will be defended by O.C. Hy. Art'y. with Prt. Engrs. under cond. O.C. Hy. Art'y. will co-ordinate his defences with flanking units of 30 Inf. Bde. Gp.

PATROLES:

(a) 30 Inf. Bde. Gp. will establish a standing patrol in the area BOERA - FOREBADE to give early warning of any enemy activity in that area.

(b) P.I.Bn. have established standing patrols each of strength one pl. at RIGO, KOKODA and OBU to carry out the following roles:

(i) Recon and observation to give early warning of any enemy activity in the area.

(ii) To harass any enemy who may land in the area and delay his advance on PORT MORESBY or any other objective.

(iii) To encourage natives in areas patrolled to pass information of enemy movements to members of our forces and generally to educate them to assist us in every way.

(iv) To educate the natives to view possible enemy action particularly from the air, in its proper perspective so that this action will not disrupt their normal routine, and therefore their usefulness, as little as possible.

AIRWATCHING NETWORK:

Under arrangements made with the N.O.I.C. and O.C. R.A.A.F. PORT MORESBY, a series of airwatching posts is being established in PAPUA and NEW GUINEA. These posts are equipped with teleradio sets for rapid communications with Fighter Control and other Units PORT MORESBY.

DISTRIBUTION

| Copy No. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 & 24 | 25 | 26 & 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 & 38 | 39 | 40 |
| No.      | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 & 38 | 39 | 40 |

GENERAL STAFF 8 M.D.

[Signature]
### APPENDIX "A" TO 8 H.D. COMMISSION ORDER No. 2 of 15 Jan. 42

**ORDER OF BATTLE**

**PORT JONASBY, DARWIN.**

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#### UNITS

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<tr>
<td>H.C. Royal Artillery Fixed Defences</td>
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<td>1187 Royal Artillery Fixed Defences Pt. Emus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1187 Royal Artillery Fixed Defences AA Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/4TPs Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Pd. Coy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 1/4Pd. 3.7&quot; Sec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Sec. 1 I.C.H. Equip. Coy. A.I.F.</td>
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<td>67 AA R.A.F.</td>
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<td>Bomb Disposal Sec. 8 H.D.</td>
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<td>Dist. Sigs.</td>
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<td>H.C. 8 H.D. Defence and Employment Pl.</td>
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<td>F. I. Bn.</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Sec. Int. Corps</td>
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<td>15 Sup. F. Sec. Coy.</td>
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<td>9 H.D. Bulk Issue Petrol and Oil Depot.</td>
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<td>A Sec. 8 H.D. Reserve I.T. Coy.</td>
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<td>265 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>274 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>421 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>15 Optical Unit</td>
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<td>16 Pd. Hyg. Sec.</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Ord. Depot</td>
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<td>19 Ord. Admin. Sec.</td>
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<td>30 Sec. Provost Pl.</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Stary Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 H.D. Printing Sec.</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Graves Registration and Inquiries Unit</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Laundry and Decontamination Unit A.M.C.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papuan Admin. Unit</td>
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<td>New Guinea Admin. Unit</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Army Fd. Bakery</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Base Depot</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Marine Sec.</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Canton Services</td>
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<td>8 H.D. Tug. Centre</td>
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#### DISTRICT Ops.

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<tr>
<td>H. &amp; P. Artillery Battery</td>
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<tr>
<td>One 3.7&quot; Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two 3&quot; Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Total 6 3&quot; guns)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three rifle coy's.</td>
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APPENDIX "A" TO 8 I.D. OPERATION ORDERS No. 2 of Mar. 42

ORDER OF BATTLE

PORT JERSEY GARRISON

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**BRIGADE GROUP**

- 13 Fd. Regt.
- 39 Bn
- 49 Bn
- 53 Bn
- Det. No. 1 Indep. Coy.

*ATTACHED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.*

Coy. R.A.A.F. Details

**TO TAKE EFFECT FROM 1200 HOURS 16 MAR. 42**
**APPENDIX "A" TO 8 H.I.D. OPERATION ORDER NO. 2 OF MARCH 25 '42.**

**ORDER OF BATTLE.**

**PORT MORESBY GARRISON.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRIGADE GROUP.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Fd. Rgt.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Fd. Rgt. Sig. Sec.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 To. 17 A/Tk. Bty. A.I.F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Inf. Bde. Sig. Sec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>39 Bn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>49 Bn.</td>
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<td>53 Bn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det. No. 1 Indep. Coy.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Bde. H.Q. Def. Pl.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ATTACHED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.**

Coy. R.A.A.F. Details

**TO TAKE EFFECT FROM 1200 HOURS 16 MARCH '42.**
INFORMATION.

1. ENEMY. The only known threat at the present time is that of action against us by the Japanese. In the fall of MANILA, it is reasonable to assume that this action becomes more imminent each day.

Enemy action in 8 H.D. has consisted so far of only aerial reconnaissance and possibly photography, over KAVIENG, RABAUL, SALAMAU, and LAB. As a result of this, and with knowledge of the country which they must have obtained from previous visits here and from previous or present residents of GERMAN extraction, aerial bombings and even air landings at these places must be expected. Similar enemy action at PORT MORESBY is possible, even before enemy bases are established in other parts of 8 H.D. In addition, enemy landings from the sea are possible at almost any selected point in 8 H.D.

2. OWN TROOPS.

PORT MORESBY Garrison is available for the protection of PORT MORESBY. Order of Battle is shown in appendix "A" attached.

No. 1 Independent Coy. has small garrisons at LORENGAI, KAVIENG (including H.Q.), RUKA, TULAGI, and VILA. The duty of these detachments is to defend A.O.S. at these places.

RABAUL is defended by a garrison — one bty. Hvy. Artillery one Infantry Bn., and attached troops.

N.G.V.R. a militia Bn. is organised on N.G. mainland and has detachments stationed to protect the main aerodromes. These detachments cannot hold out for long against an attack in force, but they serve as warning stations and as a detachment against landing of planes in small numbers.

A V.A.O. platoon exists at SALAMAU. Its role and usefulness approximate to those of the N.G.V.R. dets. mentioned above.

3. OFF SERVICES.

(a) H.Q. Naval organisation in 8 H.D. consists of shore installations only, including port authorities at PORT MORESBY and RABAUL and coast watching stations (C.W.S.) at selected points around the coast. Action by offensive or defensive units, R.A.N. is decided by higher authority.

(b) R.A.A.F. PORT MORESBY Sqn. consists of E.O. and two sqns. (flying boats). Its role is protective reconnaissance and is controlled by H.Q. Northern Area R.A.A.F. This latter H.Q. also controls bomber and fighter sqns, which may and do operate in or from 8 H.D. Several bombing raids have been conducted against KAPINGARANG Is., which is approx. 500 miles from RABAUL.

4. INTENTION.

PORT MORESBY Garrison will hold the following places to allow their continuous use by the combined services:

(a) 7-Mile Aerodrome.
(b) PORT MORESBY Harbour.
METHOD.

6. DISPOSITIONS AND ROLES.

30 Inf. Bde. Gp. will be disposed to perform the following roles:

(a) To give immediate warning to any enemy activity.

(b) To prevent any enemy landing or landings in the area bounded by the coast line from BOOBA 860103 to TUPUSELEI Rd. 200904, less the PORT FORESBY town area from incl. ELEVALA Pt. 065031 to incl. east end ELE Bch. 018003.

(c) Should the enemy effect landings from the sea or from the air

(i) to deny to him the NAPA NAPA Peninsular.

(ii) to prevent his movement eastwards along the North shores of FAIRFAX Harbour.

(iii) To prevent his movement northwards from a line from the mouth of VAI VAI BR. 17892 to GABATU 037993.

(iv) To prevent his movement towards PORT FORESBY and 7-MILE aerodrome from the line of LALOKI RIVER.

Details District tos., R.A.A.F. and V.D.C. will prevent any enemy landing in the area bounded by the coast line from incl. ELE Bch. to incl. east end of ELE Bch.

The following details will be responsible for areas as follows:

- **R.A.A.F.** - From incl. ELEVALA Pt. to excl. ELE VALE Point 999004.
- **V.D.C.** - ELA Bch. from excl. Native Hospital to incl. east end of beach.
- **H.Q. 8 M.D.** - Reserve.

These details will come under the control of H.Q. 8 M.D., and mutual arrangements being made between this H.Q. and R.A.A.F.

6. HY. ARTY. & FRT. ENGRS.

Hy. Arty. and Frt. Engrs., MORESBY Fixed Defences will engage all enemy shipping within range. Should time permit, the fire cont. will inform H.Q. 8 M.D. of his intention to engage any target.

O.C. Hy. Arty. will make all necessary arrangements to engage targets in the direction of FOREBADA 875072. The O.P. necessary for this task will be maintained permanently, the necessary personnel being attached to the H.Q. of details 30 Inf. Bde. operating in the FOREBADA - NAPA NAPA area.

7. A.A. DEFENCE.

23 A.A. Bty. will man the 3-inch Station, MORRIS Hill and will ready for action by 1200 hrs. 5 Jan. or earlier, if possible. The 3.7-inch Station, TUAGUBU Hill will be prepared and the guns mounted to prepare the station for action in the shortest possible time.

All units will provide their own L.H.G. A.A. protection. Dispositions will be co-ordinated by G.S.O.II, H.Q. 8 M.D.

8. L.O.C. AREA.

The L.O.C. area will be astride the rd. PORT FORESBY - ROUNA, both places incl. The retention to this area is essential to the defences of our vital areas. 30 Inf. Bde. Gp. will be responsible for its defence.
9. ACTION ON GENERAL ALARM.

All units detailed to definite battle stations will immediately man same.

Units, as yet not so detailed, will 'stand to' in vicinity of their own lines, ready to move as ordered.

Dress: Battle dress with full water and iron rations.

Units and transport 'Standing to' will adopt suitable formation to avoid casualties from air.

All units will ensure that vehicles on their charge carry spare petrol and water at all times.

The signal for General alarm will be passed by Dist.

Signals.

ADMINISTRATION.

10. MEDICAL.

The following organization will be brought into use as soon as possible:

- BASE HOSPITAL - ROUNA area.
- A.D.S.S. - NAAPA NAAPA

FAIRFAX Harbour (vicinity 975076)

Junc. rd. ROUNA - PORT Moresby and track leading to BOOTLESS Inlet.

Collecting Ports - Lower 3-MILE Valley
Lower 7-MILE Valley.

Until the ROUNA hospital is established, the Camp Hospital, MURRAY Barracks will act as a base hospital.

11. AMMUNITION.

All units will be issued with ammunition to complete up to unit reserves, plus any additional quantity which can be carried. Other ammunition will be dumped in the L.O.C. area and will be issued to units by the Ordnance Depot on demand.

12. TRANSPORT.

Transport is being issued to units on a modified scale. The services of additional transport may be obtained on demand from the Dist. A.A.S.C. Coy. Requirements for 30 Inf. Bde. Gp. will be passed through Bde. H.Q.

13. SUPPLIES AND PETROL.

Reserve supplies and petrol will be dumped in the L.O.C. area. Issues to units will be made from these depots and from the Supply Depot, PORT Moresby.

14. WATER SUPPLY.

Arrangements are in hand to connect the maximum number of units to the town water supply. Other units will develop local supplies with the object of making themselves self-contained in this respect.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

15. SIGNALS.

Dist. Sigs. and 30 Inf. Bde. will liaise to provide intercommunication between all units.
Code names are being issued separately to all units.

**DISTRIBUTION**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>23 A.A. Bty.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Pte. Ingrs.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>E &amp; M. Sec. 1 A.Tps.Coy.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Dist. Sigs.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>P.I.B.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Sec. Int. Corps</td>
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<td>Coy. A.A.S.C.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Camp Hospital</td>
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<td>3 M. Amb.</td>
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<td>16 Ed. Hqs. Sec.</td>
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<td>Provost Pl.</td>
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<td>Postal Unit</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>13 Ed. Regt.</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>&quot;O&quot; Tp. 17 A/Tk. Bty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>7 Ed. Coy.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>30 Inf. Bde. Sigs. Sec.</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>39 Bn.</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>49 Bn.</td>
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<td>53 Bn.</td>
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**31 & 32 A.H.Q.**

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>33 N.O.I.C.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>R.A.A.F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Comdt.</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>C.R.E.</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>A.D.S. &amp; T.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>A.D.I.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>A.D.O.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>N.G.V.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>N.G. Area</td>
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</table>
**ORDER OF BATTLE**

**PORT FOWESBY CARRIAGE.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.Q. 8 L.D.</td>
<td>H.Q.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY ARTILLERY (H.Q. &amp; Pag Battery)</td>
<td>One 3.7 in. Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 A.A. Battery (Less A.A. L.G. Sec.)</td>
<td>One 3 in. Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fowesby Mixed Defences - Frt. Engineers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E &amp; H Section 1 A Troops Coy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>District Signals</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.I.Bn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 A.D. Sec Intelligence Corps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 A.D. Coy M.M.S.G.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 A.D. Bulk Rates Issue Petrol and Oil Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Field Ambulance</td>
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<tr>
<td>253 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>257 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>274 Dental Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>301 Dental Unit</td>
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<td>16 Field Hygiene Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 A.D. Ordnance Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Bde. Gp. Provost Platoon</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 A.D. District Accounts Office</td>
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<td>8 A.D. Postal Unit</td>
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<td>8 A.D. District Records Office</td>
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<td>District Stationery Depot.</td>
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<td>8 A.D. Graves Registration Sec.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BRIGADY GROUP.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Inf. Bde. Headquarters</td>
<td>A.I.F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Pd. Regiment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G Tp. 17 A/Tank Battery</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Pd. Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Pd. Regiment Signal Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Inf. Bde. Signal Section.</td>
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<td>39 Bn.</td>
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<td>49 Bn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>53 Bn.</td>
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**ATTACHED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.**

Coys. V.D.C. } Formed into Port Fowesby
Coys. R.A.A.F. Details } Composite Bn.

**TO TAKE EFFECT FROM 1200 HOURS 4th JANUARY 1942**
NG FORC E OF INST N No 41

ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMS

1. NG Force Op Instn No 25 of 18 Aug 42 is cancelled and the following re-allotment of duties will take effect from 1200 hrs 4 Nov.

2. The Deputy Signal Officer in Chief, Allied Land Forces, who is now in the area, will co-ordinate all ground comms in NG including RAN, Air Force and USA Forces.

3. The Deputy Signal Officer in Chief will generally supervise and control the first siting or changes in the location of the main wireless transmitters of all forces and services in NG to safeguard the interests of other services and forces where interference with existing channels may occur.

4. The Deputy Signal Officer in Chief will issue Signal Instns to all concerned when technical co-ordination of signal comms are necessary.

5. The CSO, NG Force, will control and supervise all comms of the field forces in NG and, where field forces are in the L of C Area, comms to L of C network exchanges or test points.

6. The CSO, NG L of C Area will control and supervise comms in the NG Base Areas. He will be responsible for:-

(i) Ground comms in port and dock transit areas;
(ii) Circuit requirements for RAN, 5th Air Force including RAAF, COSC and USA special units except internal circuits;
(iii) Coast watching and Air Warning network;
(iv) Ground comms for Base Depots and workshops;
(v) Fixed Signal Services of the Fortress;
(vi) Comm for AA Bdes and AA Searchlight installations;
(vii) Allotment of circuits or main trunks and distribution of permanent line routes to Field Force, RAN, Airforce, COSC and USA Forces;
(viii) Operation and maintenance of main trunks and trunk exchanges;
(ix) Technical liaison with RAN, Air Force, COSC and USA Forces.

7. Circuit requirements of Adv Ech GHQ will be met by CSO NG L of C Area.

8. Ack.

Issued at 2315 hrs

Brig GS NG Force

DISTRIBUTION (see over)
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<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
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<td>C-in-C</td>
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<td>7 Aust Div</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>GGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 US Div</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>BGS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILNEE FORCE</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>G(O)</td>
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<td>KANGA FORCE</td>
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<td>G(I)</td>
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<td>HQ AA Defences NG</td>
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PORT MORESBY
NG FORCET OPERATING INSTRUCTION No. 25

Allocation of Responsibilities

1. With reference to NG FORCE Op Instn No. 24, para 11, the following reallocation of duties to signal units will take place on arrival of 1 Aust Corps and 7 Aust Div Sig Units, on dates to be mutually arranged by CSO and Oomda Sig units concerned. The arrangements necessary for handing over between signal units concerned, will be supervised and controlled by CSO NG FORCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sigs</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sig Posts</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sigs NG FORCEx</td>
<td>Ground Comms in port and dock transit areas.</td>
<td>Incl wireless systems but excl internal comms in fwd areas unless specified in separate instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground Comms for RAN, RAAF, US Air Corps and US special units</td>
<td>KANGA FORCE Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground Comms for Base depots &amp; wk/shops</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed Signal services of Fortress</td>
<td>Incl exch &amp; Adm systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sigs AA Bde (Details)</td>
<td>Comms for AA Bde and AA searchlight installations</td>
<td>Main trunk requirements to be demanded through NG Dist Sigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sigs 1 Aust Corps</td>
<td>Ground Comms in L of C areas from excl KAGI (MYOLA LAKE) to excl serial 1.</td>
<td>Includes operation &amp; maintenance of exchanges and Sig offices at: 17 Mile, 12 Mile, 7 Mile, Wonga Base Area Corps HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sigs 7 Aust Div</td>
<td>Comm to L of C network exchanges. Formation direct lines and local comms in 7 Div HQ area. Comms in areas fwd of KAGI incl those to forward tps. In reserve for operations by 7 Aust Div</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Technical Co-ordination

Where, for technical reasons, or to provide for dual use and maintenance of channels, special directions are found necessary, these will be included in Signal Technical Instructions issued to all concerned by CSO NG FORCE.

3. ACK

Time of signature 2230 hrs

GS NG FORCE
NEW GUINEA FORCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATION.

in accordance with

N.G.F. OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 9 of 11 MAY 42.

Report on Japanese ground installations at NIVANI Is. in the DEBOYNE group, LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO.

Everything pertaining to military matters gave evidence of a very poorly trained unit. Much importance had been given to self-protection (slit-trenches) and very little to defensive positions (gun positions).

1. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

The Intelligence Section at NIVANI, if any, was of a very low standard. Wireless diagrams and instructions, belonging to a unit of ours, which was captured at NIVANI, were left lying in the corner of a shed. These papers contained information as to the working of our net work frequency, the "X" frequency.

2. WEAPON POSITIONS.

Two of these positions were constructed of coconut palm trunks about 4" ft. in length and standing upright. The trunks were let about 6 inches in the sand and were held together with pieces of 1/8 inches pine packing case timber. No effort had been made to fill in the gaps between the palms and in some places these gaps were 2 inches in width. The several rifle rests were also made of 1/8 inch pine and these extended about 6 inches above the coconut palms with a V cut in the top of them to hold the rifle. All the work on these positions was very flimsy and would have provided very little protection from small arms fire.

Another weapon pit was constructed of coconut palms, empty packing cases and sand bags filled with rubbish.

The three of these positions were all of the same design - a half circle in shape and facing seawards. No attempt had been made to form any protection from the rear.

3. SLIT TRENCHES.

There were three of these finished and two more under construction. The total length of each trench would be from 40 – 50 ft., 3 – 4 ft. deep and 2 ft. to 2 ft. 6 inches in width. The trenches changed direction about every 15 ft. The tops were covered over with heavy timber beams with coconut palms as planking and then sand bags on the very top, giving a total depth of overhead cover of approx. 3 ft.

4. BOMB DAMAGE FROM ALLIED A/C.

One building totally demolished and many craters around the others with only slight damage to them. Many palms were down and all the palms standing for at least 50 yds. from craters were shattered by fragments. Numerous craters in the sea.

A native report states that one bomb fell amongst three seaplanes on the beach and when the dirt had cleared there were no planes left.

[Signature]
Instances have been reported of wireless equipment being used in such a manner as to endanger the security of the network. Unauthorized conversations in English, Kootan and Fidgin English have been carried on between various stations describing such things as the positions of stations, personnel on stations and movements of vessels. It can be assumed that enemy listening posts have been established, and that all this information is received by them. The results of these conversations can prove disastrous.

The following rules will therefore be strictly adhered to:

1. No private conversations whatever will be held between stations. No messages will be passed between stations without permission first being obtained from the Control Station VIG.

2. **CALL SIGNS**

   The use of Call Signs coupled with the identity of a station must cease. In many cases 'alternative' call signs have been issued and eventually all stations will have them. Where the alternative call signs have been issued, it is of supreme importance that the station's identity be NOT linked with the Call Sign.

3. **SECURITY OF COMMUNICATIONS**

   The ciphers used on those networks are of a comparatively simple type, and would present little difficulty to expert cryptographers if intercepted. Even complicated ciphers cannot be used owing to long encoding and decoding times. For v.r. the codes can be made quite effective if care is given to the wording of the messages. Direct references to places or personnel should be avoided, if the meaning can be otherwise made clear, taking into consideration the addresses, knowledge of local conditions and contents of previous messages.

4. All reports of aircraft proceeding away from PORT will be sent in code immediately, Plain language will NOT be used.

5. **REPORTS OF VESSELS**

   No information concerning the movements of vessels will be passed between stations, unless authority to do so has been obtained from the N.C.I.C. Fort Teesy. All reports of movements of vessels must be sent in code.

6. **PRIVATE OF MESSAGES**

   Messages must be made as brief as possible. The shorter the time a station is on the air, the less the chance of enemy interception.

   The importance of these instructions cannot be over-emphasized. Many lives, and the success of our operations, can be endangered by thoughtless use of 'Wireless Channels.'

   **C.P. West, Capt.**

   **Cdr. R. E. Col.**

   E. 8 K.D. etc...

**DISTRIBUTION LIST:**

- COPY Nos. 1-30: All stations of Coast-Watching Air-earning Net-work.
- 31: N.C.I.C.
- 32: Air-Observer Corps R.A.A.F.
- 33: C.B.O.
- 34: P.A.
- 35: War Diary
- 36: War Diary
- 37: P.O.
- 38: G Admin
- 39: A.
- 40: A.
- 41: A.
AMENDMENT No. 1 TO H.M.D. OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 6

1. Delete all par 5

2. Re-number par 6 as par 5 accordingly

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

COPY No.   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13
          30 Inf. Bde
          3 Aust. Lt. A.A. Bty
          25 A.A. Bty
          R.A.A.F. PORT MORESBY
          N.O.I.O.C.
          A.Q.
          G. ADM.
          G.H.Q.
          G.H.Q.
          WAR DIARY
          WAR DIARY
          FILE
          FILE

Lt-Col
General Staff H.M.D. FORCE
OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 5.

1. A party consisting of one sec of the Ind Pl PORT MORESBY and personnel of L. of C units will embark from PORT MORESBY at 0800 hrs Sun 29 Mar 42. on the M.V. H & S. The remainder of the pl will embark on the M.V. RASPUTIN at 0800 hrs Mon 30 Mar 42.

2. Operational roles of the pl will be:
   (a) To form a base at KUDJERU from which patrols and the air observation can operate.
   (b) To prevent any enemy movement South from WAU.
   (c) To contact and maintain touch with H.Q., N.G.V.R. in the vicinity of BULOL.

3. Route. By the M.V. H & S to the mouth of the LAKEKAMU RIVER where the journey will be broken and continued by canoe up the LAKEKAMU RIVER. On arrival at BULLDOG the journey will be continued overland to KUDJERU, Native carriers and guides will be supplied by P.A.U.

4. Base. The pl will operate using KUDJERU as a base. Stores will be drawn from O.C. Base, Maj. STANSTFIELD.

5. Orders. The pl will carry out its operational role under orders from OPS H.Q., PORT MORESBY. Communication will be as far as possible by wireless.

6. Stores and transport of the pl will be arranged by A.A.Q.M.G.

Lt.-Col.
GENERAL STAFF & M.D.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No I & 2 Lic. HOWARD.

" 3 " A.A. & R.M.G.
" 4 " C. Adm.
" 5 " O.C. P.A.U.
" 6 " N.O.I.C.
" 7 " R.A.A.F. PORT MORESBY
" 8 " H.Q. N.G.V.R.
" 9 " O.C. N.G.A.U.
" 10 " 30 Inf Bde.
" II & I2 A.H.Q.
" I3 & I4 War Diary
" I5 " File.
OPERATION INSTRUCTION:

Ref: Map:-- Port Moresby 2" = 1 mile.

INFORMATION:
1. Air raids may be expected at any time.

INTENTION:
2. To take precautionary measures by imposing a "Black Out."

METHOD:
3. The siren will sound at 2300 hrs. 12 Dec.41.
4. "Lighting restrictions" will operate from that hour onwards for the remainder of the night.
5. Each subsequent night at 2300 hrs. "Lighting restrictions" will operate.
6. The siren will NOT be sounded at 2300 hrs. on these subsequent nights.
7. Action will be taken by G.Os. units and Os.C. sub-units to ensure these instructions are known by all ranks under their command.

INTERCOM:
8. The sounding of the Siren on any other occasion or at any other time indicates that "Lighting restrictions" are immediately operative and that enemy aeroplanes are operating in PORT MORESBY.

Lt. Col.,
G.S.O. I 8 E.D.

DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No. 1 H.Q. 8 H.D. Copy No. 11 A.A.S.C. Copy No. 21 D.O.
" " 2 Paga Bty. " 12 A.A.C.C. " 22 A.A.N.S.
" " 4 "47th A/T. " 14 D.R.C. " 24 R.A.A.F.
" " 6 Fort. Sigs. " 16 Staty. " 26 L.D.(Govt)
" " 7 49th En. " 17 Education " 27 V.D.C.
" " 8 P.I.Dn. " 18 301 Den. " 28 "Jar Diary
" " 9 9th Fort. Coy. " 19 Cipher " 29 File
" " 10 "I" Sec. " 20 Op. Command. 30 -32 Spares

A undeniable.

Operation Instruction No. 2:

INTERCOM: Para 9 - delete the words "One green flare" and substitute "one green flare to be used ONLY in emergency if lamp communication is not immediately effective."
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Receipt for SECURITY Documents.

Issued to H.O.C. Date 12th Dec 1941

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following Security Documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official No. on document</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Copy Nos.</th>
<th>Total number of copies</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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NOTE.—1. When a Security document is identifiable by use of an official number, the title will not be inserted, and the receipt will be returned in a single unregistered envelope.

2. When a Security document bears no official number, the title will be shown and the receipt returned by registered post.

(Signed)

(Appointment)

Date 1941...

(To be completed and returned immediately)

To H.Q. 87th M.D.

(Headquarters Issuing Document.)

6 MAR 42

FILE

PORT MORESBY AREA

EMOLITION - INSTALLATIONS, PORT MORESBY AREA

This schedule of demolitions to be effected by units under your own control, in the event of the occupation of areas in which dumps, installations, buildings etc., are located. Preparations for these demolitions are to be made immediately and will be completed not later than 1900 hrs., 6 Mar 42. A report will be submitted to this H.Q. when all preparations are complete.

2. Personnel detailed to demolish dumps, petrol and ammunition dumps will act under orders of local unit commanders.

3. In all areas, if the position becomes critical in any locality and the order to demolish has not been received from the direction authority, C.O., C.O.1's or officers of higher appointment in that locality will be responsible for the execution of the demolitions.

4. It is essential that no useful material, instructions etc., should be allowed to fall into enemy hands intact. Officers mentioned in Para. 3 above will determine what to do within their own area and will make themselves conversant with methods of demolition to be effected.

5. It is the responsibility of all C.O.'s and C.O.1's of Units to ensure that no unit vehicle or equipment should fall into enemy hands, unless it has been rendered useless.

Vehicles should only be abandoned when it is impossible to do otherwise when following measures will be taken:

1. Short Engine and Rocs
2. Drain Radiator
3. Drain Sump
4. Break water jacket with hammer etc.
5. When engine has seized, break as many parts as possible with hammer etc. and set fire to petrol tank.

6. Units will order explosives from the 6½ mile Magazine or direct from ordnance dumps. This issue will be co-ordinated by C.O., I.A.

Issued at __________ hrs.

6 Mar 42.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1: The Artillery
Copy No. 2: R.A. A.Bty.
Copy No. 3: C.O.1.
Copy No. 4: M.R.E.
Copy No. 5: M.R. Engns.
Copy No. 6: 1 A. Tyg. C.O.
Copy No. 7: V. M.C. Corps.
Copy No. 8: 20 Inf. Bde.
Copy No. 9: D.A. D. C.O.
Copy No. 10: D.A. N.S.
Copy No. 11: D.A. D. 2.
Copy No. 12: A.H.Q.

Copy No. 13: M.O. I.C.
Copy No. 15: Comdt.
Copy No. 16: Asst.
Copy No. 17: Admin.
Copy No. 18: War Diary
Copy No. 19: "
Copy No. 20: File
Copy No. 21: "
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<th>Demolition Task No.</th>
<th>Task</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>All R.A.N. Buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>All Water Craft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>